Order of Play, Forward Induction , and Presentation Effects in Two-Person
Games
R. Andrew Muller,
Department of Economics, McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
mullera@mcmaster.ca
Asha Sadanand,
Department of Economics, University of Guelph,
Guelph, Ontario, Canada
asadanand@uoguelph.ca
Abstract
We investigate the effects of order-of-play (simultaneous, unobserved sequential
and fully observed sequential play) and form of presentation (extensive
vs. normal) in three simple two person games: battle-of-the-sexes with
and without outside option and a three strategy game which differentiates
between virtual observability (VO) and iterated elimination of dominated
strategies as principles of equilibrium selection. VO predicts that knowledge
of the order of play alone will affect the distribution of strategies chosen.
We contrast this with the predictions of iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. We report results from 1800 one-shot games conducted in 6 sessions
with 120 subjects and analysed as panel data. The form of presentation
strongly affects the distribution of outcomes and strategies. Information
about order of play shifts the distribution of strategies away from the
distribution in simultaneous play and towards the distribution in fully
observed play, especially in the less complicated games presented in normal.
Order-of-play effects are less evident as complexity of the game increases.
Extensive form presentation appears to induce sequential thinking even
in simultaneously played games.
Send Correspondence to:
R. Andrew Muller,
Department of Economics,
McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ont. Canada L8S 4M4
e-mail: mullera@mcmaster.ca
fax: (905) 521-8232
tel: (905) 525-9140 x 23831
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Last updated: Oct 7, 2001