Shirking for Dollars: Regulating the Exploitation of a Common Pool Resource
Stephan Schott
Carleton University
Neil Buckley, Stuart Mestelman, and R. Andrew Muller
McMaster University
Draft of November 4th 2002
Abstract
This paper provides an experimental testing ground for an equal output-sharing
partnership approach as a common pool resource (CPR) management instrument.
It examines the behaviour of resource users in output-sharing partnerships
of different sizes, and evaluates the impact of partnership size and the
way partners are assigned on effort (extraction) levels. Experimental
results are very close to Nash predictions, and confirm that group size
significantly affects resource user's effort supply. The first best
solution is achieved when resource users are privately extracting from
the CPR and equally sharing their output with the socially optimal number
of partners. The way partners are allocated (randomly or with the
same partners over 15 periods) does not significantly affect aggregate
effort contributions. Income distribution, however, is more
equitable with random allocation of partners than with fixed partners.
Links to: [ Paper
in pdf | Appendices]
Send Correspondence to:
Stuart Mestelman
Department of Economics
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4M4
Canada
e-mail: mestelma@mcmaster.ca
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