On Rent
by Alfred Marshall

Economic Journal
vol. 3, 1893


    It has been said that man's progress in the knowledge of the
world in which he lives may be measured by the extent to which he
has been able to see the Many in the one and the one in the Many.
Judged by this standard, the modern developments of economic
science in relation to rent indicate progress. For we are
learning that what is commonly called the rent of land is really
a very complex thing made up of many elements, some of which
differ more widely from one another than it, as a whole, differs
from profits, or than some elements of it differ from wages. And
as the obverse of this movement, those elements in rent, in
profits, and in wages, which are similar to one another, are
being drawn together, and the particular laws which govern them
are being subsumed under more general laws common to all. In many
countries - simultaneously people of widely different tempers,
and of divergent aims in social and political matters, have been
developing the same kind of analysis. They sometimes make much of
small differences; but they have attained independently broad
results which so far agree as to justify the hope that further
progress will not destroy, but develop them; just as recent
progress has developed Ricardo's work; and has pruned away only
the dogmas deduced from it by followers of a different stamp of
mind from his. 
    It is especially difficult for persons, who learnt Ricardian
doctrines early in this century, to adjust themselves to the new
mode of thought, and to realise how fully the living spirit of
Ricardo's work has been freed from the encumbrance of dead
dogmas. They think they find inconsistent concessions and naive
admissions in work that claims to be a direct development of
Ricardo's ideas, but does not harmonise and was not intended to
harmonise with Ricardian dogma. The new work seems to them a
chaos, and they protest. 
    The most important of such protests is contained in the Duke
of Argyll's Unseen Foundations of Society. He writes as a critic
of modern as well as classical doctrine; but his own studies seem
to have brought him nearer to the newer path than he is aware. He
has a remarkable practical knowledge of the modern history of
agriculture; he is in the first rank both as a student and as a
statesman; he is a vigorous disputant, but he is too keen a
thinker to be an unfair or ungenerous one. He undertakes, as his
title page tells us, 'an examination of the fallacies and
failures of economic science due to neglected elements;' and this
calls for some answer from adherents of the new thought, however
strongly they may hold that life is too short to allow much time
for criticism and controversy. 
    I propose therefore to attempt to gather together shortly the
chief results of modern analysis as applied to that problem of
Rent and its relation to Value which lies at the centre of his
criticisms. I shall not attempt to break new ground. For brevity,
I shall speak only in my own name, without any reference to
authority; and shall make no apology for making frequent
references to my Principles of Economics where I can save space
by doing so. 
    The Duke of Argyll objects to Ricardo's doctrine of rent and
its modern developments on the grounds that they treat the rent
of land as an isolated thing, instead of as one particular form
of hire. But on this, and several minor points his opinions are
not inconsistent with modern analysis as I understand it. There
are however, other points on which we appear to differ in
substance; though it is possible that we misunderstand one
another a little, and that even here our differences are really
less than they appear. Among these points are the character of
what, in spite of the Duke's protests, I must call by the short
name of 'marginal production'; the relations in which this stands
to the price of the whole produce; and lastly, that vague and
perhaps misleading sentence - Rent does not enter into cost of
production. 
    I will begin by setting out my own position as to rent: and
afterwards consider how it is related to the Duke's position,
quoting what I think are the key-passages, in his own words. 

    The rent of land appears to differ in degree rather than in
kind from the net income yielded by other agents of production,
the supply of which may be taken as fixed for the time under
discussion, whether that be long or short. This keynote is struck
in my first preface:-  'The greater part, though not the whole,
of the distinction between Rent and Interest on capital, turns on
the length of the period which we have in view. That which is
rightly regarded as interest on 'free' or 'floating' capital, or
on net-investments of capital, is more properly treated as a sort
of rent - a quasi-rent it is called below - on old investments of
capital. And there is no sharp line of division between floating
capital and that which has been sunk for a special branch of
production, nor between new and old investments of capital; each
group shades into the other gradually, and thus even the rent of
land is seen, not as a thing by itself, but as the leading
species of a large genus, though indeed it has peculiarities of
its own which are vital from the point of view of theory as well
as practice.'
    Producer's Surplus is a convenient name for the genus of
which the rent of land is the leading species. Producer's Surplus
is the excess of the gross receipts which a producer gets for any
of his commodities over their prime cost; that is, over that
extra cost which he incurs in order to produce those particular
things, and which he could have escaped if he had not produced
them.
    Now the question how great a part of his expenses he must
enter in these prime costs, and how much he must deduct from his
selling price before he calculates his surplus, depends entirely
on how far he looks ahead; or in other word, on whether he is
making his calculations for a long period or only for a short.
    If he is looking only a little way ahead, and is not afraid
of spoiling his market; if he has got all his apparatus ready and
standing idle; then a new order coming in will give him a surplus
over its direct cost to him, consisting of the whole price which
he receives after deducting the special outlay for raw material,
for extra wages, and for wear and tear of plant involved in
filling up the order, But suppose him to be looking far ahead,
&nd proposing to extend his factory so as to do an increased
business; he does not then reckon any price as affording him a
real surplus unless, after allowing for all risks, it will yield
him, in addition to prime costs, sufficient to give normal
profits on all his outlay for material, plant, and for building
up his business connection, together with charges for
depreciation though the lapse of time, and for once and other
general expenses, which are not reckoned in the prime, or special
and direct, costs of filling up any particular order.
    The conditions which govern the amount of this surplus and
its relations to value, depend not so much on the nature of the
industry as on the period of time for which the calculation is
made. But a short period for one class of industry may be a long
one for another; just as the age of youth for a dog is shorter
than for an elephant. 
    Since human life changes rapidly this difference may give
rise to important practical consequences, and in fact it often
does so. It is reasonable to suppose that the manufacturing plant
existing at any time was made or bought by its owners, or
immediate predecessors, in anticipation of economic conditions
very much like the present. To interfere with their action, or
with the income they derive from the plant, might be for some
special reason necessary, just, and wise; but it would certainly
be an interference with definite expectations, and would
perceptibly diminish the inducements acting on other people to
provide similar plant and develop manufacturing industries in
general. 
    Land in a new country, but only there, resembles
manufacturing plant from this point of view - The settler engages
in a risky occupation open to all; and one of the chief motives
to his exertion is the hope of becoming the possessor of title
deeds to land that will rapidly rise in value. A tax on any part
of his gains, present or in the near future, would instantly
discourage the enterprise of himself and others, and make itself
felt strongly in the supply and therefore in the price of
agricultural produce. Accordingly, the whole of his income is to
be regarded as earnings and profits, or at most as a quasi-rent
and not as rent proper: although even in a new country a
far-seeing statesman will feel a greater responsibility to future
generations when legislating as to land than as to other forms of
wealth; and even there land must be regarded as a thing by itself
from the economic as well as from the ethical point of view.(1*)
    I admit that the soil of old countries is often as much an
artificial product as those pieces of earth which have been
arranged into brick walls, and that a great deal of it has
yielded but a poor return to the vast capital sunk in it even
within recent times. And doubtless the returns to new capital
applied to the land are for the greater part like the gains of a
settler in a new country: a special tax on them would check the
supply of produce and be transferred partly to the consumer, in
spite of the importation of foreign produce. They are but
quasi-rents. 
    on the other hand the soil receives an income of heat and
light, of rain and air, which is independent of man's efforts;
most of its advantages of situation - which are especially
important in the case of urban land - are independent of the
action of its immediate owners; and a special tax on these would
not much affect production directly. I regard the income derived
from them as true rents for all practical purposes. 
    This brings me to the Duke's complaint (2*) that I underrate
the importance of security. That is a large and grave subject on
which I have never yet said much. I do not think there is a wide
difference between us. But it is true that I care for security
for property chiefly as a means to security for liberty, and I
might be willing to give up a very little of it, if necessary, in
order to increase a great deal the security of well-deserving
persons against extreme want. At present we have not got security
in the full sense of the term; and we cannot preserve what we
have not got. I agree, however, that a violent confiscation even
of rent proper would give so great a shock to general security as
to be a blunder from every point of view. it would discourage
both accumulation and production even more than a moderate
special tax on any kind of profits or quasi-rents. 
    But to return from this semi-ethical question to our
analysis. Speaking broadly the price of anything and the amount
of it that is produced are determined together by the general
relations of demand and supply; the price just covers the
expenses of production of that part of this amount which is
raised at the greatest disadvantage, and every other part yields
a surplus above its direct cost. This surplus is a result and not
a cause of the selling price. For the price is determined by the
relations of supply and demand; and while, of course, the surplus
does not affect the demand, so neither does it affect the supply,
since it is yielded only by a part of the produce which would be
produced even for a lower price.
    In other words, there is a part of the produce which is on
the margin of doubt as to whether it will be supplied or not, and
the decision to supply it or not will affect price; but this part
of the produce yields no surplus. The surplus does not enter into
its cost of production; that is to say the surplus does not enter
into that cost of production that gives the level at which the
whole supply is held fixed. And this is what we mean by the
phrase: producer's surplus does not enter into cost of
production.' it is one of those short phrases which do not
explain themselves, and are easily misunderstood. But it has an
important meaning; and it is applicable to many different kinds
of income. 
    If this surplus is derived from natural advantages which
became private property in forgotten ages, there are no practical
problems for which it need be regarded as entering into cost of
production, or therefore into price. There are not many such
problems, if it is derived from any natural advantages, which
were brought into use long ago, or again from the improvement of
the environment through the growth of population or other causes
in which the owners played no direct part.(3*)
    If the surplus is derived from buildings or other
improvements which can be quickly made, but last long, it does
not enter into price for short periods, but does enter for
moderately long periods; and it is best described as a quasi-rent
when there is no special mention of the period under discussion. 
    But on the other hand, the income derived from such machinery
and other plant as is both quickly made and quickly destroyed
enters into cost for all but very short periods. It is therefore
best described generally as profits; though when very short
periods come under discussion, it has to be regarded as a
quasi-rent. 
    This account of the relations between rent and value is
independent of the incidents of land tenure. For modern analysis
regards these incidents as holding but a secondary role in the
fundamental problems of economics. The true nature of the rent of
land, the relations in which it stands to the incomes earned by
other agents of production, have been disguised by its not being
generally worked by its owner as manufacturing plant is. up to a
certain point indeed the progress of the theory of rent in Great
Britain was assisted by the fact not wholly accidental that,
within recent times at least, the broad line of division between
the landlord and the farmer has assigned to the former most of
those improvements which bear fruit slowly, and to the latter
most of those which bear fruit quickly. The whole of the farmer's
net income is therefore as a rule to be regarded as profits
except for very short periods; while the greater part of the
landlord's income is to be regarded partly as a rent proper for
all periods, and partly as a quasi-rent for all except very -long
periods; and, consequently, Adam Smith and his followers, while
discussing the incidents of English land tenure, were impelled
towards an analysis of value, the ultimate results of which were
quite hidden from them, and have not been fully developed even
yet. But we have now got far enough to strip away the accidental
from the essential, to see that the central problem of rent is
superior to all incidents of land tenure; that these incidents,
important as they are, and fascinating as is the interest which
attaches to their history, belong to a later chapter of economic
analysis. 
    The producer's surplus, earned by the land and improvements
in it, accrues to the landowner if he cultivates it himself; if
he does not, then it accrues to him and his tenants, regarded as
a firm engaged in the business of cultivation. This holds true
whatever be the division which custom or law or contract may have
arranged between them with regard to their several shares of the
cost of cultivation 'on the one hand, and the fruits of the
cultivation on the other; and from the modern point of view the
general analysis of rent proceeds on the assumption: that the
cultivation of the land is undertaken by its owner.' This
includes two facts which the Duke of Argyll seems to think that
economists have ignored. One is that when the owner takes a farm
into his own lands, it is not considered: to pay,' unless it
yields as a surplus over the immediate expenses of working it,
its rent, that is: the estimated price of the hire of it.' (4*)
And the other is that the landlord who invests his capital in
improvements has as much right to be called an 'enterprising
undertaker' as the tenant farmer has.(5*) 
    The surplus which any piece of land actually yields is
governed by the markets, and by the course of cultivation
actually followed by landlord and tenant together. That part of
this surplus which the tenant is called on to pay as rent is
however not that net income which he actually does earn (in
addition to profits on his own capital, and earnings of his own
industry). It is generally that which a farmer of normal ability,
enterprise, and command over capital, may be expected to earn;
but the result of accidents chiefly of a local and personal
character, it is sometimes more and sometimes less than this.(6*)
    And here something may be said on the Law of Diminishing
Return and its application to rent. The returns are always
supposed to be such as nature will yield to successive doses of
capital and labour, applied not by a cultivator of infinite
intelligence, skill, enterprise, and command over capital, but by
the ordinary cultivator of the place and time; just as the cost
of production of cloth or anything else is estimated on the
supposition that it is made not by a person of extraordinary
genius, but by the ordinary manufacturer of the place and time.
In the discussion of the Law of Diminishing Return we cannot go
back to prehistoric times and take account of all the capital
applied to the land. We go back as far as may be convenient, and
reckon the applications of capital and the return to them for
long periods or for short, as we like. We can adapt our argument
(or our diagrams) to short periods for which the capital invested
by the landlord is reckoned with the natural richness of the soil
as yielding rent; or to long periods for which a part or the
whole of this capital is classed with the tenant's capital as
yielding profits. The treatment by Ricardo's method of
arithmetical examples, or by the more powerful modern method of
diagrams, is elastic and adaptable to almost every kind of
problem which is brought to light by commissioners investigating
the: depression of agriculture,' or the need for further
'Compensations for Improvements,' amid all the varieties of local
customs and economic surroundings. 
    Some charges which the Duke brings against the forms of
modern economic analysis, may here be answered. He objects to
such terms as: final utility,' 'marginal production,' etc., as:
appropriated to some scrappy conception.' Frankly I accept that
description, and do not regard it as one of reproach. These terms
are used to enable ordinary readers to get the chief advantages
which mathematicians derive from their training in the analysis
of the laws of continuous growth.(7*) And after a little trial
and error, at the hands of two generations of workers, they have
reached a form which experience shows enables them to render
great service to the student. Science, like machinery, must begin
with scrappy operations. Analysis is nothing else but breaking up
a complex conception into scraps, so that they may be easily
handled and thoroughly investigated. Afterwards the scraps have
to be put together again, and considered in relation to many
other complex notions, and the intricately interwoven facts of
life.(8*)
    Science must study facts, ascertain which of them are
representative and normal, and then analyse, and reason about
normal conditions, at first within a narrow range; and
afterwards, as knowledge increases, giving a wider range to these
normal conditions and thus becoming at once more complex and
nearer the actual facts of life. But it can never finish off a
problem for practical purposes; the finishing touches must always
be given by common sense, as the products of even the finest
machinery need to be finished off by handicraft. Scientific
analyses, like the operations of machinery, are in their first
attempts always clumsy and often a little ridiculous. They are,
however, changing the face of the world: because their progress
is cumulative throughout the whole life of the race, while each
man's common sense, like his skill in handicraft, dies with him. 
    We may now pass to the graver charges which the Duke brings
against Ricardo's theory of value and its modern developments. Of
course he is able to make some good verbal points against
Ricardo; for no one denies that Ricardo's phrases are slovenly,
and that they must be interpreted before they are defended.(9*)
In particular, we must supply that allowance for the element of
time which a careful reading shows to have scarcely ever been
absent from his mind, though he seldom gave signs of it in his
words. 
    The central sentence of the Duke's attack runs:(10*) -- With
every possible explanation and excuse, the broad and unqualified
assertion of Ricardo remains one of the monstrosities of
pretended science - that the price of all commodities is
regulated by the cost of the worst and most expensive agency
employed in its production. The truth of the exact opposite
proposition is a matter of continual and familiar experience and
observation. We all know, and many of us must have suffered from
the fact, that the opening of some cheaper and easier method of
production so lowers the exchangeable value, or price, of some
given commodity in which we deal, that those who may have before
derived a large profit from its production can only thenceforward
continue to produce it at a profit comparatively low. In all such
cases, add they are numberless in commercial life, the
exchangeable value of every article or commodity is always seen
to be regulated by the best and cheapest, and not by the worst,
or dearest mechanism of production.' He gives an instance in
which the price of a commodity (nickel) was lowered by the
discovery of richer sources of supply. The poorer mines, having
to accept the lower price which was forced on them by the richer
mines, yielded lower returns to their owners. 
    He makes a good verbal point as to the phrase 'is regulated
by'; for no doubt the cost of production at the margin cannot be
the sole and ultimate regulator of price; because the margin
itself is determined by the general relations of demand and
supply. But he seems to hold that 'regulated' can mean nothing
more here than 'ascertained'; and that the marginal cost merely
supplies one particular way of calculating the price. I hold that
it does more than that.
    Ricardo's general position appears to be this. Market
fluctuations of value are the results of the pressure of
temporary (and I some cases local) demand against temporary (and
in some cases local) supply. The supply consists mainly of the
stocks actually in the market; with more or less reference to
'future' supplies, and not without some influence of trade
combinations.(11*) But the current supply is in itself the result
of the action of producers in the past; this action has been
mainly determined by their comparing the prices which they expect
to get for their goods with the expenses to which they will be
put in producing them. The range of expenses of which they take
account, will depend on whether they are merely considering the
extra expenses of certain extra production with their existing
plant, or are considering whether to lay down new plant for the
purpose. But in any case it will be the general rule that that
portion of the supply, which can be most easily produced, will be
produced unless the price is expected to be very low. Every
increase in the price expected will, as a rule, induce some
people who would not otherwise have produced anything, to produce
a little; while those who have produced something for the lower
price, probably produce more for the higher price.(12*)
    The producers who are in doubt whether to produce anything at
all, may be said to lie altogether on the margin of production
(or, if they are agriculturists, on the margin of cultivation).
Their decision exerts some influence on supply and therefore on
price. But as a rule they are very few in number; there may be
none in this position; and anyhow their action is far less
important than that of the great body of producers who will
produce something whatever he the price (within certain limits),
but watch the price to see how far it is worth their while to
extend their production. That part of their production with
regard to which such persons are on the margin of doubt as to
whether it is worth while for them to produce it at the price, is
to be included together with that of the persons who are in doubt
whether to produce at all; the two together constitute the
marginal production at that price. 
    Now I hold that the point of Ricardo's doctrine is to he
sought in the fact that the cost of production of the marginal
produce can be ascertained (theoretically at least)(13*) from the
circumstances of the margin, without reasoning in a circle, and
that the cost of production of other parts of the produce cannot.
For other parts yield a rent or a quasi-rent, or both; and these
are determined not by the circumstances of production of the
parts in question, but by the price of the whole produce. The
costs of production of these parts cannot be reckoned up without
counting in the corresponding rents and quasi-rents; and
therefore the price of the commodity cannot be deduced from them
without reasoning in a circle. This is what I take Ricardo's
doctrine to mean; and it seems to me fertile in important
results. 
    Another aspect of the same truth is that the income earned by
machinery and other plant already in existence is not any given
percentage on their cost of production, but is a quasi-rent
determined by the value of what they produce. If they are of
obsolete fashion, this quasi-rent is small. But whether it is
large or small, this value is found by capitalising their
quasi-rent, and if we were then to turn round, and say that their
quasi-rent would return a certain rate of interest on their value
we should be reasoning in a circle.(14*) It was then completely
in accordance with Ricardo's principles, that when richer
supplies of nickel were discovered the price fell to the level of
the marginal cost of production under the new relations of demand
and supply, and that the net return yielded by the Duke's old
mines fell in consequence.(15*)
    Attention has just been called to the fact that the marginal
production is not to he sought only in places and in businesses
which have no differential advantages for production. For every
producer, whether well-placed or ill-placed, whether cultivating
rich land or rentless land, comes to some point at which he is on
the margin of doubt whether to go further or not. That shows he
thinks any further production would not increase the net surplus,
which he gets from his differential advantage; and such
production would therefore be marginal. I hold therefore that
Ricardo's theory of rent and his deductions from it in no way
depend on the existence of rentless land; but the Duke referring
(16*) to a previous statement of mine to this effect, says: -
'Thus we see that the Ricardian argument is defended on the
ground that it is entirely independent of facts.' No: it is
independent only of the accident whether there happens to be any
rentless land in the neighbourhood. A statement with regard to
the manner in which fish breathe, which claims to apply to all
(true) fish, including trout, cannot be described as 'independent
of facts,' on the ground that it is independent of the question
whether there happen to be any trout in the stream which is under
discussion.(17*)
    The chief remaining attack by the Duke traverses part of the
same ground as the last. He says that rent is only one kind of
hire, and therefore must enter into cost of production as other
kinds of hire do. I admit that it is a kind of hire, and I say
that relatively to short periods many kinds of hire do not enter
into cost of production. Now, strangely enough, the Duke takes
account of the element of time, just as I should, when he is
establishing his premiss: but in applying his premiss he ignores
it, and then we no longer agree. 
    He has to meet the argument that the rent of land is marked
off from all other kinds of income by the fact that land: is a
thing of which the supply is limited, and cannot be increased by
man's action.' And he contends that the supply of other things
also available at any place is also limited for the time. He
says:(18*) 'It is true that if I want to hire a farm, and if the
owner won't let it to me at a price which I think to be its
value, I cannot say to him that I can make another farm at a
lower rent. But it is equally true that if I want to hire a boat
or a sewing machine, or a steam engine, or a horse or a cow, and
if the owner charges for the hire of such articles more than I
think they are worth, I cannot practically say to him that I can
build a boat for myself, or make a sewing machine, or a
steam-engine, or breed for myself a horse or a cow. All of these
are things which can be multiplied by man's action. But at any
given time and place they are as entirely out of the reach of
multiplication by individual men as the acres of a farm.
Practically, therefore, everything we can either buy or hire, is
strictly limited in quantity by conditions, which are for the
time at least, and perhaps for ever, insuperable to every
individual buyer or hirer; and in this respect the price we pay
for the purchase or for the hire of land cannot be differentiated
in principle, or as regards its origin and cause, from the price
we pay for the hire of any other article whatever.'
    So far well. He introduces the limiting words 'for the time'
always at the critical place, and is so far quite in agreement
with Ricardo. But he drops these limiting words when he proceeds
to his attack on Ricardo. He says:(19*) 'The hire of anything
which is hired at all is, of course, measured by its excess of
value over another thing of the same kind. Thus, the pony or
donkey which a costermonger may hire to draw his cart may be
either a young and strong pony or donkey capable of much work,
which well repays its keep and a considerable hire.' As I should
say, its work yields a considerable surplus or quasi-rent above
the prime cost of that work. He goes on: 'Or it may be an old and
feeble pony or donkey which just pays for its keep and no more,
or so much more as to be a mere nominal amount for hire. in this
case the value of the efficient pony or donkey, and the hire the
costermonger has to pay for it, may be said to be the excess of
the value of that animal over the value of the animal which is so
weak as to fetch no hiring value at all. But what is the use of
saying this?' And again:(20*) 'The mere isolation of one
particular case of lending and of hiring from all the other
innumerable cases of the same transactions, must of necessity be,
in itself, a copious source of fallacy. It essentially consists
in, and depends upon the greatest of all failures in science, -
the failure to recognise identity of principle and of law, under
superficial diversities of form. The fundamental importance
attached to the mere half-truth that the rent of land is, in each
particular case, predominately the result or consequence of the
price of its produce, and conversely that rent does not directly
enter as a cause into the price of produce, is an excellent
example of this kind of fallacy. It is true of the price of the
hire of the land, only, as we have seen, in the same sense in
which it is equally true of the hire of labouring men, or of the
hire of horses, or of the hire of implements; so that the
isolation of the one particular case of the hire of the land from
other cases of hire, which are equally incidents in the same
production is essentially a failure to distinguish between the
essential and the accidental, which is the worst of scientific
errors.'
    The reader has now the two positions before him. I submit
that modern analysis does not 'isolate' the rent of land, but
says that what is true of the hire or net income earned by ponies
for a short time, is true of the hire of or net income earned by
houses and permanent improvements in land for a long time; and
that it is true of rent proper in an old country, and especially
in the towns of an old country for a much longer time. The
limiting words 'for the time' have disappeared from the later
stages of the Duke's discussion of the hire of ponies, and I will
not consent to part with them. That is the difference between us.

    In my view, the hire of ponies, like that of land, is
governed for a time by the value of the services they will
render, and the value of those services is determined by the
relations in which the supply of ponies, etc., stands to the
demand for such services. If nothing unexpected has happened,
that supply will have been so adjusted to the demand that an
average (or normal) pony during a life of average length and
activity will yield a hire giving normal profits on its cost of
production. As a rule it will do this, and yield no 'surplus'
above normal profits to the producer. Of course the demand for
ponies may have been wrongly estimated, and the hire (or
quasi-rent) yielded by an average pony may exceed or fall short
of normal profits on its cost of production. But the divergence
can be only for short periods in the case of ponies, because they
are so quickly raised, and they so quickly die off, that any
error in the adjustment of supply to demand can be quickly set
right. The difference between the rent of land and the
quasi-rents of most other things lies in the fact that their hire
can never for any long time diverge much from normal profits on
their cost of production; while the supply of fertile land cannot
be adapted quickly to the demand for it, and therefore the income
derived from it may for a long time together, or in some cases
even permanently, diverge much from normal profits on the cost of
preparing it for cultivation. That is my case on the main issue. 
    But there is one side issue to which I will refer. The
relation in which the rent or quasi-rent of any agent of
production stands to the price of the produce which it takes part
in raising has been discussed so far without reference to the
possibility of diverting that agent from one branch of production
to another. We have spoken of the rent of land, for instance,
with reference to agricultural produce in general, and without
reference to the competition between crops for the occupation of
the land. But of course it is true that the marginal cost of
production of oats near London is higher than it would be if the
land had nothing to do but to grow oats. The high rent which the
land can pay for the purposes of market gardeners and others
alters the position of the marginal production of oats, and thus
alters the price of oats. The Duke quotes a passage from the
first edition of my Principles in which I had referred rather
clumsily to this fact, and infers (21*) that I hold 'it would be
absurd to say that the cost of producing any one of these crops
is determined or caused by the cost of its production on the
worst bit of land on which it is actually grown; but it would be
perfectly correct to say that the aggregate value of the whole
produce of the farm is caused by the cost of production on the
poorest bit of it.'
    I did not intend to say that. But without disputing whether
my words really implied it, I will quote a more careful version
from my second edition:(22*) - 'When applied to the cost of
production of one particular crop, though still literally true as
it stands, experience shows that it [the doctrine that rent does
not enter into cost of production] is liable to be interpreted in
senses in which it is not true. For if land which had been used
for growing hops, is found capable of yielding a higher rent as a
market garden, the area under hops will undoubtedly be
diminished; and this will raise their marginal cost of production
and therefore their price. The rent which land will yield for one
kind of produce, though it does not directly enter into those
expenses, yet does act as the channel through which a demand for
the land for that kind of produce increases the difficulties of
supply of other kinds; and thus does indirectly affect their
expenses of production - 'I hold that this can be extended to the
ground rents of factories which are applicable to several trades,
to the quasi-rents of their machinery;(23*) and to the rents of
rare natural abilities, and the quasi-rents of trained skill,
when they are not limited to a single occupation.(24*) There are
many other points in the Duke's instructive and suggestive
criticisms on which I feel tempted to say a few words. But my
article is already too long; and I can only hope that it may lead
him to find a little more agreement than before between his own
positions and those of the modern followers of Ricardo; and may
incline him to the opinion that however untenable may be the
so-called 'Ricardian dogmas,' the analysis of which Ricardo was
the chief builder, has firm if often unseen foundations. 

NOTES:

1. The argument of this paragraph is developed in some detail in
my Principles, Book V, chap. ix, of the second, and Book vi,
chap. iii, of the first edition.

2. Unseen Foundations.

3. In my Principles I have traced in some detail the way in which
that part of the rental value of land which is derived from
advantages of situation passes by imperceptible gradations from
the character of a pure rent, in cases in which the owners of the
land have no direct part in improving its environment, to that of
a quasi-rent or even profits, when the conditions of the
environment were deliberately brought bout by and at the expense
of the owners of that land in order to raise its value. I have
studied this, not so much for its won sake, as because of the
strong light which it throws by analogy on the analysis (into
rent, profits and earnings proper) of the total incomes that
accrue to business men, to professional men, and even skilled
artisans, and are due not solely to their own industry and the
capital invested in their education, but also to the accidents of
their birth, to advantages of their environment, to opportunity
or, in German phrase, to "Conjunctur".

4. Unseen Foundations, pp. 302, 303.

5. Ibid, p. 373-4. After all the care I have taken to discuss
Producer's Surplus from the point of view of the cultivating
owner, and not the tenant farmer, it is a little hard to be told
that my interpretation of its faulty 'because the owner is denied
his share in "cultivation"' Ibid, p. 322, foot-note.)

6. Something is said of the ethical aspects of this question in
my Principles, pp. 701-2, of the second, pp. 690-2 of the first
edition.

7. They correspond to differential co-efficients connecting the
rates of growth of two mutually dependent elements. I admit that
these terms and the diagrams connected with them repel some
readers, and fill others with the vain imagination that they have
mastered difficult economic problems, when really they have done
little more than learn the language in which parts of these
problems can be expressed, and the machinery by which they can be
handled. When the actual conditions of particular problems have
not been studied, such knowledge is little better than a derrick
for sinking oil-wells erected where there is no oil-bearing
strata. But the technical language and machinery of every science
are liable to a similar misuse; and this evil, though not
unimportant, is not to be weighed against the aid which
clear-headed and careful students continually derive from them.

8. The Duke makes a complaint, apparently aimed at myself, as to
the use of capital letters for scrappy conceptions. Capital
letters are a great disfigurement to a page; and no reasonabl
writer would use them for his own gratificaion. Their purpose is
solely to assist the reader in hearing in mind that certain terms
do correspond to scrappy conception, and in finding references to
places in which these scrappy conceptions are defined. The Duke
suggests that capitals might have been excused in the use of
terms already established by authority, but those terms do not
need signals to indicate that they are to be taken in an unwonted
sense. Perhaps however I should have done better to sacrifice
comeliness to the reader's convenience rather less.

9. I have urged this repeatedly, but especially in the long note
on Ricardo's theory of value in my Principles, pp. 529-536 of the
first and pp. 538-345 of the second edition.

10. Unseen Foundations, p. 348.

11. Where there is a strong combination, tacit or overt,
producers may sometimes regulate the price for a considerable
time together with very little reference to cost of production.
And if the leaders in that combination were those who had the
best facilities for production, it might be said, in apparent
though not in real contradiction to Ricardo's doctrines, that the
price was governed by that part of the supply which was most
easily produced. But as a fact, those producers whose finances
are weakest,and who are found to go on producing to escape
failure, often impose their policy on the rest of the
combination. And it is a common saying, both in America and
England, that the weakest members of a combination are frequently
its rulers.

12. For brevity, I pass by, as the Duke ahs done, the special
conditions of those branches of manufacutre which obey the law of
increasing return; that is, to which -- even allowing for the
difficulties of getting incrased supplies of raw material and
labour -- an increased output can be turned out at a less than
proportionate expense. I have always felt that Ricardo's
treatment of this case was inadequate; and I do not quite concur
in the treatment of it by Cournot, by Auspitz and Lieben, and by
the Austrian economists generally. My own attempts to deal with
it are given in my Principles (second edition) pp. 368-79, 403-4,
426-9, 439-40, 484-97, 535-536. the corresponding discussion in
the first edition are less fully and much less carefully written;
they are in pp. 371-380, 412-428, 438-439.

13. The difficulty of getting a case of production free from all
quasi-rent is referred to in Principles, second edition, pp.
408-9 and 495-7.

14. See Principles, p. 470, p. 622, of the second, p. 500, p. 630
of the first edition.

15. I do not regard that net yield as income, but partly as the
result of the sale of capital. (For I admit that free gifts of
nature when appropriated become private capital.) I hold that a
royality is not a rent, any more than is the charge which a
grocer makes for sugar. Royalities always do enter into cost of
production, because every ton of ore that is raised has to pay
its share; there is no marginal produce which pays no royality.
See Principles, pp. 463-4 of the second edition, p. 491 of the
first.

16. Unseen Foundations, p. 300.

17. So far from regarding the existence of rentless land as
needed for Ricardo's docrine of rent, I have urged that new
countries, whre there is an abundance of rentless land, are just
those to which his theory is not applicable without great
reservations. He was perfectly aware that marginal produce need
not come from rentless land. In his chapter on rent he say: "It
commonly happens that before... inferior lands are cultivated,
capitall can be more productively employed on these lands that
are already in clutivation.. In such case, capital will be
preferably employed on the old land and will equally create a
rent; for rent is always the difference between the produce
obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of capital and
labour... In this case, as well as the other, the capital last
employed yields no rent." (McCulloch's Editon, p. 36, 37).
Ricdaro's statement (pp. 38, 39) that "no reduction would take
place in the price of corn, though landlords should forego the
whole of their rent" is based on the fact that "the value of corn
is regulated by the quantity of labour bestowed on its production
on hat quality of land or wiwth that portion of capital which
pays no rent." and thus it is explicitly independent of the
question whether there is any rentless land. The Duke (p. 299)
seems to have misconceived his criticism (pp. 34, 35) of Adam
Smith's statement that rent is paid for forests in Norway. His
point is that he charges made for leave to cut down timber are
not rents. He is not, as the Duke thinks, insisting on the
existence of rentless land. J.S. Mill's remarks on the subject
are a little inconsistent.

18. Unseen Foundations, pp. 292-3.

19. Unseen Foundations, pp. 310-11.

20. Ibid, pp. 370-1.

21. Unseen Foundations, p. 317. His printer has made the sentence
even worse that mine by substituting 'agreed' for 'argued' in the
fourth line of the quotation.

22. Page 532. See also pp. 459-463.

23. Principles, pp. 462-3 and 471 of the second, pp. 490-1 of the
first edition.

24. Ibid., pp. 611-3 of the second, pp. 608-9 of the first
edition.