Volunteering a Public Service: An Experimental Investigation
Marc Bilodeau, Indiana University - Purdue University at Indianapolis
Jason Childs, McMaster University
Stuart Mestelman, McMaster University
Draft of 17 April 2003
Abstract
In some public goods environments it may be advantageous for heterogeneous
groups to be coordinated by a single individual who will bear private costs
for acting as the leader while enabling each member of the group to achieve
maximum potential gains. This environment is modeled as a war of
attrition in which everyone is tempted to wait for someone else to volunteer.
The hypotheses that individuals use backward induction, rely on a focal
point, or act as if they are playing against nature to determine their
actions are evaluated using the data from a laboratory environment.
Laboratory results provide more support for the play-against-nature hypothesis
than the others.
Send Correspondence to:
Stuart Mestelman
Department of Economics
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4
Canada
e-mail: mestelma@mcmaster.ca
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Last updated: Aug 14, 2001