Andrew Muller
Michelle Vickers
Department of Economics
McMaster University
Hamilton, Ont. L8S 4M4
This draft: June 4, 1996
We replicate and extend an experiment due to Walker and Gardner by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the Gardner and Walker result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. Face-to-face communication significantly increases mean efficiency. Three groups of five sustain a "good" Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a "good"equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication.
Keywords: Common Property, Experiments, Communication, Probabilistic Destruction
JEL Classifications: Q22, C92
Correspondence to:
Andrew Muller,
Department of Economics, McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ont. Canada L8S 4M4
e-mail: mullera@mcmaster.ca phone: (905) 523-7265 fax: (905) 521-8232