

A S E C O N D
V I N D I C A T I O N

O F

Mr. *L O C K E*,

Wherein his S E N T I M E N T S relating to

Personal Identity

Are clear'd up from some Mistakes of

The Rev. Dr. *B U T L E R*,

I N H I S

DISSERTATION on that Subject.

And the various O B J E C T I O N S rais'd against
Mr. *L O C K E*, by the learned Author
of *An ENQUIRY into the NATURE of*
the HUMAN SOUL, are consider'd.

To which are added

REFLECTIONS on some Passages of Dr. *W A T T S*'s
P H I L O S O P H I C A L E S S A Y S.

Censure is the Tax a Man pays to the Publick for
being eminent. Lord *B A C O N*.

By *V I N. P E R R O N E T*, *A. M.* Vicar of *Shoreham in Kent*,
and Chaplain to the Right Hon. Earl *S T A N H O P E*.


L O N D O N,

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T H E
P R E F A C E

OW far the learned and ingenious Gentlemen, whom I have taken the Liberty of dissenting from in the following Pages, have either rightly understood Mr. *Locke*, or have themselves been rightly understood by me, is intirely submitted to the Judgment of others.

As to the learned Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, I shall here only beg Leave to observe, that, if he had thought it proper to have confined himself
to

to the *Demonstration* of the Soul's *Immateriality*, and to the Proof of the *real*, but *dependent* Existence of *Matter*, he had been confined to a Task, to which he has shewn himself abundantly equal.


But 'tis plain, the ingenious Author judg'd something more to be needful. The Victory could not be compleat, without numberless Attacks upon Mr. *Locke*: With what Success, let the judicious Reader determine.

P.S. It is the first Edition of Dr. *Butler's* Book, which is here made use of. But the second Edition both of the *Enquiry*, and of Dr. *Watts's Essays*.

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T H E
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ERRATA.



Mr. *LOCKE*'s
SENTIMENTS

Relating to

Personal Identity, &c.

E R R A T A.

P. 2. l. ult. for *Doubt it*, read *Doubt about it*. P. 30. l. 29. for *Page* read *Face*. P. 43. l. 23. place a Comma after *all*. P. 81. l. 24. for *separate*, read *separable*. P. 85. l. 9. dele *be*. P. 93. l. 21. dele *to*. P. 113. l. 31. for *Divertisy* read *Diversity*. P. 117. l. 17. for *Mr. Locke*, read *Mr. Locke's*. P. 120. l. 27. for *it*, read *is*.

Lately published, by the same AUTHOR,

A VINDICATION of Mr. *LOCKE*, from the CHARGE of giving Encouragement to SCEPTICISM and INFIDELITY, and from several other Mistakes and Objections of the learned AUTHOR of the PROCEDURE, EXTENT, and LIMITS of HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. In six *Dialogues*. Wherein is likewise enquired, Whether Mr. *LOCKE*'s TRUE OPINION of the SOUL'S IMMATERIALITY was not mistaken by the late learned Monf. *LEIBNITZ*.

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON, at the *Bible* and *Crown* in *Ludgate-Street*.

THAT Persons of acknowledged Candor and Ingenuity may sometimes mistake the Meaning of the best of Writers, seems plain from the learned Author of the *Dissertation on Personal Identity*. Who tho' he has carefully distinguish'd between Mr. *Locke*, and those who have made a very absurd and wicked Use, of what is said by him upon this Subject; yet that he has not every where rightly apprehended him, will I hope appear from the following Reflections. But first, Dr. *Butler* observes, that

B

“Great

“ Great Difficulties have been raised by some concerning *Personal Identity*, or the Sameness of *living Agents*. * That strange Perplexities have been raised about the Meaning of that *Identity* or Sameness of Person, which is imply'd in the Notion of our living Now and Hereafter, or in any two successive Moments. And that the Solution of these Difficulties hath been stranger than the Difficulties themselves. For *Personal Identity* has been explain'd so by some, as to render the Inquiry concerning a future Life, of no Consequence at all to Us, the Persons who are making it. Now when it is asked, wherein *Personal Identity* consists, the Answer should be the same, as if it were asked, wherein consists Similitude or Equality. That all Attempts to define, would but perplex it.”†

Had Gentlemen, who treat of this Subject, made a proper Use of Mr. *Locke's* Observations, I am persuaded many of those *Difficulties* and *Perplexities* the Dr. complains of, had been entirely avoided.

“ The Difficulty or Obscurity, says Mr. *Locke*, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the Names ill used, than from any Obscurity in Things themselves. For whatever makes the specific *Idea*, to which the Name is apply'd, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the Distinction of any thing into the Same and Divers, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no Doubt it.”†

* See a late excellent Treatise, entitled, *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Reveal'd, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* P. 11. † P. 301. ‡ *Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 28.*

Indeed

Indeed such an “ Explanation of *Personal Identity* (which the Dr. mentions) as renders “ the Inquiry concerning a future Life of no Consequence at all to us,” may, it is greatly to be fear'd, proceed from a much worse Principle.

As to *Personal Identity* itself, if a Doubt should arise, whether a *Person* was the same to Day, he was Yesterday; it would, I presume, be very necessary to enquire, what was meant by *Person*, before any satisfactory Answer could possibly be given. But when Men had settled amongst themselves, what they meant by this Term, they might, I think, very easily agree, whether he were the same, or a different Person. So that I must beg leave to dissent from this Gentleman's Opinion, that all Attempts to define *Personal Identity*, or That, in which it consists, would but perplex it. I rather take what he immediately subjoins, to be much righter, that there is no Difficulty at all in ascertaining the Idea. Tho' the Difference between *This*, and settling the *Definition**, seems to me rather in the Expression, than the Thing itself. But this Ingenious Writer thus proceeds:

“ Upon the Consciousnesses of ones Self or ones own Existence in any two Moments, being compared, there immediately arises to the Mind the Idea of *Personal Identity*. [This] Comparison, not only gives us the Idea of *Personal Identity*, but also shews us the Identity of ourselves in those two Moments: The present, suppose, and that immediately past, or the present, and that, a Month,

* See *Locke's H. Und. B. III. C. 4. § 6.*

B 2

“ a Year,

“ a Year, or twenty Years past. Or in other
 “ Words, by reflecting upon That, which is
 “ myself now, and That, which was myself
 “ twenty Years ago, I discern They are not
 “ two, but one, and the same Self.”*

Again, “ Every Person is conscious, that he
 “ is now the same Person or Self he was, as far
 “ back as his Remembrance reaches; since when
 “ any One reflects upon a past Action of his own,
 “ he is just as certain of the Person who did that
 “ Action, namely Himself, the Person who
 “ now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the
 “ Action was at all done. Nay very often a
 “ Person’s Assurance of an Action having been
 “ done, of which he is absolutely assured,
 “ arises wholly from the Consciousness that he
 “ Himself did it.” †

What the Dr. here maintains, does not seem
 very different from what is laid down by Mr.
Locke: Who affirms “ it to be the same Con-
 “ sciousness that makes a Man be himself to
 “ himself. — And that as far as any intelli-
 “ gent Being can repeat the Idea of any past
 “ Action with the same Consciousness it had of
 “ it at first, and with the same Consciousness it
 “ has of any present Action; so far it is the
 “ same *Personal Self*. For it is by the Consci-
 “ ousness it has of its present Thoughts and
 “ Actions, that it is *Self to Itself* now, and so
 “ will be the same *Self*, as far as the same Con-
 “ sciousness can extend to Actions past, or to
 “ come. — The same Consciousness uniting
 “ those Distant Actions into the same *Person*.” †

* The Analogy, &c. p. 301, 302.
 † Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 10.

† Ibid. p. 308.

But

But how far these Gentlemen do really agree,
 will better appear hereafter.

• “ Tho’ Consciousness, says Dr. *Butler*, does
 “ thus ascertain our *Personal Identity* to ourselves;
 “ yet to say, that Consciousness makes *Per-
 “ sonal Identity*, or is necessary to our being the
 “ same Persons, is to say, that a Person has not
 “ existed a single Moment, nor done One Acti-
 “ on, but what he can remember; indeed none
 “ but what he reflects upon. And one should re-
 “ ally think it self-evident, that Consciousness
 “ of *Personal Identity* presupposes, and therefore
 “ cannot constitute *Personal Identity*, any more
 “ than Knowledge in any other Case, can con-
 “ stitute Truth, which it presupposes.”*

It must appear perfectly evident from these
 Objections, not only that Dr. *Butler*’s *Idea* of
Person here differs from Mr. *Locke*’s, and which
 we shall more fully observe hereafter; but that
 the Dr. did not here reflect, that Mr. *Locke* ex-
 pressly makes a Distinction betwixt the same
Man, and the same *Person* †. And therefore it
 will be very proper to consider in this Place,
 what Mr. *Locke* means by *Person* or *Self*; and
 what by *Personal Identity*.

“ *Person* then he defines, a thinking intelli-
 “ gent Being, that has Reason and Reflection,
 “ and can consider itself as itself, the same think-
 “ ing Thing in different Times and Places;
 “ which it does only by that Consciousness,
 “ which is inseparable from Thinking.” †
 Again, “ *Self* is that conscious thinking Thing
 “ — which is sensible, or conscious of Plea-

* The Analogy, &c. p. 302.
 § 15. 20.

† H. Und. B. II. C. 27.

† Ibid. § 9.

“ sure

“sure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern’d for *Itself*, as far as that Consciousness extends.”*

“By this Consciousness [every intelligent Being] finds himself to be the *same Self*, which did such or such an Action some Years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now.”†

“*Person*, as I take it, is the Name for this *Self*. Wherever a Man finds what he calls *Himself*, there I think another may say is the *same Person*. It is a Forensic Term, appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery. This Personality extends *itself* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by Consciousness, whereby it becomes concern’d and accountable, owns and imputes to *itself* past Actions, just upon the same Ground, and for the same Reason it does the Present.”‡

Moreover, “Since Consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ’tis That that makes Every One to be what he calls *Self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking Things; in *This* alone consists *Personal Identity*, i. e. the Sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this Consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action, or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *Self* now it was then; and ’tis by the same *Self* with this present One that now reflects on it, that That Action was done.”**

* Hum. Und. B. II. § 17. † Ibid. C. 27. § 25.
‡ Ibid. § 26. ** Ibid. § 9.

By

By comparing which together, I think it must appear sufficiently plain, that by *Person*, Mr. Locke does not mean either a *Man*, or any other *living Agent*, in general; but only *such* a Rational Being, as is *actually* conscious of its own Behaviour; *capable* of a Law, and *answerable* for its Actions. So that consequently One in a Phrensy, notwithstanding his being a *Man* or *living Agent*, would not however, according to Mr. Locke, be esteem’d a *Person*. — For *whatever Substance there is*, says he, *without Consciousness, there is no Person**. As to *Personal Identity*, This consists in *Identity of Consciousness*, and in That alone. His Reason is, — “It being the same Consciousness, that makes a Man be himself to himself, *Personal Identity* depends on That only.”†

And indeed, since his *Idea of Person*, is a Being *actually conscious* of its own Actions, in what else can the *Identity* of such *Person* consist? And therefore when Dr. Butler thus expresses himself — “to say that Consciousness makes *Personal Identity*, or is necessary to our being the same Persons, is to say that a Person has not existed a single Moment, nor done one Action, but what he can remember, &c.” —

All This, I think is a plain Demonstration, that by *Person*, the Dr. here only means in general, a *Man* or *living Agent*; and that therefore his Objections have nothing to do with *Person* or *Personal Identity*, as understood by Mr. Locke, — However that Gentleman thus proceeds, — “This wonderful Mistake may possibly have arisen from hence, that to be indued with

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 23. † § 10.

Consci-

“Consciousness, is inseparable from the Idea of
 “a Person, or intelligent Being. For this
 “might be express’d inaccurately thus, that
 “Consciousness makes Personality; and from
 “hence it might be concluded, to make *Personal Identity*. But though present Consciousness
 “of what we at present do and feel, is necessary
 “to our being the Persons we now are; yet
 “present Consciousness of past Actions, or
 “Feelings, is not necessary to our being the
 “same Person, who perform’d those Actions or
 “had those Feelings.”*

If this ingenious Objector had but duely consider’d, what it is that makes a *Person*, according to Mr. *Locke*, he would not have given himself the trouble of accounting for what he supposes a *Mistake*. However let us examine what is here advanced.

If by the *Sameness* of *Person* we are to understand the *Sameness* of *living Agents*, as this Gentleman elsewhere explains it; † then *present Consciousness of past Actions* is certainly *unnecessary* to our being the same *Persons*, i. e. the same *living Agents*, who perform’d those Actions: Since we are undoubtedly the same *living Agents*, whether we are conscious of our *past* (or even *present*) Actions or not. — But what has This to do with our being the *same Persons* in Mr. *Locke’s* Sense of the Word?

I am persuaded if the learned Author would narrowly examine his *Ideas*, he would go near to find that he uses the Word *Person*, not in the same strict Meaning in both Places. In the former he appears evidently to use it in the Sense

* The Analogy, &c. p. 302.

† p. 11.

of

of Mr. *Locke*; in the latter, the Word seems only to stand for *Man* or *living Agent*. *Present Consciousness*, says he, *of what we at present do, is necessary to our being the Persons we now are.* — That is, to our being *accountable Agents*, or *Persons*, in Mr. *Locke’s* Sense. But what is the Reason that *Present Consciousness of past Actions is not necessary to our being the same Persons, who perform’d those Actions?* It is not indeed necessary to our being the same *Men*, or *living Agents*, as has been already observed: But is *Consciousness* of what is past *necessary* to our being the *same proper Objects* of Punishment, which we were at the Time of Commission? If it be, then *present Consciousness of past Actions is necessary* to our being the *same Persons*; that is, according to Mr. *Locke’s* Idea of the Word *Person*. Or shall we say, that every *Man*, who was guilty of a Crime whilst he enjoy’d his Senses, is under all Circumstances, *justly* punishable? Is the *Mad Man* *justly* punishable for what the *Sober Man* did? If he be not, then we must allow that something more is necessary to constitute the *same Person*, in Mr. *Locke’s* Sense, than barely being the *same Man*. He that has lost his Understanding, and the Remembrance of his Crimes, is yet the *same living Agent*, and may, I presume, be call’d the *same guilty Man*: But if he be not the *same Conscious Being*, or the *same proper Object of Punishment*, he is not in Mr. *Locke’s* Phrase, the *same Person*. And indeed his Opinion, that God Almighty will punish no *Man* hereafter for any Crime, but what is first brought home to his Mind and Conscience*, seems to have plain Reason, if not plain

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 22, 26.

C

Reve-

Revelation, on its Side. And he may well say, that “in this *Personal Identity*, is founded all “the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment.”* For tho’ to reward a Man in a Phrensy could do him no Hurt; yet the Attempt would be as absurd, as the punishing of him in those Circumstances, would be irrational and cruel. — But to proceed. — “The Inquiry, says Dr. *Butler*, what makes Vegetables the same in the common Acceptation of “the Word, does not appear to have any Relation to This of *Personal Identity*; because “the Word *Same*, when apply’d to Them, and “to Person, is not only apply’d to different “Subjects, but it is also used in different Senses. “For when a Man swears to the same Tree, as “having stood fifty Years in the same Place, “he means only the same as to all the Purposes “of Property and Uses of common Life, and “not that the Tree has been all that time the “same in the strict Philosophic Sense of the “Word. For he does not know, whether any “one Particle of the present Tree, be the same “with any one Particle of the Tree, which stood “in the same Place fifty Years ago. And if “they have not one common Particle of Matter, They cannot be the same Tree in the proper Philosophic Sense of the Word *Same*; it “being evidently a Contradiction in Terms, to “say They are, when no Part of their Substance, and no one of their Properties, are “the same. — And therefore when we “say the Identity or Sameness of a Plant consists, in a Continuation of the same Life, com-

* § 18.

“municated

“municated under the same Organization, to a “Number of Particles of Matter whether the “same or not; the Word *Same* when apply’d “to Life and to Organization, cannot possibly “be understood to signify, what it signifies in “this very Sentence when apply’d to Matter. “In a loose and popular Sense then, the Life, “and the Organization, and the Plant, are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the “perpetual Change of the Parts. But in a “strict and Philosophical Manner of Speech, “no Man, no Being, no Any-thing, can be the “same with That, with which it hath indeed “nothing the same. Now Sameness is used in “this latter Sense when apply’d to Persons. “The *Identity* of These therefore, cannot subsist with Diversity of Substance.”*

I beg leave here to observe, that if the *Sameness* of a Vegetable consists in the *same* numerical Particles, the *Identity* is as much destroy’d by the Loss of a *Few*, as by the Change of *All*. And a Tree is no more the *same*, which has stood fifty Days, than what has stood fifty Years. But if the *Identity* of a Plant consists in what Mr. *Locke* supposes, then a Tree of fifty Years standing, is as much the *same* Tree, even in the strictest Sense of the Word *same*, as a Tree which has stood but so many Hours. And tho’ it be very certain, that *no Being*, nor indeed *any thing* else, can *strictly be the same with That, with which it hath Nothing the same*; yet I think it may be a Question, whether it be *Unity of Substance that comprehends all Identity, or will determine it in every Case.*†

* The Analogy, &c. p. 303, 304. † Hum. Und. B. II C.27. § 7

Mr. *Locke* is of Opinion, that the *Identity* of Vegetables and Animals depends not, like the *Identity* of a Mass of Matter, on the same Number of Particles; but on the contrary, that “in
 “ Them the Variation of great Parcels of Mat-
 “ ter alters not the *Identity*: An Oak growing
 “ from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp’d,
 “ is still the same Oak: And a Colt grown
 “ up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean,
 “ is all the while the same Horse; tho’ in both
 “ these Cases, there may be a manifest Change
 “ of the Parts: So that truly they are not ei-
 “ ther of them the same Masses of Matter,
 “ tho’ they be truly one of them the same Oak,
 “ and the other the same Horse. The Reason
 “ whereof is, that in these two Cases, of a Mass
 “ of Matter, and a living Body, *Identity* is not
 “ apply’d to the same Thing.” As to the former,
 “ Whilst two or more Atoms exist united
 “ together, the Mass, consisting of the same
 “ Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same
 “ Body.”* Whereas “ a Plant continues the
 “ same, as long as it partakes of the same Life,
 “ though that Life be communicated to new
 “ Particles of Matter vitally united to the liv-
 “ ing Plant.”† And “ the same Animal is
 “ the same continued Life, communicated to
 “ different Particles of Matter, as they happen
 “ successively to be united to that organiz’d liv-
 “ ing Body.”‡

Indeed, to one, who will judge of the *Sameness* of all Beings, by what constitutes the *Sameness* of a Mass of unorganiz’d Matter, it is impossible that either Vegetable or Animal shou’d

* Ibid. § 3.

† § 4.

‡ § 8.

continue

continue the *same* for one Day together. Whereas he that judges of *Identity*, by what answers to all the Purposes of Property, and Uses of common Life, can never be without the *same* Trees in his Park; provided, upon the Fall of any, there be others planted in their stead.

As to Mr. *Locke*’s Sentiments; I could as soon doubt, whether a Man were the *same* Man, after his Hair was cut and his Nails were pared, as I could doubt, whether a Tree was the *same* Tree (even in the strictest Sense of the Word *same*) after its Leaves were fall’n, or its Boughs trim’d. It is true, neither the one nor the other wou’d consist of the *same* numerical Particles, they did before; and consequently they are not the *same* Masses of Matter: But then as my Idea of a *Man* or *Vegetable*, is not the Idea of a Mass of mere unorganiz’d Matter; so That which is necessary to constitute the *Identity* of the One, does not appear to me necessary to the *Identity* of the Other. However this, as Mr. *Locke* observes, will be just according to our several Ideas of the Subjects, we apply *Identity* to: And Men may dispute for ever, whether Vegetable or Animal, whether Person, Man, or Substance, be the *same*; ’till they have agreed amongst themselves, what Ideas those different Words shall stand for*.

As to what the Dr. affirms, that “*Sameness* is used in a strict and Philosophical Manner of Speech, when apply’d to Persons: And that the *Identity* of These cannot subsist with Diversity of Substance:” ——— I could wish he had been more particular in explaining,

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27, § 7. 15. 28, 29.

what

what is here meant by *Persons*, and what by *Substance*. For if by *Person* we understand the *Immaterial Spirit* only; and by *Substance*, the Substance of such Spirit: In this Case it would be saying, that the *Identity* of an *Individual Spirit* cannot subsist with the *Diversity* of its own Substance: And which, I presume, has not been controverted. But if by *Substance*, be meant *That* of the Body, the Proposition would amount to This, either that the Body never gain'd or lost any Particles of Matter; or that an *Immaterial Spirit* could not continue the *same*, under such a Variation of the Substance of the Body. Or lastly, if by *Person*, be meant the whole Compound, *Spirit* and *Body* united; then the *Identity* of such *Person* may certainly subsist with Diversity of Substance; or we shall never be able to find the *same Person*, for perhaps two Hours together. — But this learned Writer thus proceeds.

“ The Thing here consider'd, and demonstratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. *Locke* in these Words:

“ *Whether it*, i. e. the same Self or Person, be the same Identical Substance?

“ And he has suggested what is a much better Answer to the Question, than that which he gives it in Form. For he defines Person, “ a *thinking intelligent Being*, &c. and Personal Identity, *the Sameness of a rational Being*. *

“ The Question then is, whether the same Rational Being is the same Substance; which needs no Answer, because Being and Substance, in this Place, stand for the same Idea. The Ground of the Doubt, Whether the same

* *Locke's Works*, Vol. I. p. 146. or *Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 9, 10.*

“ Person

“ Person be the same Substance, is said to be
 “ This, that the Consciousness of our own
 “ Existence, in Youth, and in Old Age, or
 “ in any two joint successive Moments, *is not*
 “ *the same individual Action* *, i. e. not the same
 “ Consciousness, but different successive Con-
 “ sciousnesses. Now it is strange that This
 “ should have occasion'd such Perplexities; for
 “ it is surely conceivable, that a Person may
 “ have a Capacity of knowing some Object or
 “ other to be the same now, which it was
 “ when he contemplated it formerly: Yet in
 “ this Case, where, by the Supposition, the
 “ Object is perceiv'd to be the same, the Per-
 “ ception of it in any two Moments, cannot
 “ be one and the same Perception.

“ And thus, tho' the successive Consciousnesses
 “ which we have of our own Existence, are not
 “ the same, yet are they Consciousnesses of one
 “ and the same Thing or Object, of the same
 “ Person, Self, or living Agent. The Person,
 “ of whose Existence the Consciousness is felt
 “ now, and was felt an Hour or a Year ago, is
 “ discern'd to be, not two Persons, but one and
 “ the same Person; and therefore is one and
 “ the same.” †

Mr. *Locke* observes that “ Doubts are rais'd
 “ (by the Interruption of Consciousness, and our
 “ losing Sight of our past *selves*) whether we
 “ are the same thinking Thing, *i. e.* the same
 “ Substance or no?” Or as he had just before
 express'd himself, — “ *Whether it* [i. e. the
 “ same Self or Person] *be the same Identical Sub-*
 “ *stance?*” || So that, I apprehend, the Doubt

* *Ibid.* † The Analogy, &c. p. 304. || *Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 10.*

I

here

here mention'd, is, Whether That, which a Man calls *Self* to Day, be that very *Being* or *Substance*, which he call'd *Self* Yesterday? But I think, as the Dr. seems to have taken the Question, it looks as if a Doubt had been started, Whether the *same Being* or *Substance*, was the *same Being* or *Substance*? And which, as he very justly remarks, *needs no Answer*.

As to the *Answer*, which this ingenious Gentleman supposes Mr. *Locke* has suggested to this Question; it does not, I think, appear to have any manner of relation to it. Mr. *Locke* is only there mentioning, what he means by *Person*; and what, by the *Sameness* of such *Person*: And since This, according to him, always depends on the same *Consciousness*, whether annexed to the *same* or a *different* Substance; those Definitions can have nothing to do, towards solving a Doubt, whether a Man be the very *same* Substance to Day, which he was Yesterday? — — Besides, as Mr. *Locke* observes, these “Doubts, how reasonable or unreasonable soever, concern not *Personal Identity* at all.”* That is, Mr. *Locke*'s Hypothesis cannot be affected by them. For as that makes *Personal Identity* to consist in *Consciousness* only; it seems to stand clear of all Difficulties of this Sort. For let Men doubt as long as they please, about their being the same individual *Self* or *Substance*, which they were a Day, a Week, or a Year before; they are equally, according to Mr. *Locke*, the *same accountable Persons* or *Beings*, as far as their *Consciousness* reaches; and *answerable* for every Transaction of their whole Lives, which can thus by Con-

* Ibid.

sciousness

sciousness be appropriated to themselves. So that let them determine of the same Identical Substance as they will, they can never get clear, upon Mr. *Locke*'s Supposition, of the least Guilt they have ever contracted, by imagining any Change or Variation of Substance whatever.

But now, tho' we are certainly able to discern ourselves to be the same *Persons*, we were formerly, as Mr. *Locke* every where supposes; yet, if by *Person* be meant the same *Substance*, how will *Consciousness* prove to any Man, that he is the same *Person*, in this Sense; unless by *Person*, he understands the immaterial Spirit, and that Only? But as All do not exclude every thing material out of their Idea of *Person*; it is impossible they should by *Consciousness* be able to discern, that they are the same *Persons*, in the Sense here understood.

Dr. *Butler* goes on to remark: ——— “ Mr. *Locke*'s Observations upon this Subject appear hafty; and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with Suppositions, which he has made relating to it*. But some of those hafty Observations have been carried to a strange Length by Others; whose Notion, when traced and examined to the Bottom, amounts, I think, to this:† That Personality is not a permanent, but a transient Thing: That it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: That no one can any more remain one and the same Person two Moments together, than two successive Moments can be one and the same Moment: That our Substance is indeed con-

* *Locke*'s Works, p. 152. † See an Answer to Dr. *Clarke*'s third Defense of his Letter to Mr. *Dodwell*, 2^d Edition P. 44 and 56, &c.

D

“tinually

“tinually changing, but whether This be so or
 “not, is, it seems, nothing to the Purpose,
 “since it is not Substance but Conscioufness
 “alone, which constitutes Personality; which
 “Conscioufness being successive, cannot be the
 “same in any two Moments, nor consequently
 “the Personality constituted by it*.”

To how many Readers any of Mr. *Locke's* Observations upon this Subject may appear *hasty*, I cannot pretend to say. He seems to have been no very hasty Writer in general, and perhaps even his Observations in this Chapter, may rather be thought by some to carry plain Marks of great Application of Mind. Tho', as to his appearing *dissatisfied* with any of his own *Suppositions*; it is no wonder, that so modest a Writer as Mr. *Locke*, shou'd not be over confident, where he owns himself to be greatly in the Dark.

“I am apt enough, says he, to think I have,
 “in treating of this Subject, made some Sup-
 “positions that will look strange to some Read-
 “ers, and possibly they are so in themselves.
 “But yet, I think, they are such as are par-
 “donable in this Ignorance we are in of the
 “Nature of that thinking Thing that is in us,
 “and which we look on as our *Selves*. Did we
 “know, what it was, or how it was tied to a
 “certain System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or
 “whether it could, or could not perform its
 “Operations of Thinking and Memory out of
 “a Body organized as ours is; and whether it
 “has pleas'd God that no One such Spirit shall
 “ever be united to any but One such Body,
 “upon the right Constitution of whose Organs

* The Analogy, &c. p. 305.

“its Memory should depend, we might see the
 “Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I
 “have made*.”

So that this great Man does indeed acknowledge his own *Ignorance*, and treats some of his *Suppositions* with a Freedom, that few Writers are guilty of in respect of themselves. But some of these Observations, Dr. *Butler* remarks, *have been carried to a strange Length by Others*. To which I beg Leave to add, that whoever will but compare what Mr. *Locke* has advanced upon this Subject, with what the Dr. mentions from those other Writers, will find as wide a difference between them, as between any two *express Contradictions* whatever.

For whilst Mr. *Locke* every where maintains to this Effect, “That Conscioufness unites the
 “most distant Actions into one and the same
 “*Person*: That wherever such Conscioufness is,
 “there is *Personal Identity*: That every *Person*
 “is strictly accountable for whatever can be thus
 “appropriated to himself by this Consciouf-
 “ness †: And that in this *Personal Identity* is
 “founded all the Right and Justice of Rewards
 “and Punishments ‡:” whilst Mr. *Locke* constantly maintains this, the *Others* affirm, “That
 “Personality is not a permanent, but Transient
 “Thing: That it lives and dies, begins and
 “ends continually: That no one can any more
 “remain one and the same Person two Moments
 “together, than two successive Moments can be
 “one and the same Moment: And that Con-
 “scioufness being successive, cannot be the same
 “in any two Moments, nor consequently the

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 27. † Ibid. § 16. ‡ § 18.

“sonality constituted by it.”

Dr. *Butler* thus concludes his Differtation :—
 “This *He, Person, or Self* must either be a
 “Substance, or the Property of some Substance.
 “If *He, if Person, be a Substance, then Con-*
 “sciousness that *He is the same Person, is Con-*
 “sciousness that *He is the same Substance. If*
 “the *Person or He be the Property of a Sub-*
 “stance, still Consciousness that *He is the same*
 “(the same Property) is as certain a Proof,
 “that his Substance remains the same, as Con-
 “sciousness that *He remains the same Substance*
 “would be ; since the same Property cannot be
 “transferr’d from one Substance to another.
 “But tho’ we are thus certain, that we are
 “the same Agents, living Beings or Substances
 “now, which we were as far back as our Re-
 “membrance reaches, yet it is asked, whether
 “we may not possibly be deceiv’d in it? And
 “this Question may be asked at the End of any
 “Demonstration whatever. Because it is a
 “Question concerning the Truth of Perception
 “by Memory: And he who can doubt, whe-
 “ther Perception by Memory can in this Case
 “be depended upon, may doubt also, whether
 “Perception by Deduction and Reasoning,
 “which also include Memory, or indeed whe-
 “ther intuitive Perception, can, Here then
 “we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to
 “attempt to prove the Truth of those Percep-
 “tions, whose Truth we can no otherwise prove,
 “than by other Perceptions of exactly the same
 “Kind with them, and which there is just the
 “same Ground to suspect; or to attempt to
 “prove the Truth of our Faculties, which can
 “no otherwise be proved, than by the Use or
 Means

“Means of those very suspected Faculties them-
 “selves*.”

Tho’ *He, Person, or Self* be certainly a *Sub-*
stance; yet Consciousness that *He is the same*
Person, cannot, I think, be Consciousness that
He is the same Substance, to any Man, who makes
 the Body one Part of his *Self or Person*.

Indeed where the Idea of *Person, is only the*
 Idea of an individual immaterial Substance, a
 Consciousness we are the *same Person, is beyond*
 all Question, a Consciousness, that we are the
same Substance. And in this Case to doubt,
 whether the *same Person, be the same Substance,*
 wou’d be only to doubt, whether the *same indi-*
vidual Substance, was the same individual Sub-
stance.

According to Mr. *Locke, we may always be*
 sure, that we are the *same Persons, that is, the*
same accountable Agents, or Beings now, which
we were as far back as our Remembrance reaches:
 Or as far as a perfectly Just and Good God
 will cause it to reach.

As to any Thing, that looks like *doubting,*
 either after a *Demonstration, intuitive Perception,*
 or *Perception by Memory; I am thoroughly per-*
 suaded this ingenious Gentleman did not design
 in the least to charge Mr. *Locke* with it. It is
 true indeed, Mr. *Locke* thus expresses himself:—
 “Why one Intellectual Substance may not have
 “represented to it, as done by itself, what it
 “never did, and was perhaps done by some
 “other Agent; why such a Representation may
 “not possibly be without Reality of Matter of
 “Fact, as well as several Representations in

* The Analogy, &c. p. 308.

“ Dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the Nature of Things *,” — But then it should be remembered, that he thus immediately adds, — “ And that it *never is so*, will by us, ’till we have clearer Views of the Nature of thinking Substances, be best resolv’d into the Goodness of God, who, as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concern’d in it, will not by a *fatal Error* of theirs transfer from one to another that Consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it †.”

And therefore it may not be amiss to observe, that Mr. *Locke* has sufficiently secured this Point; when he rests it upon no weaker a Foundation, than the *Goodness* of God. Of which, I presume, we may be as infallibly assured, as of the Truth of any of our Faculties whatever. A Man may certainly, with as much Modesty, doubt of the Truth of his own *Memory* or *Perceptions*, as call in question that Divine Attribute. And surely he that can do This, may with equal Reason, doubt of the very *Being* of a God, or of his own Existence.

Mr. *Locke* indeed supposed, that we knew not enough of the Nature of Thinking Substances, peremptorily to determine that such *Representations* could never happen; and therefore he esteem’d it the most effectual Way to obviate Doubts of this Kind, to resolve the Whole into that Adorable Goodness, which could not suffer us to be so far deceived, as to be render’d for ever *undeservedly* miserable. And at the

* H. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 13.

† Ibid.

same

same time, he “ leaves it to be considered, how far this may be an Argument against those, who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting Animal Spirits *.” And a very powerful Argument this must certainly appear to every Man, who has any just or rational Conceptions either of the Deity, or of his own Nature.

Upon the whole, Mr. *Locke* has been so far from encouraging any *Unreasonable* Doubts (I mention this for the Sake of those Readers, who may either mistake Mr. *Locke* or Dr. *Butler*) that he has expressly endeavour’d to guard us against them, since he tells us, that let our Ignorance of the Nature of thinking Substances, and of their Operations upon one another, be what it will; yet we may be infallibly assured, we can never be deceiv’d in that *Consciousness which draws Reward or Punishment with it*, from the Hands of God. But that whatever Actions such Consciousness appropriates to us, whether good or evil, are most certainly our own; that we are the *very Persons*, who once actually did those Actions; and that *we alone* are justly rewardable or punishable for them.

As to the learned Author of the *Dissertation*, it is by no Means surprizing, if he and Mr. *Locke* differ with regard to *Personal Identity*: Since whilst they both talk of the *same Person*, they sometimes talk of very *different* Things. Mr. *Locke* will not allow any *unconscious Being*, Agent, or Substance to be a *Person*: he esteems Consciousness so essential in this respect, that he affirms “ A Carcase may be a *Person*, as well as any Sort of Substance be so, without Consci-

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 13.

“ ousness.”

ousness*.” Whereas, tho’ a *present Consciousness* of what we at present do, is supposed *necessary to our being the Persons we now are*; — I think *Person*, in the Doctor’s Sense of the Word, may generally stand for any *living unconscious Man* whatever. And therefore as their *Ideas* of what constitutes a *Person*, are different, it is no Wonder they disagree as to what constitutes the *Sameness* of That *Person*.

However it is submitted, whether Mr. *Locke’s* Sentiments in relation to *Personal Identity*, have been altogether placed by Dr. *Butler* in their proper Light; and withal, how far they have been affected by the *Objections* of that learned and ingenious Writer?

* Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 23.



THE



THE
OBJECTIONS

Rais’d against

Mr. *LOCKE*

BY

The Learned Author of *An ENQUIRY*
into the Nature of the Human Soul,
Consider’d.

“ SINCE Matter, says this Writer, cannot be percipient, it cannot have Ideas; Ideas are perceiv’d, and are consequently nothing but Perceptions; and therefore it cannot have Sensation, Feeling, or Life, because all these imply Perception.” Vol. I. p. 192.

This being laid down, the ingenious Author proceeds thus to remark: — “ From this we
E “ may

“ may see what little Reason Mr. *Locke* had to
 “ be so peremptory in his Dispute with the Bi-
 “ shop of *Worcester* about the Possibility of Mat-
 “ ter’s Thinking; where, to prove it possible,
 “ he says, for Example, God creates an extend-
 “ ed solid Substance, without superadding any
 “ Thing else to it, and so we may consider it at
 “ rest: To some Parts of it he superadds Mo-
 “ tion, but it has still the Essence of Matter.
 “ Other Parts of it he frames into Plants, with
 “ all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and
 “ Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose, or a
 “ Peach-tree, *above the Essence of Matter in ge-*
 “ *neral*, but it is still but Matter. To other
 “ Parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion,
 “ and those other Properties that are to be found
 “ in an Elephant. Hitherto it is not doubted
 “ but the Power of God may go, [and that the
 “ Properties of a Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant,
 “ superadded to Matter, change not the Pro-
 “ perties of Matter; but Matter is in these
 “ Things Matter still*:] But if one venture to
 “ go one Step farther, and say, God may give
 “ to Matter Thought, Reason, and Volition,
 “ as well as Sense and spontaneous Motion, there
 “ are Men ready presently to limit the Power
 “ of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he can-
 “ not do it, because it destroys the Essence, or
 “ *changes the Essential Properties* of Matter †.”

To this our Author replies, — “ A Man
 “ may warrantably say, That to effect a Con-

* The Words here inclosed are left out in the Quotation.
 The ingenious Objector might think them superfluous;
 but they may not appear so to others.

† B. IV. C. 3. § 6. In the Notes at these Mords — *We
 have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, &c.*

tradiction

“ tradition is not the Object of any Power;
 “ nothing less limits Omnipotence: And such
 “ it is to effect that a Substance, which as solid-
 “ ly extended, must resist all Change of State,
 “ should, while remaining solidly extended, be-
 “ come of *dull, dead Earth*, Life, Sense, and
 “ spontaneous Motion*; for that is to say, it
 “ becomes *living, sensible*, and *spontaneously mov-*
 “ *ing Earth*, while it remains dull and dead
 “ Earth.” Vol. I. p. 192—194.

After our Author has reproved Mr. *Locke*
 for having been over *peremptory*; he proceeds
 next to charge him with a *Contradiction*, which,
 like the *Egyptian Darkness*, may really be *felt*.
 For it seems according to Mr. *Locke*, Earth may
 become *living, sensible*, and *spontaneously moving*,
 whilst it remains without *Life*, or *Sense*, or *Mo-*
tion! Not that Mr. *Locke* is taxed with main-
 taining this in so many Words; but *only* what
 amounts to it. If we enquire after Mr. *Locke*’s
 Proposition, here it seems to be: — “ A Sub-
 “ stance, whilst solidly extended, may become
 “ of *dull, dead Earth, Life, Sense*, and *sponta-*
 “ *neous Motion!*” At least this Proposition must
 be suppos’d to contain Mr. *Locke*’s Meaning;
 since we are refer’d to the very Page, Volume,
 and Edition of his Works. But whether our
 Author has not given us a very *faulty Paraphrase*
 of his own, rather than the Words or Sense of
 Mr. *Locke*, may be partly conjectured from the
 very Letter publish’d by Mr. *Locke* himself.

“ If the Omnipotent Creator, says Mr. *Locke*,
 “ had not superadded to the Earth, which pro-
 “ duced the irrational Animals, Qualities far

* In the Page immediately after, *viz.* 145. Vol. II. Edit.
 printed 1715.

E 2 “ surpassing

“surpassing those of the dull, dead Earth, out of which they were made, Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than were before in it, it had still remain'd rude senseless Matter*.”

Pray what is here of the *dull dead Earth* becoming *Life*, and *Sense*, and *spontaneous Motion*? May not Creatures form'd of Earth, be endued with *Life*, and *Sense*, and *Motion*, without becoming those very *Powers* or *Qualities*? or does Mr. *Locke* affirm any thing else?

Indeed in these three Pages which begin the *Attack*, Mr. *Locke* is very closely press'd. At the Bottom of p. 193. after our Author has quoted a Paragraph from that Gentleman, where he says, “It is impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own *Ideas*, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly dispos'd, a Power to perceive and think, or else join'd and fix'd to Matter so dispos'd, a thinking immaterial Substance,” [B. IV. C 3. § 6.] I say, after this we meet with the following extraordinary Remark: — “This is founded upon what Mr. *Locke* elsewhere endeavours to maintain, That our *Ideas* are only *arbitrary Combinations*, without Connexion to any Thing in Nature.”

What can this Gentleman mean by this Assertion? Was Mr. *Locke's* Doubt, to wit, Whether *Omnipotence* had done the one or the other, founded upon this Supposition, *that our*

* Third Letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*, p. 399, 400. See also the fifth Edition of the *Essay*, p. 458. As to that Edition of Mr. *Locke's* Works which is refer'd to, I have had no Opportunity of consulting it.

Ideas are only *arbitrary Combinations*? Our Author seems evidently to affirm, *It is founded upon this*. Might he not as well have affirm'd, that *it was founded upon* the great Church at *Harlem*?

Besides, since this Gentleman knows that Mr. *Locke* only maintains *some** of our *Ideas* to be *arbitrary Combinations*; why should he express himself in so loose and careless a Manner, as may possibly mislead his Reader? Would not any Man, who was unacquainted with Mr. *Locke*, imagine he had maintained that *all* our *Ideas* were only such *Combinations*? However, what these *Ideas* are, and what Mr. *Locke* says of 'em, we shall have occasion to consider hereafter.

But now before we proceed to what immediately follows in this Writer, I beg Leave to take Notice of an Observation at some Distance. He tells us, that “For the superadded Properties of Thought, Reason, &c. to have no Subject of inherion, but the *Function* of dead Parts to dead Parts, is, notwithstanding the Word *Omnipotence* inserted, as contradictory, as any other Way of asserting the Materiality of thinking Beings †.”

A *Contradiction* is most certainly a *Contradiction* still, whatever is, or is not inserted. But tho' the Word *Omnipotence* will not alter a *Contradiction*, may it not, in some Measure render it excusable? I think it certainly must in the Opinion of our Author. Let us hear how beautifully he speaks of *Omnipotence* upon some other Occasions: — “Must we know, says he,

* B. II. C. 22. § 2. B. III. C. 5. § 1—6.

† Vol. I. p. 370. and Notes.

“ all the Art and Power of an *Omnipotent Creator*? or allow no Power and Art beyond what we know? Let any one answer this at his Leisure. We are but in our first Stage of Existence*.” “ Let him who hath the Term [*Infinite Power*] often in his Mouth, consider only the *Import* of it †.”

Is it possible for a Man to have so just a Sense of the *Almighty Power* of God, without thinking great Indulgence due to that Person, who, thro’ an awful Regard to *Omnipotence*, is betray’d into a Contradiction?

But be this as it will, after our Author has endeavour’d to fix the Absurdity about the *dull dead Earth* upon Mr. *Locke*, he thus triumphs: — “ So that, notwithstanding this Complaint, as if the Bishop had been unreasonably in opposing his Conclusion, it appears the Reason was good, and that he could not go one Step farther, without destroying the Essence of Matter, *viz. solid Extension*; and that he had gone a Step or two too far before, in making the *spontaneous Mover* in an *Elephant*, and the *external Mover* in the Mechanism both of Plants and Animals, *Properties* of dull and dead Earth.” Vol. I. p. 194.

The Reader, I durst say, will observe, that all this is not *only* asserted, but asserted in the very Page of a Quotation where Mr. *Locke* plainly denies so much as *Motion* to be a *Property* of *Matter*! Where he affirms the *Vegetation* and *Life* of a *Rose* or *Peach-tree* to be above the *general Essence of Matter*, tho’ such *Rose* or *Peach-tree* be still *Matter*! And withal, whilst he

* Vol. I. p. 173. in the Notes. † Vol. II. p. 434.

tells

tells us (in the Place refer’d to by our Author) that the *Life*, and *Sense*, and *spontaneous Motion* of Animals are *Qualities far surpassing* those of the *dull dead Earth*: *Nobler Qualities* than are to be found in *rude senseless Matter*! And yet this Gentleman ventures to tell his Reader, that “ Mr. *Locke* makes the *spontaneous Mover* in an *Elephant*, and the *external Mover* in the Mechanism both of Plants and Animals, *Properties of dull and dead Earth*!”

Let the judicious Reader now determine, which of these Gentlemen has advanced a Step or two too far.

However, it seems, “ Mr. *Locke* hath well observed, that they are different Considerations that prove the Soul *immortal* and *immaterial*; but yet when he says, that *It is as evident to him that [some] Brutes reason in certain Instances*, as that they have *Sense*,” [B. II. C. 11. § 11. fifth Edit.] “ and here takes it for granted, that *it is but mere Matter with super-added Properties that thus reasons* (tho’ he offers no Proof of either of these Assertions) and since all Men suppose the Matter of the Brute Body finally dissipated at Death, this gives an *ignorant Sceptic* Courage to affirm that it may be so with the Human Soul: Why should we maintain a Point *gratis*, and barely for maintaining’s Sake; as here Mr. *Locke* allows the Soul is immaterial, but contends it might have been material; why, I say, should he maintain a Point *gratis*, that hath a bad Tendency? Were all other Arguments wanting, this itself would be one against it. No Truth by being known, could have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men: And contra-

“ rily,

“ rily, what will always have a bad Effect on
 “ the Minds and Lives of Men, will have strong
 “ Probability at least against its being Truth,
 “ supposing no Argument could be brought for
 “ or against it.” Vol. I. p. 194, 195.

As to the first of these *proofless Assertions*,
 Mr. *Locke* tells us in the very Section refer'd to,
 that “ *If Brutes have any Ideas at all, and are*
 “ *not bare Machines* * (*as some would have them*)

* Since the late learned Author of the *Procedure, Extent,*
 and *Limits of Human Understanding*, has maintain'd that
 “ *Brutes are mere Matter*, p. 169. and that all their *Actions*, as
 “ he calls 'em, are from a *Necessity* of Nature, like the Mo-
 “ tion of a *Clock*, or a *Watch*, or as one *Ball* struck against
 “ another; and that they are moved by the *internal Impulse*
 “ of *Ideas*, without any Capacity of moving themselves, or
 “ of *intending, designing, or altering* any Motion,” p. 162, —
 164, 395. Besides what has been already observ'd, [See *Vind.*
 of Mr. *Locke*, Dial. VI.] I beg leave here to propose an Ar-
 gument against this *Hypothesis*. which, tho' not an Argument
 of the *abstract* Kind, will, I hope, appear to have some
 Weight in it. — It is confess'd on all Hands, that an Horse,
 for Instance, will pass quietly by some Objects, but not by
 others. Shall we say the Reason is, because the great Author
 of their Being has, in Order to their Preservation, united
 such particular Effects to such and such Causes: So that what-
 ever is hurtful, or likely to prove so, shall constantly be at-
 tended with such various Motions of these Animals, as are
 most likely to secure and protect 'em from Danger? This, I
 presume, is the most that can be said for the different Be-
 haviour of these Creatures, upon the *Cartesian Hypothesis*,
 which seems to me much the same with that Gentleman's.
 [See the *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke*, in the Place just refer'd to.]
 But now if this be the Cause that *Brutes* will startle at one
 Object, and not at another: What Reason is to be assign'd,
 why they will more frequently endanger their Rider at the
 Sight of that which can never hurt 'em, than at the Sight
 of that which actually may? Will not the same Horse fly
 from a dead Dog, or a Bundle of Chips, who will pass un-
 concern'd thro' an Army of Men? And on the other Hand,
 with what Difficulty are these Creatures remov'd when a Sta-

“ we

“ *we cannot deny them to have some Reason:*” Pre-
 suming, I suppose, that if they have *Ideas*,
 they might make some use of 'em. And he
 moreover infers from the Behaviour of some of
 these Animals, that they not only have *Ideas*,
 but lay them up in their Memories, and use
 them upon Occasion. [B. II. C. I. § 19. C. 10.
 § 10.] But notwithstanding this, it seems Mr.
Locke has not so much as offer'd a Proof, that
 [some] *Brutes reason in certain Instances!*

Well, but Mr. *Locke* takes it for granted, viz.
 in his Dispute with the Bishop of *Worcester*, that
 an *Elephant* (whom elsewhere he asserts to have
 some Degree of Reason) is only Matter with *su-
 peradded Properties*. As Mr. *Locke* had no Dis-
 pute with that learned Prelate in Regard to
 the Composition of *Elephants*, what were we
 to expect he should *prove* about 'em? That

ble is in Flames, and they in the utmost Danger of perishing?
 Surely if these helpless Animals have not a Power of *Self-
 motion*; but are necessarily impell'd by their *Ideas*, is it to
 be imagined that the wise Author of Nature would establish
 such Laws, as should operate in so *preposterous* a Manner? Is
 it conceivable that *Brutes* should lie under a Necessity of con-
 forming themselves to a certain blind Impulse of *Ideas*; which
 in some Instances, forced them to fly where there was no
 Danger; and in others, oblig'd 'em to stay, tho' with the
 utmost Risk and Hazard of their Lives?

I should be glad to see these Difficulties fairly answer'd,
 upon that *Hypothesis*. Whereas, allowing those Animals a
Power of Self-motion; that they are really conscious of some-
 thing that affects 'em; that they can properly discern and dis-
 tinguish one Object from another; and that as Objects are
 more or less familiar, and appear more or less agreeable or
 terrifying, they conform themselves and their Motions ac-
 cordingly; upon these Suppositions, where is the Wonder
 if *Brutes* are mistaken as well as Creatures of a far superior
 Rank; or if their Fears and Apprehensions often impose
 upon 'em?

F

which

which is there mention'd, he plainly supposes his Lordship would grant; and therefore, as any other wise Man would have done, he says no more than he had Occasion to say.

But still these *Assertions*, whether *proved* or not, *encourage an ignorant Sceptic* to draw bad Inferences.

Suppose Mr. *Locke* had maintain'd, that not only *Elephants*, but *Fleas* and *Mites* have *immaterial Souls**; will this Gentleman assure us, that an *ignorant Sceptic* could not draw a foolish Conclusion from it?

But then, Why should Mr. *Locke* maintain a Point *gratis*, which has a *bad Tendency*? With all Submission, the proper Question is, Why should Mr. *Locke* write whilst there were *Fools to read*? If Men will leave God Almighty out, where Mr. *Locke* has always declared *he is present*; if they will infer their Souls shall die, whilst he maintains the reverse†, as directly the reverse, and as expressly the contrary, as Light is to Darkness; who is to be answerable for the *bad Tendency* of this? Suppose it be affirm'd, that “there is no Being but what is *naturally immortal* as long as God doth not extinguish it: And that otherwise there is no Being at all, but what is *naturally mortal*: — That all Immortality is founded on the *Will* and *Design* of God, and that it is therefore absurd to seek for a Demonstration of it *in the Nature of the created Being itself* ‡:” Let this be said, and let an *ignorant Sceptic* read

* See the *Enquiry* Vol. I. p. 214—217, 241.

† B. I. C. 1. § 5. B. II. C. 7. § 5. C. 21. § 44. 70. B. IV. C. 3. § 6. C. 12. § 11.

‡ Ibid. p. 243. in the Notes.

it,

it, as he reads Mr. *Locke*; pray what would become of the *Immortality* of the Soul? Or where would be the Difference in Point of *Immortality*, betwixt the *Soul* of a *Man*, and the *Body* of a *Brute*? But who is answerable for all this? Shall we say that no one ought to answer for the *Folly* and *Wickedness* of others but Mr. *Locke* only? Or shall we find out a *Distinction*, and affirm that nothing is here maintain'd *gratis*? What a surprizing Difference must this make in the *bad Tendency* of a Proposition? And how differently will an *ignorant Sceptic* find himself affected by it?

What our Author afterwards observes, that “*No Truth by being known could have a bad Effect on the Minds and Lives of Men*,” is, I presume, very firmly held by all the various Sects of Philosophers whatever. Thus our own *Hypotheses* being always *true*, and *Truth* having no *bad Effects*, it is plain all the *Danger* can only arise from the Doctrine of our Opponents. Tho' indeed this Gentleman has given us Authority to say, that “*the Things we are afraid of, may be but our own particular Prejudices*.” Vol. I. p. 247. in the Notes.

This Author disputing against a Scheme of a very learned Prelate*, who undertakes to prove the *Non-existence* of Matter, he thus expresses himself: — “Mr. *Locke* speaks of *sensitive Knowledge* with much Fairness and Candor, giving it the third Place, or making the Degrees of our Knowledge to be *Intuitive*, *Demonstrative*, and *Sensitive*, B. IV. C. 2. § 14. and C. 11, But with much Submission, the

* Bishop Berkeley.

F 2

Existence

“ Existence of Matter in general, or at least of
 “ material Sensories, to which the Soul is united,
 “ seems to me — to be nearer *Intuitive* than *De-*
 “ *monstrative* Knowledge, if the same *Perception*
 “ of *Parts* proves to us both the *Spirit* and a
 “ *material Sensory*.” Vol. II. p. 339.

Here appears to be some little Difference between this Gentleman’s Thoughts and Mr. *Locke*’s; tho’ what it is, I must own is not very clear to me. It seems however as if Mr. *Locke* had supposed the *Existence of Matter* in general, or of *material Sensories*, to be the Object of *Demonstrative* Knowledge; whereas according to Mr. *Locke*, such Knowledge, I believe, is not *Demonstrative* but *Sensitive**. However, let the Mistake lie where it will, it is an Affair of little Importance. Our Author’s Observation, that Mr. *Locke* speaks of *Sensitive* Knowledge with much *Fairness and Candor*, is most certainly true. And I will beg leave to add, that he not only speaks of *Intuitive* and *Demonstrative* Knowledge in the same Manner; but that he has said enough in the Places last mention’d (notwithstanding he is so often charged with encouraging of *Sceptics*) to root out all unreasonable *Scepticism* from the Minds of Men, if the Thing itself was capable of being done.

Mr. *Locke* had told his learned Antagonist, the Bishop of *Worcester*, that “ if his Lordship
 “ allow’d Brutes to have *Sensation*, it would follow,
 “ either that God can and doth give to
 “ some Parcels of Matter a Power of Perception
 “ and Thinking, or that all Animals have im-
 “ material, and consequently, according to his

* B. IV. C. 2. § 14. C. 9. § 2. C. 11.

“ Lordship,

“ Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men.”
 Lett. 3. p. 406.

“ Here, says our Author, Mr. *Locke* supposes
 “ that *Sensation* implies *Thinking*, as much as it
 “ implies *Perception*; which is quite wrong, I
 “ conceive.” Vol. I. p. 214. Notes.

It is not unlikely but Mr. *Locke* might suppose that a Creature could not be conscious of Pain or Pleasure, without attending in some Degree to those different *Sensations*. And hence, I presume it is, that in the Place just mention’d, he says, that *Sensation* is comprehended under *Thinking in general*; as elsewhere he makes *Sensation* a *Mode of Thinking*, B. II. C. 19. § 1. and how any Animal can be *sensible* of the Smart of a Wound, without *thinking* in some Measure upon it, let him that can, conceive.

But in Answer to this, we may be told, that, “ without *Freedom* there cannot be a *thinking*
 “ Being; and that an *active* Being, a *thinking*
 “ Being, and a *free* Being are synonymous
 “ Terms.” Vol. I. p. 203. Notes.

However, does not this Gentleman allow *Brutes* to be *spontaneous* as to the Power of beginning some Motions, as well as Men? p. 177. Notes; and that they have a *spontaneous* Mover within ’em? p. 194. and withal that they are *active* in *willing** Motion? p. 190. and that *Activity* and *Power* belong to *Spirit* by its *Nature*

* As to the being *active* in *willing*, see Dr. *Clarke*’s Remarks upon a *Philosophical Enquiry* concerning Human Liberty, p. 7—9, 22, 23. Indeed our Author seems to use *willing* not for the *Passive Perception of the Understanding*; but for the *Exertion of the Self-motive Power*, for he maintains, that to *will* is to *act*. V. 1. p. 203. Notes: and consequently, the being *active* in *willing*, is only the being *active* in *acting*.

and

and *Constitution?* p. 255. How then, it may be ask'd, can a Creature be *active* in *willing*; or how can it have *Activity* and *Power* belonging to its very *Nature*, and yet be no *active* Being? or, which is much the same Thing, how can it be *spontaneous** without *Freedom*? But be this as it will, neither the *Immateriality* of the *Souls* of *Brutes*, nor their *Spontaneity*, *Activity*, or *Power* will entitle 'em to the Privilege of *Thinking*: for "wanting the other Species of *Activity*, the "spontaneous Direction of their perceptive Capacity towards and thro' their past Perceptions, they cannot be called *thinking Creatures*." Vol. I. p. 190.

But still some may apprehend, that since a *Brute Animal* can often remember his Lessons; and frequently appears shy of one Man and fond of another, this looks as if his *perceptive Capacity* was directed towards his past Perceptions. However, what if this should not be *spontaneous*? or granting it was, yet there may be as much Difference between *spontaneous* and *spontaneous*, as between *active* and *active*.——But now with Submission to this Gentleman, to maintain that the *Activity* of the Human Soul is of two Kinds, and its *Perceptivity* twofold, the one more noble than the other; but that the Soul of *Brutes* has only the single *Activity* and *Perceptivity* of the lower Sort, to which *thinking* does not belong; [Vol. I. p. 351—353.] all this is no more than saying in other Words, that *Brutes cannot think*.——The vast Difference between the *thinking* of Men and *Brutes* is finely observ'd by Mr. *Locke*; [B. II. C. II. § 5—11.] but because the

* See Dr. *Clarke's* first Letter to a Gentleman at *Cambridge* concerning *Liberty* and *Necessity*.

Thoughts

Thoughts of the one are neither employ'd about the same sublime Subjects as those of the other, nor in so extensive a Manner, therefore to maintain they *think* not, is little better reasoning than to infer a Creature *sees* not, unless it has the Eyes of a *Hawk* or an *Eagle*.——Our Author farther observes, that "if the *Brute Soul* super-exist the Dissolution of the Body, we "cannot conceive it without the perceptive Capacity, as to external Objects; and that in a greater Degree than when confined to it; but even "here it is inferior to the Human Soul. It is not "percipient of Harmony in Sound," &c. p. 353. Notes.

If this last Clause relate to the *Super-existence* of the *Brute Soul*, one would be glad to know how this Gentleman came by his Information? If it belong to their *present* State, it may be Matter of Surprize to some, how those Creatures that can charm Mankind with their own melodious Notes, and who are capable of learning musical Lessons from us, should yet not be percipient of Harmony in Sound! Again, "if the "[Brute Soul] super-exist, it is easier to conceive "that it must have some kind of *Activity*, than to "determine what that is." p. 354. Notes. I don't find that this ingenious Gentleman cares to let these Creatures think hereafter, any more than at present. He really seems to be as much afraid of their *thinking*, tho' he has furnish'd 'em with *immaterial Souls*, as ever the learned **Des Cartes* could be, who made nothing of 'em, but so many Systems of *Matter*.

* Lettre 67. p. 335 — 338. & Dissert. de Methodo, p. 44—46.

But

But it seems, “ since Mr. *Locke* wrote (that is since he told the learned Prelate what must follow from his Lordship’s Concession) “ others “ have caught the Hint, and brought in the “ *Eels in Vinegar*, and other *Microscopical Animalculæ*, to expose the Immateriality of Souls.” Vol. I. p. 215. Notes.

I hope this Gentleman don’t mean to insinuate that *all* who have talk’d a little *jocosely* of the Souls of such *Animalculæ*, have either done it with a Design to *expose* the Immateriality of the Human Soul, or that they *have caught the Hint* from Mr. *Locke* *. If we had been favour’d with a more particular Account of those *others*, it had been more easy to determine how far Mr. *Locke* might be involved in their Guilt.

The next Article against Mr. *Locke* relates to his “ using the Word *Spirit* for a thinking Substance, without excluding Materiality out of “ it, by the Authority of *Virgil* and *Cicero*.” But first let us hear what Mr. *Locke* says upon this very Occasion. [This] “ perhaps will be “ thought too great a Liberty, and such as deserves Censure. — I readily own, that Words “ should be sparingly ventur’d on in a Sense “ wholly new; and nothing but absolute Necessity can excuse the Boldness of using any “ Term in a Sense, whereof we can produce no “ Example. But in the present Case, I think “ I have great Authorities to justify me.” [After having mention’d his Authorities, he thus proceeds:] “ Whether they thought right in “ this, that is not the Question; but whether

* See the Author of the *Procedure*, p. 173, 174. or the *Vindication of Mr. Locke*, p. 110, 111.

“ they

“ they spoke properly, when they called an “ active, thinking, subtle Substance, out of “ which they excluded only gross and palpable “ Matter, *Spiritus*. I think that no body will deny, That if any among the *Romans* can be “ allow’d to speak properly, *Tully* and *Virgil* “ are the two, who may most securely be depended on for it*.”

“ But with Submission, replies our Author, I “ think no Man ever before defended *the Propriety* “ of an Expression, exclusive of the Truth of it, “ in a Philosophical Controversy †.” — Admitting this to be true, What may be the Mischief or Absurdity of it? Why, “ If the Acceptation of a Word is such as determines the “ Question, without farther Argument, as “ in this Case; to justify the Propriety of it then, “ is to make the common Use of Language decide in Points of Philosophy ‖.”

What *Question* may this Gentleman be here talking of? Mr. *Locke*’s Question was only, whether *Virgil* and *Cicero* spoke *properly*? But whether they did, or did not, how will this *make common Language decide in Points of Philosophy*? The Reason is, I presume, because the *Propriety of common Language*, and the *Truths of Philosophy* are always *inseparably* connected.

However, “ If *Cicero* or *Virgil* had wrong “ Ideas as to the Immateriality of the Soul, tho’ “ they express’d these wrong Ideas right, that “ doth not mend the Matter ‖.”

Unfortunate Mr. *Locke*! The whole, he contended for, is admitted; and yet he has lost his

* First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 68 — 70.
† Vol. I. p. 220. in the Notes. ‖ Ibid.

G

Point

Point notwithstanding! For tho' *Cicero* and *Virgil* might with *Propriety* call That *Spirit*, which they thought was *subtle Matter*; yet *Mr. Locke* cannot with *Propriety* do the same Thing!

Besides, "The Dispute between the Bishop and *Mr. Locke*, was, whether *Matter* could think, and not the classical Acceptation of the "Word *Spiritus*||."

Now suppose this Gentleman had said, that the *Dispute* was, whether God Almighty can, if he pleases, *superadd* to *Matter* a Faculty of Thinking; — I say if our Author had chose to express himself in this Manner, it is submitted, whether such a Representation had not been full as *kind* and as *just*, as his own present Account*? What we are to infer from his telling us, that *the Dispute was not about the classical Acceptation of the Word Spiritus*, I know not. He could never design to insinuate, that *Mr. Locke* was guilty of a needless or impertinent Digression; for the ingenious Author most certainly knew better †.

But be that as it will, *Mr. Locke* is next corrected about the *Mobility* of Spirits.

"Having, says our Author, mention'd Motion as an Affection of real Motion in Matter, let me be permitted to explain, and restrain a little, what *Mr. Locke* hath advanced concerning the Motion of all finite Spirits. In B. II. C. 23. § 17, 18. [*Mr. Locke*] having enumerated the primary Ideas peculiar to *Body* and *Spirit*, as contradicting each other; he makes *Mobility* common to them

|| *Ibid.*

* See *Mr. Locke's* first Letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*, p. 64. and *Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 3. § 6.*

† First Letter, p. 64—75.

"both; which he illustrates and defends
 " *Sett.* 19—21. He hath before ascribed *Mobility*, or a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought, to Spirit, as one of the Ideas peculiar to it; so that by *Mobility* he seems to mean a Capacity in Spirit of being moved by something *ab extra*, and not the Power of moving, which is included in *Motivity*; especially since he makes *Mobility* common to both Matter and Spirit. Which, with Submission, I think is very wrong, and tends to confound the Natures of the two Substances he would distinguish. — A Substance that no way impedes Motion, but effects it, can with no Propriety, I think, have the Capacity of *Mobility* ascribed to it; as it is ascribed to Body, a Substance which resists Motion, and no way effects it. — To make Spirit Material, and so at once both to cause and hinder Motion, is a plain Contradiction*. — Even in the Journey betwixt *London* and *Oxford*, where the Man's Spirit is not the Mover, but the Horses move the Coach, his Body and all his Spirit doth not impede the Motion, or make the Draught heavier; or is not properly a Mover. So that, in Effect, *Mobility* doth not belong in common both to Body and Spirit. Nor farther, can Motion belong to both, but in very different Senses. — It is true, Spirits change Place, and Motion in this Sense is competent to all finite Spirits. But in this Motion they are not Movers but Movers; which is the Distinction endeavour'd to be confounded. Sceptical People conclude from

* See the Vindication of *Mr. Locke*, p. 57—60.

“ this, that whatever *moves*, is material. But it
 “ will not follow, that whatever moves as a
 “ Mover, is material, and has the relations of
 “ Matter*.”

This Gentleman has very well observ'd in another Place, that “ it is an easy but a fallacious Method, to run away with a *Flux* of Words: We may draw up, says he, such a *specious* Shew of *Probabilities*, supported by *Prejudices*, as shall make a *dreadful Appearance* taken all together; and yet *turn to Nothing* at last, when *examined* and *sifted* separately†.”

But let us now consider his Objections. And First, the *Mobility* ascribed by Mr. *Locke* to finite Spirits, *tends to confound the Natures of the two Substances he would distinguish*. After This we are told, that *the Distinction* between *Moved* and *Movers* is *endeavoured* to be *confounded*.

But This, notwithstanding it looks a little *suspiciously*, cannot be design'd for Mr. *Locke*. For how is it possible, he should *endeavour* to *confound* That, which our Author assures us, he *would distinguish*?

However, as to the Supposition itself, that *One Spirit may be moved by another*, what *Confusion* need it occasion? or what bad Consequences can arise from it? Why, *Sceptical People may conclude from this, that whatever moves, is material*. However, now this Gentleman has *explain'd* the Matter; it is to be hoped they will *conclude* more wisely for the future. But then, *A Spirit is a Substance that no way impedes Motion, but effects it*. And yet Nothing is more demonstra-

* Vol. I. p. 229—231. in the Notes. † Vol. II. p. 128.

ble,

ble, than that a *Spirit* can as well do the One as the Other.

Does not this Gentleman himself tell us,——
Spirit, it is true, stops Motion? P. 230. However, This is perform'd “ by the same *living Efficacy*, “ by which it begins it, not by a *Deadness* and “ *Resistance in itself to be moved*.—— It hath no “ *Moment*, as Body hath, proceeding from its “ *Vis inertiae*. The Capacity of *Mobility* can “ with no *Propriety* be ascribed to it, as it is “ ascribed to Body. And it doth not in a Journey [whilst the Body is in the Coach] impede “ the Motion, or *make the Draught heavier**.”

Well then, the whole seems to amount to this, —— A *Spirit* can both *effect* and *impede* Motion; tho' it never by its *Weight*, or *Deadness*, or *Sluggishness* hinders or resists it.

But now, where has Mr. *Locke* so much as suggested one Word to the Contrary? Or how will all this prove, that One Spirit can't *move* Another?

If the *Active Force* of *A* be twice superior to that of *B*, what should hinder *A* from compelling *B* to *move*; tho' never so much against his *Inclination*? It is admitted, that *B* makes no *Resistance* by his *Weight* or *Deadness*: He only resists by the *Exertion* of his *Active Power*; but when that is overcome by a superior Force, must he not of *Necessity* give Way to it? So that it is submitted, whether *Mobility*, even in this Sense, be not *competent* to *finite Spirits*?

But now after all, if by the *Mobility* of Spirits, Mr. *Locke* should only mean their being *moved* by themselves, or their *changing the Place* they were before in, by *their own proper Motion*; I say,

* Ibid.

if

if he should mean no more than this, *the dreadful Appearance* may all *turn to Nothing*. And that he means no more, I appeal to any Reader, who will but turn to the Sections, where Mr. *Locke* speaks of this *Mobility*.

“ There is no Reason, says he, why it should be thought strange, that I make *Mobility* belong to *Spirits*: For having no other *Idea* of Motion, but *Change of Distance* with other Beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding that *Spirits* cannot operate but where they are; — I cannot but attribute *Change of Place* to all finite *Spirits*. — For my Soul being a real Being, as well as my *Body*, is certainly as capable of *changing Distance* with any other Being, as *Body* itself; and so is capable of Motion. — One may certainly conceive a *Distance*, and a *Change of Distance* between two *Spirits*; and so conceive their Motion, their Approach, or Removal one from another. — The Soul being united to the *Body*, — *constantly changes Place* all the whole Journey, — and I think may be said to be truly all that while in Motion. To consider [the Soul] as going out of the *Body*, or leaving it, and yet to have no *Idea* of its Motion, seems to me impossible*.”

But here it may be objected, If this be Mr. *Locke's* Meaning †, how comes he to ascribe *Mobility* both to *Body* and *Spirit*?

Has *Body* a Power of moving itself? Or if it has not, how does *Mobility* belong in common to Both?

* B. II. C. 23. § 18 — 21. See also § 28. and B. IV. C. 10. § 10. † B. II. C. 23. § 18.

Whoever

Whoever will with *Candor* consider what Mr. *Locke* says in the Places just cited, will find that *Mobility*, as refer'd to *Body*, can mean no more, than a Power of being moved by something else; but not a Power of *Self-motion*, which it signifies, when ascribed to *Spirit*.

However, our Author approves of Mr. *Locke*, because he “ allows that the internal, unknown Constitution of Things is something; — which I think, says he, is very right, for Qualities cannot depend on *Nothing*. This is taken Notice of, because sceptical Men begin to suppose they have Mr. *Locke's* Authority for insinuating that the unknown Constitution of Things is in itself *Nothing*; and that *Substance*, or what he calls *Substratum*, is “ but empty Sound*.”

Tho' I am very glad that Mr. *Locke* is here out of Danger; yet I must beg Leave to take Notice, that there are some other Persons, besides *sceptical Men*, who look upon *Substance*, as distinguish'd from certain Powers or Properties, to be no more than a very needless Word: And who seem to think they have, in some Measure, Mr. *Locke's* Authority with them †. However suppose they are mistaken as to both; as with regard to the latter, I presume it will be shewn ‡; yet since neither of these Gentlemen, I believe, ever fell under the Suspicion of *Scepticism*, this discovers, with how much Caution, Terms of an odious Sound should be used.

* Vol. I. p. 323. in the Notes. † See the second *Philosophical Essay* of Dr. *Watts*. And the ingenious Mr. *Law* in his Notes on *Archbishop King's* Origin of Evil. Vol. I. p. 4. Note 1st. ‡ See below the *Reflections* on Dr. *Watts's* *Essays*.

But

But now, Mr. *Locke* having said that *Essentia*, “in its primary Notation, signifies properly *Being*; and that *Essence* may be taken for the “*Being* of any thing, *whereby it is, what it is**;” our Author infers, that by *Essence*, Mr. *Locke* understands the mere *Being* or *Existence* of a Thing †.

In answer to which, I would first observe, that Mr. *Locke* speaks only of “two Sorts of “*Essences*, the *Real* and the *Nominal*||.” By the latter he means that “*Complex Idea*, which, “for Example, the Word *Gold* stands for, let it “be, for instance, says Mr. *Locke*, a Body yellow, of a certain Weight, malleable, fusible, “and fixed. By the *Real Essence*, he means the “Constitution of the insensible Parts of that “Body, on which those Qualities, and all the “other Properties of *Gold* depend**.”

“I have often says he mention’d a *real Essence*, “distinct in Substances from those abstract “Ideas of them, which I call their *Nominal Essence*. By this *real Essence*, I mean that real “Constitution of any Thing, which is the “Foundation of all those Properties, that are “combined in, and are constantly found to “co-exist with the *Nominal Essence*; that particular Constitution, which every Thing has “within itself, without any relation to any thing “without it †.”

Again, “The *real Essence* of a Thing, is that “internal Constitution, on which the Properties “of that Thing depend †.” And thus what

* B. III. C. 3. § 15. † Vol. I. P. 322—324. and Notes.
|| Ibid. ** B. III. C. 6. § 2. ‡ Ibid. § 6. † First
Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 49.

he

he had before call’d the *Being* of a Thing, *whereby it is, what it is*; he immediately after expresses in these Words, — *The real, internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things**.

But now, notwithstanding Mr. *Locke* has so clearly explain’d what he means by the *Being* of any Thing; yet our Author can by no means approve of the Word.

“Mr. *Locke*, says he, rather takes *Essence* “for the *Being* of any thing; tho’ we usually “say, such a Property is of the *Nature* or *Essence* of a thing, taking either Word indifferently; but never that it is of the *Being* of it, “which rather imports its *Existence* †.” Again, “*Being*, I think, is equivocal, and signifies the “*internal, unknown Constitution of Things*, less “properly, at least, less commonly, than any “other thing. The *Being* of a thing is ofteneft “taken in Opposition to the *not-being* of it; and “then it is the same as the *Existence* of it. We “say such a Thing is not *in being*. — But “granting that *Essence, Being*, and the *internal unknown Constitution* of Substances are properly the same Thing; we must resolve the “*Essence* of things into *Idea*, and make it the “same with their *Nature* †.”

However this Concession is afterwards revoked: This Gentleman resumes the Debate again after a short Intermission, and attacks Mr. *Locke* afresh from a *Title Page* of the late learn’d Dr. *Clarke*.

* B. III. C. 3. § 15. † Vol. I. p. 322—324. ‡ P. 323,
in the Notes.

H

“ But

“ But then, says our Author, as to his Acceptation of the Word *Essence*; as it seems not just in itself; so I think, it is inconvenient in Philosophy. The Word *Being*, by which he explains *Essence*, rather imports the *actual Existence* of a Thing, than its internal unknown Constitution, as hath been observed. Thus Dr. *Clarke* calls his Excellent Book, *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*; that is, a Demonstration that there really exists a God, and what his Attributes are. It would have sounded strangely to have said, a Demonstration of the *Essence*, or internal unknown Constitution,” &c.* —

This extraordinary Criticism may be left, I presume, in its full Force, without any Remark. But since the learned Dr. *Clarke* is brought in upon this Occasion, I beg leave just to observe, what he says of the Word in Controversy. — *Essence* according to him, may be taken either for the *inmost Substance* of Things, or for their *Essential Properties*. This last he calls the *proper metaphysical* Sense of the Word. In which Sense, the *Attributes* of God constitute his *Essence*; and *Solidity* or *Impenetrability* is the *Essence* of Matter. “ He does indeed himself use that Word for *Substance*; and which he likewise calls the *inmost Substance* of Things, and the *inmost Nature* of such Substance †.”

Whether *Essence*, in this Acceptation, be not exactly the same with Mr. *Locke's* *real Essence*, is submitted to the Reader's Judgment.

* Vol. I. P. 329. † See the Preface to the second Volume of his *Boyle's* Lectures 7th Edit. p. 132, 133.

However

However, since our Author maintains, that “ If there is any such thing as *Qualities* or *Properties*, there must be some *farther Thing*, to which they belong: since a *Quality* could not subsist by itself, or without a *Subject*: And that this *other Thing* — must be call'd *Subject*, *Support*, *Substance*, or some such Name, let Men ridicule as much as they please: For though we know not what the *Substratum*, or *Support* of *Properties* is, nor have any particular *Idea* of it; yet we know *that it is*, unless *Properties* could subsist by themselves*.” I say forasmuch as this is maintain'd, why should a *Demonstration* of the *Divine Essence* be thought by him to sound strangely? For is it possible, there could be a *Demonstration* of the *Divine Attributes*, which would not at the same time be a *Demonstration* of that *Real Essence*, that *inmost unknown Nature* of the *Divine Substance*, from whence those *Attributes* flow, and on which they depend? And if by *Essence* we only understand *Modes* or *Properties*, what is then a *Demonstration* of the *Divine Essence*, but merely a *Demonstration* of the *Divine Attributes*?

But it is farther objected, “ If *Substances* have unknown *Essences*, and other things have not; it will either follow, that there are two different *Species* of *Essences*; or that other things, besides *Substances*, have *no Essence* at all †.”

And what if we should suppose there are *two different Species* of *Essences*, would any *Inconvenience* arise from hence to *Philosophy*? On the

* V. I. p. 324 Notes, and p. 328. † P. 329.

H 2 contrary,

contrary, suppose Mr. *Locke* has shewn that there
 “ are *unknown Essences* belonging to *Substance*;
 “ and that the *real unknown Essence*, on which
 “ the discoverable Properties of *Substance* de-
 “ pend, is a very different Thing from those
 “ Properties, which he calls the *Nominal Es-*
 “ *sence*; tho’ this *Nominal Essence* be often mis-
 “ taken for the other: Suppose he has shewn
 “ Men the Difference between them; has taught
 “ us how to distinguish the one from the other,
 “ and thus has clear’d up what was dark and
 “ confus’d before. Suppose he has proved, that
 “ things are not sort’d by Men according to
 “ their *real unknown Essence*; but are put into
 “ different *Classes*, according to the Conceptions
 “ of Mens Minds: that is, according to that
 “ *Abstract Idea*, which Men by Observation
 “ have fram’d of the several Properties and
 “ Powers of *Substances*, and which Collection
 “ contain’d in such *Idea*, Mr. *Locke* calls the
 “ *Nominal Essence**.” If Mr. *Locke* has done all
 this, must it not be own’d that he has done real
 Service to Mankind; and that the learned World
 are greatly oblig’d to him? Some indeed may
 think so: but our Author seems of a very
 different Opinion.

“ He observes that Mr. *Locke* hath been
 “ thrown upon the Distinction of *real* and *No-*
 “ *minal Essences*; which, says this Gentleman,
 “ though it hath obtained, since he wrote his
 “ Book, yet I humbly beg leave to say, I do
 “ not see any Service it hath done to Philoso-
 “ phy †.”

* B. III. C. 3. § 11—14. C. 4. § 19. 20. C. 6. See also the
 fifth Edition of the *Essay*, p. 354. 357. in the Notes. † V. I.
 p. 330.

But

But pray, did not this Gentleman *see Cause*
 of commending Mr. *Locke**, for allowing the
internal, unknown Constitution of Things to be
something? And does he not there make a *Di-*
stinction himself, between that *something*, and the
Qualities which depend on it †? Well, but Mr.
Locke having call’d that *internal, unknown Con-*
stitution, the *real Essence* of *Substance*; and the
 discoverable *Qualities* depending on that *Con-*
stitution, the *Nominal Essence*, he has, I presume,
 by this means, undone every thing again; and
 our Author now *sees no manner of Service done*
to Philosophy! Nor is this all; but as Mr. *Locke*’s
 Misfortunes seldom come alone, so his being
 thrown upon that *Distinction*, has been the Oc-
 casion of *throwing* him upon something else: and
 which is neither more nor less, than a downright
Absurdity.

“ This again, says our Author, hath thrown
 “ him upon the Absurdity of asserting that all
 “ our *Moral* and *Mathematical Ideas*, those of Vir-
 “ tue, Vice, Justice, *Temperance*; a Circle, Square,
 “ Cube, Triangle, &c. (Things of as *fixt* and
 “ immutable Natures, as any that can be named)
 “ having only, according to his Distinction, no-
 “ minal Essences, are nothing but the mere
 “ arbitrary Compositions of Ideas in our Minds:
 “ which admitted, would be of the greatest *Dis-*
 “ *service* both in *Philosophy* and *Practice*, as shall
 “ be shewn elsewhere ‡.”

Would not any Mortal be inclin’d to think,
 that Mr. *Locke* had given a much greater Power
 to every Individual, than ever *Bellarmino* was
 charged with giving to the *Pope*? Not only a

* See above. † Vol. I. p. 323 Notes ‡ P. 330.

Power

Power of turning *Virtue* into *Vice*, and *Vice* into *Virtue*; but of turning *Circles* into *Squares*, and *Squares* into *Circles*?

But in what Part of his Works has Mr. *Locke* endanger'd the *fixt* and *immutable* Natures of these Things? Are the particular Places cited, which are to support this Charge? Indeed they are not. They are left entirely to the Reader's *Sagacity*, to find out. The late learn'd *Le Clerc* somewhere calls such an Omission, a *bad Custom*.

But with Submission to that great Critic, there may be *good* Reasons for it. To such Readers, as are already acquainted with those Passages, such Quotations would be *superfluous*. To those of an *implicit* Faith, they would be to *little* Purpose. And as to the *candid* and *impartial* Enquirer, tho' they might save him *some Trouble*, they might however do a Writer *much Mischief*. How far this may be the present Case, will be worth while to examine.

Mr. *Locke* then observes, that "*The Mind* often *exercises an Active Power in making those* several *Combinations of Ideas*, which he calls "*mixed Modes* *."

"Who can doubt, says he, but the *Ideas* of "*Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed in "*the Mind of Men*, and have Names given "*them*; and so these Species of mixed Modes "*be constituted*, before either of them was ever "*committed*; and might be as well discours'd "*of*, and reason'd about, and as certain Truths "*discovered* of them, whilst yet they had no "*Being* but in the Understanding, as well as

* B. II. C. 22. § 2. See also Sect. 9. where he mentions all the different Ways, by which we get the *Complex Ideas* of *mixed Modes*.

" now,

" now, that they have but too frequently a real "*Existence*? whereby it is plain, how much *the* "*Sorts of mixed Modes are the Creatures of the* "*Understanding*, where they have a Being as "*subservient to all the Ends of real Truth* and "*Knowledge*, as when they really exist *." But now, what is here contrary to the *immutable Nature* of Things? How many *Ideas* would a Man find in that *Complex Idea*, *Sacrilege*, if he was to give himself the Trouble of taking the Composition to Pieces? But how came they together? Did they grow up like a *Plant*? Or is not the whole *Combination* the Work of the Mind? And is not this equally true, whether a Man framed this *Idea*, before the Crime was committed, or afterwards? And may not the same clear and certain Truths be affirmed of it?

Again, Mr. *Locke* having said that "*abstract*, "*complex Ideas, with Names to them, are Essences* "*of the Sorts or Species of Things*; and that "*these Essences are supposed to remain steadily* "*the same*, whatever Mutations the particular "*Substances are liable to*; which cannot be true "*of the real Constitutions of Things*, which "*begin and perish with them*; he observes, "*that by this means the Essence of a Species rests* "*safe and entire*, without the Existence of so "*much as one Individual of that kind*. For "*were there now*, says he, no Circle existing "*any where in the World* (as perhaps, that *Figure* exists not any where exactly marked out) "*yet the Idea annexed to that Name*, would not "*cease to be what it is*; nor cease to be "*as a Pattern*, to determine which of the "*particular Figures we meet with*, have, or

* B. III. C. 5. § 5.

" have

“ have not a Right to the Name *Circle*; and
 “ so to shew, which of them, by having that
 “ Essence, was of that *Species**.” Whence now
 can arise any Danger to this *Figure*, or any of
 its *Properties*, from what Mr. *Locke* has said?
 And if he has not dealt worse by any other *ma-*
thematical Idea, it is submitted to the *Mathema-*
ticians, what just Cause of Complaint Mr. *Locke*
 has given? Besides, does not this Gentleman
 himself maintain, that Things which have only
 an *Ideal Existence*, have their *Essence* or *radical*
Properties? “ The chief and radical Property,
 “ says he, is the Essence of any thing in *Idea*,
 “ though the Thing should not exist, nor have
 “ any internal, unknown Constitution †.”

But tho’ its Constitution be not *unknown*, yet
 if there be not a Foundation in the very Nature
 of that Thing for such a Property, what can it
 be the *radical* Property of; from whence does it
 proceed; or on what does it depend? But to
 return to Mr. *Locke*: It may be farther objected,
 that he not only affirms “ those *Ideas*, which he
 “ calls *mixed Modes*, such as *Sacrilege*, *Parricide*,
 “ and the like, to be *Creatures of the Under-*
standing, but he maintains that the Mind pro-
 “ ceeds *very arbitrarily* in framing such *Ideas* †.”
 He really does so; but still, I hope, there is
 no manner of Danger.

“ The Mind indeed in making this Sort of
 “ *Ideas*, is not confined, as in the Case of *simple*
 “ *Ideas*, where it has no Power to make any
 “ One: Nor is it here obliged to examine them
 “ by the real Existence of Things, as it does
 “ in the complex *Ideas* of Substances; but mak-

* B. III. C. 3. § 19. See also § 17.
 † B. III. C. 5. § 1—6.

† Vol. I. p. 342.

ing

“ ing Use of what *Ideas* it had before, it *chuses*
 “ a certain Number, *gives* them Connexion, and
 “ *ties* them together by a Name*.” This seems
 to be all the *Dispensing Power* Mr. *Locke* has
 given the Mind in framing this sort of *Ideas*.
 And as a farther Check upon this *Power*, he has
 enter’d a *Caveat*, that “ they should *not be made*
 “ *at Random*, or jumbled together without any
 “ Reason at all: But that they should be always
 “ suited to the End, for which abstract *Ideas* are
 “ made; and that is for the Convenience of
 “ Communication, which is the chief End of
 “ Language †.” So that if the Mind keeps up
 to these Rules, we shall be safe enough, not-
 withstanding all her *Power*: If she does not,
 Mr. *Locke* can hardly, in Reason, be blamed
 for it.

However, it may still be urged, that all this
 will signify nothing; for if, according to Mr.
Locke’s *Distinction*, all our moral and mathemati-
 cal *Ideas* have only a nominal *Essence*; the Mind
 may compound her *Ideas* as she pleases; but
 Things of a *fixed* and *immutable* Nature, will
 have no *real Essence* at all: And if this Suppo-
 sition be not of bad Consequence both in *Philo-*
sophy and *Practice*, nothing can. — Let it be
 so. However, before Sentence is past, let us,
 according to the equitable Rule in Law, bear
 the other Side.

Does not Mr. *Locke* maintain, that “ the
 “ *real* and *nominal* Essence of *Modes* (of mathe-
 “ *matical Ideas*, for instance) are *always the same*?
 “ That a Figure including a Space between three
 “ Lines, is the *real* as well as *nominal* Essence

* B. III. C. 5. § 2, 3, 4.

† § 7.

I

“ of

“ of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract
 “ *Idea*, to which the general Name is annexed,
 “ but the very *Essentia*, or Being of the Thing
 “ itself; that Foundation, from which all its
 “ Properties flow, and to which they are all
 “ inseparably annexed*.” What is here call’d
 the very *Essentia*, or *Being*, Mr. *Locke* elsewhere
 calls the *formal Constitution*, or *Essence* of a Tri-
 angle. And this he observes *lies open to our*
Senses; which the *formal Constitution* [or *real Ef-*
sence] of a Substance does not †.

As to our *moral Ideas*; does he not maintain,
 that “ *the true and only Measure of Virtue, is the*
 “ *Rule prescribed by God* †? that *Morality is capa-*
 “ *ble of Demonstration*; and that the precise *real*
 “ *Essence* of the Things moral Words stand for,
 “ may be perfectly known**? That the Mea-
 “ sures of *Right* and *Wrong* may be made out by
 “ *necessary Consequences*, as incontestable as those
 “ in *Mathematicks* †? And that the *Ideas* that
 “ *Ethicks* are conversant about, are all *real Ef-*
 “ *sences* †?” Does not Mr. *Locke*, I say, main-
 tain all this? Beyond the least Controversy, he
 most evidently does. What Injury has he then
 done to *any* of our *moral* or *mathematical Ideas*?
 Or how can it be affirm’d, that *All* of them, ac-
 cording to his *Distinction*, have only *nominal Ef-*
sences? Good-nature inclines one to be in pain
 for the Man, who has *ventured* to affirm it.

But proceed we now to fresh Articles of In-
 dictment.

“ I cannot help being concern’d, says our
 “ Author, to find some great and learned Men

* B. III. C. 3. § 18. † B. III. C. 11. § 22. See also B. II.
 C. 31. § 6. ‡ B. I. C. 3. § 18. ** B. III. C. 11. § 16.
 † B. IV. C. 3 § 18. † B. IV. C. 12. § 8.

“ taking

“ taking the *wrong Side* of ambiguous Appearances,
 “ and falling in with the sceptical Notions of
 “ the World, by insinuating *that the Soul owes*
 “ *the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*;
 “ and this in order to maintain another *Hypothese-*
 “ *sis* of no very great Consequence in itself,
 “ tho’ it were true in this State of Union; viz.
 “ *that the Soul thinks not always*; which yet is
 “ not easily to be proved, even though the
 “ Activity of *Spirit* be clogg’d with dead Matter,
 “ and is certainly false in a State of Separation*.”

The Passage here refer’d to in Mr. *Locke*, is
 as follows: —

“ ’Tis true, we have sometimes Instances of
 “ Perception, whilst we are *asleep*, and retain
 “ the Memory of those *Thoughts*: But how *ex-*
 “ *travagant* and incoherent for the most part
 “ they are; how little conformable to the Per-
 “ fection and Order of a rational Being, those
 “ who are acquainted with *Dreams*, need not
 “ be told. This I would willingly be satisfied
 “ in, whether the Soul, when it thinks thus a-
 “ part, and as it were, separate from the Body,
 “ acts less rationally, than when conjointly with it,
 “ or no. If its separate Thoughts be less ratio-
 “ nal, then these Men must say, that the Soul
 “ owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to
 “ the Body: If it does not, ’tis a Wonder that
 “ our *Dreams* should be, for the most part, so
 “ frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul
 “ should retain none of its more rational Solilo-
 “ quies and Meditations †.” Upon this, our
 Author thus expresses himself:

* Vol. I. p. 319—321.

† B. II. C. 1. § 16.

“ We shall afterward see, *who in this Place*
 “ ascribes the Perfection of rational Thinking
 “ to the Body; however here is a broad Hint
 “ for material Souls. What *is for the most part*
 “ *only*, is not *always*: That Side ought to have
 “ been considered also. I hope it will appear,
 “ that the most incoherent of our Dreams is an
 “ Appearance far above Matter, or any Power
 “ Matter can be endued with: and that, upon a
 “ narrow Examination, the Actions properly of
 “ the Soul, in dreaming, will not be found so
 “ irrational, as is here presumed, and generally
 “ conceived*.”

As this Gentleman here pretty *broadly* intimates, *who* is to be charged with *ascribing the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*; so in other Places, perhaps for the better *illustrating* Mr. *Locke's* Opinion, we read this Charge with a little Variation. Thus in one Place, —

“ If the Soul were endebted to *Matter* for
 “ the Perfection of rational Thinking, &c. †.”
 In another, — “ It is very inaccurate, to a-
 “ scribe all the wild Representations, that are
 “ involuntarily forced upon the Soul, — to
 “ the Soul itself, and then insinuate that it owes
 “ the Perfection of rational Thinking to *Mat-*
 “ *ter* ‡.” In a third, — “ We are injurious
 “ in debasing the Nature of our Souls all Man-
 “ ner of Ways. We would have the Soul mate-
 “ rial: If it be not, yet we would ascribe the
 “ Perfection of rational Thinking to *Matter* ||.”
 And elsewhere having told us that Mr. *Locke's*
 Representation of the Appearance of Sleep and
 Dreaming was *unjust* and *inaccurate*, he thus pro-

* Vol. I. p. 320, Notes.
 p. 25. || P. 164.

† Vol. I. p. 321. ‡ Vol. II.

ceeds:

ceeds: — “ This Phænomenon of Sleep and
 “ Dreaming therefore, which hath been made
 “ use of to exalt the Nature of Matter, and
 “ depress the Perfection of the Soul, rightly
 “ considered, shews the very contrary*.”

How *exalted* a Notion Mr. *Locke* had of the
Nature of Matter; and how inclined he was to
depress the *Perfection* of the *Soul*, have been set,
 I presume, in a very clear and impartial Light †.

But now, tho' Mr. *Locke* in the Section just
 refer'd to, be only considering what must be
 allow'd by those, who grant the *separate Thoughts*
 of the Soul to be *less rational*; yet let us sup-
 pose he was of Opinion, that a Man generally
 thinks more rationally *awake* than *asleep*: And
 that a *right Disposition* of the Body was necessary,
 in this present State, to *the Perfection of rational*
Thinking. If this be supposed; what can, by
 the common Rules of reasoning (not to mention
Candor or *Humanity*) be infer'd from hence?
 And that this is the whole, which Mr. *Locke*,
 with any Shadow of Reason, can be charg'd
 with, I appeal to every Man, who is able to
 read him without Passion or Prejudice. The
 ingenious Author, indeed, has in this Section
 found a *broad Hint* for *material Souls*. Perhaps
 some Readers would as soon have found a *broad*
Hint for the *Longitude*. But so dangerous was it
 for Mr. *Locke* to affirm, that our *sleeping Thoughts*
 are, for the most part, *extravagant*: and our
Dreams, for the most part, *frivolous and irrational*!
 I should be glad to know, whether this
 Gentleman would esteem it a Complement, to
 suppose his learned Piece was the Production of

* P. 187, 188. † See the *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke* p. 2—7.

his

his *sleeping* Thoughts? and if he would not; what might be the Reason?

But then it is observed, that “*what is for the most part only, is not always: And that this Side ought to have been considered also.*” — Whether Mr. *Locke* did not think his Subject required a more elaborate Dissertation upon *Dreaming*; or whether he was *unable* or *unwilling* to engage in such a Task; yet it may charitably be hoped, there was no *malicious* Design in that Omission. And besides, since he has by this means given our learned Objector a very fair Opportunity of *amply* supplying* his Defects; there seems the less Reason for this Gentleman to be so greatly displeas’d with him. But now, notwithstanding our Author has here very plainly insinuated, that Mr. *Locke* is the Man, who has *ascribed the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body*; yet elsewhere he speaks a little doubtfully; as for Instance,

“Mr. *Locke* seems to favour the Opinion of those, who ascribe the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Matter of the Body †.” Or, as he afterwards expresses it, — *to the right Disposition of that Matter ‡.*” However, whether Mr. *Locke* seems only to favour such an Opinion, as it is mention’d in one Place; or whether Mr. *Locke* makes it appear to be his own Opinion, as this Gentleman thinks, in another ||; it may possibly be some Consolation to Mr. *Locke*’s Friends, to understand, that this Opinion is capable of “*one Meaning, that is consistent enough with the Immateriality and rational Nature of the Soul**.*” And that “it is no Reproach

* See Vol. II. p. 1—255. † P. 3. ‡ P. 185.
|| P. 186. ** Vol. I. p. 386.

“upon

“upon the rational Soul to say, that the Perfection of rational Thinking depends on the Matter of the Body, as an *impeding* or *obstructing Cause**.” I say, perhaps, here Mr. *Locke*’s Friends may take Courage, and fancy that all is safe enough. But alas! they are utterly mistaken; and their Hopes vanish the very Instant they are conceiv’d! For our Author thus immediately adds, —

“But that the Perfection of rational Thinking should depend upon the Matter of the Body, as a *promoting* or *effecting Cause* (which is indeed the true Meaning intended in the Objection) is a direct Contradiction †.” This is that *other Meaning*, which he had before told us, was *artfully shuffled in, under Colour of the former ‡.*

’Tis true indeed, that in this last Place, none are mention’d, but the *modern Sceptic* ||: And in the former, neither *Sceptic*, nor any other Person. However, since the Opinion itself is charged upon Mr. *Locke*; since he is taxed with giving, by this very means, a *broad Hint for material Souls*; and since no Exception is made in relation to him; it is therefore humbly enquired, whether Mr. *Locke* is to be understood as a Party concern’d with the *modern Sceptic*, in *artfully shuffling in this contradictory Meaning?* If he be not; — Whether our Author has not left him (I hope altogether *undesignedly*) very much exposed to the undeserved Censure of *certain Readers?* But if Mr. *Locke* is to be charg’d either with *artfully shuffling in*, or at least with holding this *direct Contradiction*; then it is sub-

* P. 395. † Ibid. ‡ Vol. I. p. 386. || P. 385.
mitted,

mitted, whether our Author can assign any better Reasons for this Compliment upon Mr. *Locke*, than merely the two following:— First, it is a *direct Contradiction*, and therefore the more likely to be Mr. *Locke's* Meaning. And secondly, there could not otherwise have been a *broad Hint for material Souls*. But now granting that it is the *modern Sceptic* only, who has *shuffled* with regard to the *Meaning* of that Proposition; yet what will become of Mr. *Locke*, if he has been guilty of *shuffling* over the *Odioufness* of an Insinuation upon Others? But first let us view the Foundation of this Charge.

“ This, says Mr. *Locke*, I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were, separate from the Body, acts less rationally, than when jointly with it, or no. If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a Wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations*.”

Our Author having quoted thus much out of Mr. *Locke*, excepting the last Paragraph, he raises the following Observations:— “ Here this Absurdity is first made a *Consequence* of what *these Men* say; and immediately it is surmized, that the Quality of our Dreams shews this Absurdity to be Fact. This is really a strange Way of proceeding, to *shuffle* over the *Odioufness* of an Insinuation upon Others;

* B. II. C. 1. § 16.

“ and

“ and in case *they* should disown it, and *that Circumstance* from which he would infer it, (viz. that the Soul thinks without being conscious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an Appearance, which he has ready at hand*.”

In answer to this, I desire it may be observ'd, that Mr. *Locke* is there manifestly considering the Nature of this Supposition, viz. that the Soul may think separately and apart from the Body. “ Perhaps, says Mr. *Locke*, it will be said, — that in the *Thinking of the Soul*, which is not perceived in a *sleeping Man*, there the Soul thinks apart,” &c. || “ Upon this Hypothesis, Mr. *Locke* tells us, the Thoughts of a *sleeping Man* ought to be most rational †.” However he proceeds to enquire in the following Section, whether this will be admitted, or not. If it be not; or, in Mr. *Locke's* Words, if the Soul's separate Thoughts be less rational, then, says he, it must be allowed by those (who maintain that Supposition) that the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body. But if on the other hand, it should be answer'd, that these separate Thoughts are more rational, and that therefore such Perfection is not owing to the Body; Mr. *Locke* replies, that if these separate Thoughts are more rational, 'tis a Wonder, the Soul retains none of them; and that our Dreams should generally be so frivolous and irrational. — It is submitted, whether this be not really the Case, and whether Mr. *Locke's* Reasoning be not levell'd at an Hypothesis, which makes the Soul to think by itself, and in which the *sleeping Man* partakes

* Vol. II. p. 186, 187. || B. II. C. 1. § 15. † See the Title to that Section; tho' I think that Title is misplac'd, and belongs to Sect. 16.

K

not,

not. Mr. Locke is evidently considering what Difficulties attend that *Hypothesis*; and observes that some Consequences must follow from it, which either the Espoufers of it would not care to admit, or which would not readily be admitted by others. And is any thing more *usual* or more *innocent*, than to argue upon a Supposition of what might possibly be offer'd; or to consider what might be propos'd either *for*, or *against* an Hypothesis?

But what a *frightful* Business has this Gentleman made of it? Here is *an Absurdity surmised to be Fact*; a *strange Way of proceeding*! the *Odioufness* of an *Insinuation shuffled over upon others*; and in case *they should disown it*, Mr. Locke would *infer it from that very Circumstance*, which he all along opposes; *viz. that the Soul thinks without being conscious of it**. This *Circumstance* however was to prove, that *the Soul owes the Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body!* No one, I believe, besides Mr. Locke, could ever have thought of such a Proof! But what if *these Men* had deny'd both *Circumstance* and *Inference*? why, as to the latter, he was still provided for them; *he had an Appearance ready at hand*, in order to *prove it*. Whether he had any thing *at hand*, to prove the former, *viz. that Circumstance*, our Author says not. However thus far Mr. Locke's *black Designs* and Intentions are unravell'd! And moreover, "*these Men* deny that "the Soul thinks less or more rationally, without being conscious of it, and therefore any "Consequence of such a Position †."

One would be glad to know, by what means, our Author came here so well acquainted with

* B. II. C. 1. § 11. See also § 10, 12, 19. † Vol. II. p. 187.
these

these Men, since, two or three hundred Pages before, he seems to know nothing at all of them. "It were, says he, to be wish'd that [Mr. Locke] "had told us, what Author it is that asserts, that "the Soul in a sleeping Man thinks, without "being conscious of it*. So that in one Place, he is utterly at a Loss to determine *whom* Mr. Locke could mean, and in another, he assures us, — *they deny* any such Thing. Perhaps some may wonder, that we were not directed to those particular Authors, who *deny* what Mr. Locke insinuates of them, since here was a fine Opportunity offered, of convicting that Gentleman of *shuffling* over his *Insinuations upon Others*. But possibly our Author was a little *tender*; and did not care to press Matters too far. He does indeed immediately after, demand with an Air of Triumph, — "But who is it here that appeals to the *Fivolousness* and *Irrationality* of "our Dreams to shew, that the Soul owes the "Perfection of rational Thinking to the Body †." But what if Mr. Locke should *appeal* to *these*, only to *shew* the Precariousness of an *Hypothesis*, which separates the *sleeping Man* from the *thinking Soul* †? Or granting he *appeals* to *these*, to *shew* that a right Disposition of the Body is necessary, during its present Union with the Soul, to the *Perfection of rational Thinking*; — Pray what is there in all this, that deserves so much severe Treatment? — Again, "Here, "[Mr. Locke] says our Author, supposes that "the Soul itself produces all it hears and sees in "Sleep, that it thinks apart and separately at "that time, and exerts the utmost Perfection it

* Vol. I. p. 333, 334. † Vol. II. p. 187. ‡ B. II. C. 1. § 15, 16.

“ is capable of, when destitute of the Help of
 “ the Body. How *unjust* and *inaccurate* a Re-
 “ presentation of the Appearance is this*?”

If the Reader should find upon Enquiry, that
 the *Soul* thinking apart and separately, is the *very*
Supposition, which Mr. *Locke* himself opposes † ;
 he may possibly be of Opinion, that the Terms
unjust and *inaccurate*, are here introduced a little
unluckily.

Indeed this Gentleman is there upon a very
favourite Hypothesis, which is to account for the
 Nature of our *Dreams*; and therefore if he ap-
 pears more out of Temper with what comes in
 his Way, than he might otherwise do, it is the
 more excusable. Authors, in such Circumstances,
 are generally impatient of Contradiction. And
 hence, I presume, it happen'd, that the immor-
 tal *Cicero* is pretty sharply corrected by him. A
 short Digression in behalf of that great Man, I
 believe the learned Reader will very easily ex-
 cuse.

“ It is known, says our Author, that *Cicero*
 “ was professedly an Academic, and that he
 “ wrote designedly in his Treatise *de Divinatione*,
 “ against this very Conclusion which I maintain,
 “ and endeavour'd to account for the *Appearance*
 “ of Dreaming, the same way, as is done here
 “ in the Objection †.” After this he proceeds to
 the Dream of *Cicero*, as it is related by his Bro-
 ther *Quintus*, who manages the opposite Side of
 the Question; and who, at the Conclusion, ob-
 serves that *Cicero* had himself own'd, that *no-*
thing could be more Divine than that Dream †.
 “ But what does *Cicero* answer, says our Author to

* Vol. II. p. 187. † B. II. C. 1. § 15. ‡ Vol. II.
 p. 52, 53. † De Divinat. L. I.

“ this

“ this particulr Instance?” *Mibi* (says he) *Tem-*
 “ *poribus illis multum in Animo Marius versabatur,*
 “ *recordanti, quàm ille gravem suum Casum mag-*
 “ *no Animo, quàm constanti tulisset. Hanc credo*
 “ *Causam de illo somniandi fuisse**.” Upon which
 our Author thus expostulates, — “ What a
 “ poor unsatisfying Shift is this! Had he not
 “ *Camillus* and *Scipio Africanus* also in his Mind?
 “ why not have dreamed of these †?” And it
 is afterwards left to be determined by others,
 how far *Cicero's* Speech of *Democritus*, is appli-
 cable to *Cicero* himself †, — *Nec cognovi quen-*
quam qui majori Auctoritate nihil diceret †. —
 But now after all, it is not impossible, but that
 great Philosopher might have the same Thoughts
 of his Dream, even when he assign'd this Rea-
 son of it to *Quintus*, which he really had at the
 Time he mention'd it in a private Conversation.
 “ If we seek for *Cicero's* true Sentiments (says a
 “ a very learned Critic) it must not be in his
 “ Disputes against others, where he had Licence
 “ to say any thing for Opposition Sake: But in
 “ the Books where he dogmatizes himself; where
 “ allowing for the Word *Probable*, you have all
 “ the Spirit and Marrow of the *Platonic*, *Peripa-*
 “ *tetic*, and *Stoic* Systems; I mean his Books *De*
 “ *Officiis*, *Tusculanae*, *De Amicitia*, *De Senectute*,
 “ *De Legibus*; in which, and in the Remains of
 “ others now lost, he declares for the Being and
 “ Providence of God, for the Immortality of
 “ the Soul, for every Point that approaches to
 “ Christianity †.”

* *Ibid.* L. II. † Vol. II. p. 60, 61. ‡ Vol. II. p. 64,
 65. † De Divinat. L. II. † See Remarks upon a Dis-
 course of *Free-thinking*, in a Letter to N. N. by *Phileleutherus*
Lipsiensis. Part II. p. 81, 82.

This

This very learned Writer had before observ'd, "that there's a vast Difference in the Manner of Dispute, that's exhibited in the *Tusculanae*, from what appears in *Academicis*, *De Finibus*, *De Naturâ Deorum*, and *De Divinatione*. In the latter no Man concedes; in the *Tusculans*, no Man resists*." So that notwithstanding *Cicero* might ascribe his Dream to quite another Cause, when it happen'd, than he does now in his *Academical Philosophy*, as our Author conjectures †; yet if "the *Academic* Objections be the most unlikely Place where to find his real Sentiments, and if *Cicero* there only uses the Privilege of an *Academic*, and speaks, not what he really believ'd, but what serv'd the present Turn ‡," it may be submitted, whether the ingenious Author has not condemn'd, without sufficient Cause, one of the greatest Men of all Antiquity! He afterwards takes notice, that it "has been long since observed of this great Man, that his *Academical Writings* are at Variance with his other Works, and that he may be confuted out of himself, and in his own Words §." But if our Author had recollected how this happen'd, and had made use of that excellen Critic's Observations for finding out *Cicero's* real Sentiments, he might perhaps have spared his Remarks with regard to the *Contradiction*, between what is advanced in the second Book *De Legibus*, and in the Treatise *De Divinatione* †; as well as omitted his Censures on a Part of the fourth Book of the *Academical Questions* **. In short, if he had

* Ibid. p. 73. † Vol. II. p. 56. ‡ The Remarks &c. p. 79, 80. § Vol. II. p. 77, 78. † P. 77. ** P. 74, 75.

con-

consider'd *Cicero* in this View, I presume he would have found him, not only a *Great*, but a *Consistent* Writer; and that there was very little Reason to be so angry with him. — Indeed in the Place last mention'd, our Author suggests that *Cicero* is guilty of a *Contradiction*, even admitting the famous *Academical Principle*; for *Cicero* having said, that "*Strato* had reliev'd him from much Terror, when he taught that God neither made, nor took care of the World*, the ingenious Author thus remarks, — "It is true, a little after [*Cicero*] endeavours to bring himself off, by the great *Academical Principle*, saying, "he neither assented to *Strato*, who deny'd a God, nor to *Lucullus*, who asserted one. "But this seems somewhat contradictory to his being relieved of his Fears †." Just as contradictory, as that he should side with *Strato*, in Opposition to *Lucullus*, and then declare that he assented to neither: But is it to be wonder'd at, that whilst he seems to side with *Strato*, he should assign some Reason, or other for it? But tho' whilst he is taking the Part of *Strato*, he tells us that *Strato* had reliev'd him from much Terror; yet surely this could not prevent him the Liberty of an *Academic*; that is of dissenting afterwards both from *Strato* and *Lucullus*. Had he said indeed, that he met with this Relief from the Former, even whilst he dissented from him; this had been an Absurdity, which no *Academical Principle* could have excused: Whereas occasionally to speak both for and against every Thing, and every Philosopher, was the Privilege of that Sect ‡, and what may easily be accounted for,

* Acad. Quæst. L. IV. † Vol. II. p. 74, 75. ‡ Acad. 2. 18. Nat. Deor. 1. 5. L. II. sine. See the Remarks on Free-thinking, Part. II. p. 80.

upon

upon that *Principle*, without making any hard Reflections upon such a Writer as *Cicero*.

But to return to Mr. *Locke*:— Our Author in the following Instance, seems to introduce that Gentleman, merely to pay him a *Civility*.— “It is true, says he, Voyages and Books of Travels tell us of several Nations, in different Parts of the World, *who have no Sort of Religion, no Name, nor Notion of any Supreme Being*: But if this be so, as Mr. *Locke* would have us believe, it seems the Inhabitants of these Countries never dream.”— With Submission to this learn’d Writer, one would rather think they were *always* in a *Dream*. However he gives the following Reason for this Opinion,— “Since we can scarce conceive that this single *Phænomenon* should not be enough to kindle up the Notion of some *Religion* or other in the Minds of Men, though we could suppose all Religion once entirely lost in the World.”— If Men were to lose *all Religion*, with their Eyes *open*; it is greatly to be fear’d, they would hardly recover it, when their Eyes were *shut*.— “However, the *Matter of Fact* itself begins now to appear false; and these *Monsters* gradually vanish, as the Countries they were said to be in, are more resorted to, and become better known. Nature seems to be every where of a Piece with herself*.”

What a Pleasure must every good Man receive, when he reflects that there are no longer any, but who have *felt after, and found out God*; none, but who from the visible Works of Creation and Providence, have *seen and understood the eternal*

* Vol. II. p. 116. in the Notes.

Power

Power and Godhead! Nature seems to be every where of a Piece with herself! If we ask, whether Nature has always been thus? our Author does not acquaint us: Or if we enquire, how long? he is likewise silent. If any should be so impertinent as to demand his *Vouchers*; it may be answer’d, that since there are only Mr. *Locke*’s *Vouchers* on the other side, such as *Publick Ministers*; *Private Gentlemen*; those very Missionaries of *China*, who are the great Encomiasts of the *Chinese*; and one Divine, who was living when Mr. *Locke* wrote †; I say it may be answer’d, that since Mr. *Locke* has no other *Vouchers*, there was no Necessity for our Author to produce any, in order to confront their Authority. It was abundantly sufficient to acquaint the Reader, that Mr. *Locke* would have us believe there were such *Monsters*; and that the *Matter of Fact* now appears to be false. It is true, the learned Bishop of *Worcester*, in his Reply to Mr. *Locke*, does himself acknowledge, that “by the best Accounts both of the *Cafres* of *Soldania*, and the *Caignæ* of *Paraquaria*, They are a People so strangely bereft of common Sense, that they can hardly be reckon’d among *Man-kind**.” However, by our Author’s Report it appears that his Lordship’s *best Accounts*, were in Truth and Reality but very *bad* ones.

But, suppose they were so, was it criminal in that learned Prelate, to believe the false Accounts of some Travellers? Most certainly it was not. This could be a Crime in none but Mr. *Locke* only.

† Hum. Und. B. I. C. 4. § 8. Or the fifth Edition of the Essay, p. 38—40. * His Lordship’s Answer to Mr. *Locke*’s first Letter, p. 90.

L “ The

“ The last Objection, says our Author, I shall mention, is an Inimination, *that our Dreams are no more than the Thoughts and Buſi- neſs of the Day recurring*: Or which it may be ſuppoſed the Soul itſelf ſome Way or other reſumes, without the Interpoſition of ſuch a Cauſe* as is here aſſigned. Mr. *Locke* ſays, “ The Dreams of ſleeping Men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man’s Ideas, though for the moſt Part oddly put together †.” “ *Lucretius* ſays only *fere* and *plerumque* ‡.”

And can this Gentleman then get leave of himſelf to imagine, that Mr. *Locke* really ſuppoſed, that all the Dreams of Lawyers related to pleading of Cauſes; all the Dreams of Generals were made up of Battles; and that Mariners dreamt only of Storms and Tempeſts? If he did not imagine this, why is Mr. *Locke* here oppoſed to *Lucretius*? And the *fere* and *plerumque* of the one, ſet in Oppoſition to all the Dreams of the other? Or why is the Particle *all* put in *Italicks*, to render it the more remarkable? But if this be his Meaning, as it ſeems pretty plain; I would deſire any Man who is not in a *Dream* himſelf, only to examine the Paſſage refer’d to; and he will eaſily determine whether Mr. *Locke* and *Lu-*

* The learned Writer here means the Agency of other Spirits See his Eſſay on Dreaming.

† Hum. Und. B. Il. C 1 § 17.

‡ *Et quoi quiſque fere Studio devinctus adheret, —
In Somnis eadem plerumque videmur obire:
Cauſidici Cauſas agere, & componere Leges,
Induperatores pugnare, ac Prælia obire,
Nauta contractum cum Ventis cernere bellum,
Nos agere hoc autem, &c.*

L. IV. from Ver. 959 to 982

See our Author Vol. II. p. 197, 198.

cretius are not treating of different Things. Mr. *Locke* only maintains, there is no Appearance, that Men in their Sleep have any *Ideas*, but what are derived from *Sensation* or *Reflection*. This is evidently the whole Purport of that Section; as would appear from the very Title of it, was not that, by ſome Miſtake, prefixed to the 16th. Conſequently then, it is not the particular Subject of Mens Dreams, which Mr. *Locke* is there ſpeaking of; but the general Materials of which they are compoſed. Theſe Materials are the *waking Man’s Ideas*: That is, ſuch *Ideas* as he receiv’d originally from *Sensation* and *Reflection*; or they are the different Combinations of thoſe *Ideas*. But his Dreams are not compoſed of *Ideas*, which the Soul might be thought to have before its Union with the Body. That this is the whole of Mr. *Locke*’s Deſign, is ſubmitted to the Judgment of the Reader,

And therefore what this Gentleman demands, by way of Objection, with regard to *Aſtyages*, who dreamt that out of his Daughter grew a *Vine* which overſhaded all *Asia**, is nothing at all to the Purpoſe. For tho’ this very Dream never employed his waking Thoughts; yet I preſume the *Materials* of it might. Was not his Daughter one *Idea*, a *Vine* another, *Asia* another, and overſhading another, which had preſented themſelves to *Aſtyages* whilſt awake? Let our Author apply this to all his other Inſtances, and he muſt find that Nothing is produced againſt Mr. *Locke*; and that Nothing can affect Mr. *Locke*’s Argument, till an Inſtance can be given of a Dream, in which *innate Ideas* are to be found.

* Vol. II. p. 199.

Even what he mentions of *Lucullus**, who dreamt of one *Autolycus*, will not do. For tho' *Lucullus* had never heard of that particular Name before; was it not however as much an *Idea* of *Sensation*, as *Lucullus* itself? It was indeed a strange and new Sound to *Lucullus*, but does not Mr. *Locke* say, that our *Ideas* in Sleep (whether of *Sound*, or *Colour*, or *Figure*, it matters not) are for the most part *oddly put together*? But still, since the Name and History of *Autolycus* were unknown to *Lucullus*, when he dreamt of him, our Author demands, "can it be said, that any of his waking Thoughts had suggested [these Things] to him †?"

Pray, where does Mr. *Locke* suggest any Thing like it?— "We are placed, says our Author himself, in Circumstances every Night, and see Things which for the *Newness* and *Strangeness* of them, we are surprized how they could enter our Fancy ‡." That is, I presume, our *Ideas* are put into a *new* and *strange* Dress. But how much may this differ from our *Ideas* being *oddly put together*? However, "This Observation of Mr. *Locke's* it seems, is so far from being exact, that if he had made *just the contrary* Observation, it would have been equally true: which is remarkable enough in a Man of his Accuracy and Judgment †."

It is undoubtedly *remarkable enough*, that a Man of such *Accuracy* and *Judgment*, should be for ever *blundering* in so egregious a Manner!

But again, "How could the *Soul*, upon Mr. *Locke's own Principles*, form to itself in Sleep a Scene of our waking Actions, and Thoughts,

* Ibid. p. 200. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. † Ibid.

and

"and *the Man* be still ignorant of it, without being two distinct Persons*?"

This surely can never be design'd for Mr. *Locke*: Since it is *Word for Word*, one of his Objections against the *Soul's thinking apart*, without the Privy or Knowledge of the *sleeping Man*. Mr. *Locke* speaking of that Hypothesis, he thus expresses himself,—"Not to mention again the Absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, &c. †."

But yet if this Passage be not design'd as an Argument against Mr. *Locke*, it will be exceedingly difficult so much as to guess, whom it can belong to. For it is preceded by three or four Pages, which contain Objections against Mr. *Locke* only; without the least Notice taken of any other Antagonist. And if it is really level'd at him, the Question will be, whether our Author is not a little unfortunate in attacking Mr. *Locke*, upon what he calls Mr. *Locke's own Principles*?

But now, before we proceed to the other Point in Controversy, that is, whether the *Soul* always *thinks*, or no; it may not be amiss, first, to consider, what Mr. *Locke* means by *Thinking*.

"*Perception*, says Mr. *Locke*, is by some called *Thinking* in general. Though *Thinking* in the Propriety of the *English* Tongue, signifies that Sort of Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, wherein the Mind is *active*; where it with some Degree of voluntary Attention, considers any thing: For in bare, naked *Perception*, the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiv-

* Vol. II. p. 201. † B II. C. I. § 15. See also § 11, 12, 19

ing

“ing*.” And in the Section, where Mr. *Locke* treats of this very Question, it appears that to contemplate Ideas, to think, and to be in Action, are used by him to express the same Thing†. So that I presume, it must be allowed, that by the *Thinking* of the Soul, Mr. *Locke* chiefly, if not altogether, means the Exertion of that active Power, where the Soul voluntarily, and with some Degree of Attention, considers or contemplates Ideas.

And as to the ingenious Author himself, he sufficiently distinguishes between *Thinking*, and barely having Perceptions‡: And, in short, he maintains *Thinking* to be Action||.

This being previously observ'd, we proceed to what Mr. *Locke* has advanced, and our Author objected.

“I confess myself, says Mr. *Locke*, to have “one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate Ideas, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move; the Perception of Ideas, being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what Motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations. — It is not necessary to suppose that it should be always Thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of Things, who never slumbers nor sleeps. — But whether that Substance [the Soul] perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us †.”

* B. II. C. 9. § 1. † B. II. C. 1. § 10. ‡ Vol. I. p. 190. p. 203 in the Notes. || P. 324. † B. II. C. 1. § 10.

“The

“The Reason, says our Author, why it is “improper to refer to Experience in this Case, “will appear immediately*.” And in the mean while, he thus animadverts on some other Parts of this Section, — “With Submission to so “great a Name, there is this material Difference, “Motion is no more the Action of Matter than “Rest is; it is equally inactive in both, as hath “been shewn †.”

With Submission to this learned Objector, Mr. *Locke* has himself shewn long ago, that the Motion of Body is rather a Passion than an Action in it‡; and that there never had been any Motion, without a more Powerful Being than Matter||. And elsewhere he asserts, that “two “Bodies, placed by one another at Rest, will “never afford us the Idea of a Power in the one “to move the other, but by a borrowed Motion**.” So that now we know Mr. *Locke*'s Meaning, I hope the Motion of the Body may be understood in a very inoffensive and Philosophical Sense. — But still it is observed, that “Matter stands in need of an external Cause to “put it into Motion, or bring it to Rest again; “but the Soul doth not want an external Mover “to set it a Thinking †. And does not Mr. *Locke*, every where maintain the same Thing? Or when he affirms “that we find in ourselves a “Power to begin or forbear; continue or end “several Actions of our Minds, and Motions “of our Bodies, barely by a Thought ††. When he makes “Thinking and Motivity to be

* Vol. I. p. 327. in the Notes. † Vol. I. p. 326, 327. ‡ B. II. C. 21. § 4. || B. IV. C. 10. § 10. ** B. II. C. 23. § 28. † Vol. I. p. 327. †† B. II. C. 21. § 5.

“the

“ the *primary Ideas* of Spirit, and *peculiar* to it* ;” when he affirms that “ the Mind, every Day, affords us *Ideas* of an active Power of moving of Bodies ; and supposes active Power to be the proper Attribute of Spirits † ;” shall we fancy he means, that the Soul *wants* an *external Mover* to set it a *Thinking* ? However, “ there is no room, says our Author, to run a Comparison between the Action of the Soul, which necessarily springs out of its own Nature, and the Motion of Matter, which must be excited in it, by *some Being* not material. This looks as if *Action* were equally extrinsick to them both, or as if it were as natural for the Soul to be without Action, as for Matter to be without Motion ; which is to pervert our justest Conceptions of spiritual Substance ‡ .”

It is submitted, whether any thing is more contrary to the whole Tenor of Mr. *Locke's* Writings, than that *Action* should be *equally extrinsick both to Spirit and Matter*. Or that it should be *as natural for the Soul* [an *active self-moving Substance*] *to be without Action, as for* [inactive, dead] *Matter* ||, *to be without Motion* ? However, it seems, Things *look* so, from the *Comparison* which Mr. *Locke* has run, whether this *Appearance* be really owing to that *Comparison*, or to some *other Cause*, the judicious Reader must determine for himself.

The whole of Mr. *Locke's Comparison*, consider'd in any *candid View*, amounting to no more than this, that he supposed the Soul might, without the least Hurt to itself, sometimes forbear

* B. II. C. 23. § 18.
|| B. IV. C. 10. § 10.

† § 28.

‡ Vol. I. p. 327.

to

to *act*, as well as the Body frequently ceases to be *acted* upon.

However, “ It will not follow, says our Author, that every Thing is separable from Substances, which is not this real internal Constitution, as [Mr. *Locke*] seems to take for granted*.”

Because Mr. *Locke* supposes, that if *Thinking* be only an Operation of the Soul, such Operation may be sometimes suspended, without any Injury to that *thinking Substance*; therefore Mr. *Locke* seems to take for granted, that *Divisibility, Figure and Magnitude* (as we shall see immediately) are *separate* from Matter !

This *seems* so plain to the ingenious Author, that he has it over again, some Pages from hence, as we shall have Occasion to observe hereafter. — But he thus proceeds, — “ The Properties that immediately flow from the internal Constitution of Things, are as inseparable from them, as that Constitution itself ; and we can as little conceive the Thing without these Properties, as without that Constitution. *Divisibility, Figure, Magnitude*, are not the internal Constitution of Matter, but Properties necessarily flowing from it ; and and yet we can as little conceive Matter without these, as without its own internal Constitution ; that is, we can as little conceive it without these, as *without Substance*. This must be so ; for it is by these that we conceive it all to be a Substance, or to have an internal, unknown Constitution. And for a like Reason, Activity and Perceptivity, by which

* Vol. I. p. 328.

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“ Powers

“ Powers alone we discover that there is a Substance different from Matter, and which is the necessary Subject of their Inhesion, must be in the Mind, even previous to the internal unknown Constitution of that Substance; as necessarily as it, and with much more Clearness than an *unknown Thing* can be, If it were pardonable to run so high, I might say, that those very Powers of Activity, and Perceptivity, which are not the internal, unknown Constitution of spiritual Substance, are yet inseparable from the *necessarily existing Spirit*; and the constant Exercise of them also; as Mr. *Locke* observes, in the Place last quoted from him*.”

But now unless it follow from all this, that *actual Thinking* is as *essential* to the Soul, as *Magnitude* is to Matter, or as a *Power* of *Thinking* is to a *Thinking* Substance, the Point in Controversy seems to be just where it was. Matter without *Figure* or *Magnitude*; and a *Thinking* Substance without a *Power* of *Thinking*, are directly *contradictory Ideas*. But will this Gentleman say, it is a *Contradiction* to suppose, that the actual Exercise of the active Powers of the Soul, may be *sometimes* suspended? He certainly appears, in some Places, to be of a different Opinion.—“ When we are, says he, sick, or heavy with Sleep, or Fatigue, it becomes easy to abstain from Action of the Body, or Mind; and only then †.” Again, “ It is only the Indisposition of the Body, that can interrupt the Exercise of this Power [of *Thinking*] at any time ‡.” Elsewhere he thus

* P. 328, 329. † Vol. I. p. 270. ‡ P. 324, 325.

expresses

expresses himself. — “ It hath been shewn before that the Soul would never cease to exert its Activity upon a rightly disposed Body; unless some Defect and Want of Reparation in the Body, forced this Principle of Life and Action to desist, and leave the material Organ ’till the Indisposition under which it labours be repaired*.” In another place, “ since Sleep is a State in which the Faculties of the Soul are obstructed, or impeded, by the Indisposition of the Matter of the Body, &c. †.” — And again. — “ If the Powers of the Soul were not impeded in Sleep, that State would not differ from being awake, except in the Indisposition of the Body ‡.” — It is true, our Author tells us, that “ the Soul *not thinking incessantly* has been often supposed to avoid unnecessary Debates in improper Places ||.” But whether the Passages just quoted from this Author, are some of those *Suppositions* that are to pass for *Nothing* we shall better discover hereafter. But I beg leave here to take Notice, that this Gentleman had before observ’d, “ that they who placed the Essence of the Soul in Thinking, rather expressed their Meaning unwarily, than had false Conceptions of the Nature of it †.” And that “ if they had made a Distinction between *Activity* [that is, a *Power* of acting**] and *real Action*; — no body could have taken Exception to their Opinion ††.

If these Writers, whoever they were, made no Distinction between *Power* and the *actual Exer-*

* Vol. II. p. 6. † P. 320. ‡ P. 321. || Vol. I. p. 330. † P. 322. ** Vol. I. p. 249. †† P. 325.

tion of it, we are not to wonder, if they expressed their Meaning unwarily. Had they made the Distinction, which this Gentleman allows they ought to have made; and only maintain'd with him, that "it is contradictory that the Soul should at any time, even while united to the Body, be without the Power of Action*," it is submitted, whether they would have met with the least Opposition from Mr. Locke? But it is still urged — "This farther may be said for those, who place the Nature of the Soul in Thinking, and suppose it to think incessantly (taking Thinking in the Sense of being always percipient of some Idea or other) that it is impossible to shew the contrary, even in this State of Union with the Body; though it hath been here allowed and often supposed, to avoid unnecessary Debates in improper Places †."

But now, as what this Gentleman here tells us has been often supposed, to avoid unnecessary Debates in improper Places, seems only to relate to Thinking, understood in the Sense of being Percipient; it may well be presumed he had no Design to revoke any Thing he had advanced, about the Action of the Soul being sometimes impeded or interrupted; — And if this be supposed, how small must the Difference appear between him and Mr. Locke? The one imagines there is no Necessity for the Soul to be always thinking; that is, always in Action: And the other affirms, that in certain Circumstances, the Action of the Soul may be interrupted, obstructed or impeded. Tho' whether this Agreement be

* P. 324. † Vol. p. 330.

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in Appearance only, or not, will once more fall under Consideration. But our Author thus proceeds — "Who can say that ever he found himself in a State of Unconsciousness, or when there was no Idea at all subsisting in his Mind*?" To the same Purpose he had before ask'd, "who ever surprized himself at any time, either asleep or awake, impercipient or in a State of pure Inaction; or was he sure he was, for the least possible Time, in such a State †?" It may possibly be said, that this is only asking, whether a Man ever found himself percipient and impercipient at the same Time? And truly the ingenious Author himself seems to have much the same Opinion of it, since he immediately adds, — "Indeed it is contradictory that any Man should so surprize himself, impercipient to wit, of all Things, with respect to the present Time: For he is conscious by Supposition, and reflecting upon an unconscious State. And as to the past Time, he cannot have any Memory of such a State: For whether ever such a State was, or was not, it is either Way a Contradiction that he should remember it; and he cannot bring an Argument for it, from his not remembering of it." Mr. Locke seems only to proceed upon this Supposition, that if his Mind "was consciously employed for several Hours, during Sleep, it would be likely he should remember something of it, the instant he waked †." I durst say he never once dreamt, that a Man could either forget and remember at the same Time, or could remember that, which was never once present to his Thoughts. But our Author thus

* P. 331. † P. 271. Notes, ‡ P. 331. || B. II. C. 1. § 13, 14, 18.

continues

continues his Argument, —

“ If a Man came through a dark Room, he
“ may be certain there was no Light there; for
“ his Eyes were open, and he missed the Light:
“ But if a Man passed an Hour of unconscious
“ Existence last Night, there is a wide Differ-
“ ence.” —

Who, ever questioned it? — “ He did not per-
“ ceive an Absence of Consciousness then; ” —
It would be strange if he did. — “ Nor can
“ he now; since he could do it but by re-
“ membring it. He hath not two distinct Con-
“ sciousnesses, one to be extinguished, and ano-
“ ther remaining to perceive the Absence of the
“ first*.” Most certainly he hath not: nor has
Mr. Locke any where suggested the contrary.

Again, “ it is easy, says our Author, for a
“ Man to confess, *that he hath one of those dull*
“ *Souls, that doth not always perceive Ideas* †:
“ But I beg Leave to observe, that this *Mo-*
“ *desty*, which is designed to pass for an Argu-
“ ment, is somewhat *inaccurate*; for he confesses
“ a Thing for certain, which he can never be
“ certain of ‡.”

Poor Mr Locke! even his very *Modesty*, when
it appears in the Form of an *Argument*, is found
to be *inaccurate*! the Reason here assign'd for
this Charge of *Inaccuracy*, is afterwards further
enlarged upon. But first, this Gentleman ob-
serves, that “ it is not in the Power of the Soul
“ to become impercipient of Ideas *at Pleasure*,
“ and [that] were the Thing effected, it would
“ be the Sign of an ill-disposed Body, and not
“ of the Dulness of the Soul ||.”

Who it is that supposes it to be *in the Power*
of the Soul to become impercipient of Ideas at Plea-

* P. 331. † B. II. C. I. § 10. ‡ P. 332 || *Ibid*
sure

sure, our Author says not. But that the Soul
can thus become impercipient *at Pleasure*, by
means of an *ill-disposed* Body, may perhaps ad-
mit of some Doubt.

Again, “ it is strange enough, says this Gen-
“ tleman, to appeal to Experience for the Re-
“ ality of a State, which, by Supposition, is an
“ utter Negation of all Experience*.” This
relates to the following Passage in Mr. Locke, —

“ And last of all, sound Sleep closes the Scene
“ quite, and puts an End to all Appearances.
“ This, I think, almost every one has Expe-
“ rience of in himself, and his own Observation
“ without Difficulty leads him thus far.” B. II.
C. 19. § 4. Upon which our Author thus re-
marks, — “ But this is only Experience of
“ having no Memory of Consciousness then,
“ which doth not infer that we had no Consci-
“ ousness then. When an Evidence makes
“ Oath, that his Memory doth not serve him so
“ far, how much proves he by this? Nothing
“ surely on either side. He only owns that the
“ Point in Controversy might have been so, or
“ otherwise, for any thing he can remember.
Mr. Locke says, B. II. C. I. § 10. “ The Que-
“ stion is about a Matter of Fact.” To this I
reply directly, the “ Question is about a Matter
“ of *Not-fact*; about a Negation of all Fact.
“ Every Body allows we are generally conscious;
“ this is not the Question then: But if we are
“ sometimes without Consciousness, it is ab-
“ surd to say, we forget our Unconsciousness,
“ it is absurd to say, we remember our Uncon-
“ sciousness. Where is the Matter of Fact to

* P. 332, 333.

“ be

“be testified to then? Or how is Experience applicable? Let a Definition of Experience be given*.”

Our Author has very rightly observed, that “it is absurd to say, we forget or remember our Unconsciousness.” If it be enquired, who it is that is guilty of all this Nonsense? why, since Mr. Locke has appeal’d to Experience, where there is an utter Negation of all Experience: Where there is no Matter of Fact to be testified to: and where Experience is not applicable; the Honour of it, I presume, belongs to him. But has not our Author himself appeal’d to Experience in much the same Case with Mr. Locke? For having told us, how far the Soul may remit its Activity in Thinking, does he not say, that Experience confirms this? ’Tis true he does; but then it certainly is with proper Caution, for he immediately adds, “— as far as we can have Experience †.” And therefore since Mr. Locke has not thus guarded his Words; how do we know, but he appeals to Experience even much farther, than we can have Experience? However let us hear Mr. Locke as to the Passage last cited from him,— “We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, that there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us. — ’Tis doubted whether I thought all last Night, or no; the Question being about a Matter of Fact, ’tis begging it, to bring as a Proof for it, an Hypothesis,

*Ibid. in the Notes † Vol. I. p. 344.

“which

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“which is the very Thing in Dispute; by which way one may prove any thing*.”

The learned Reader will now judge, whether Sleeping without Thinking may most properly be call’d a Matter of Fact, or a Matter of Not-Fact: Whether Mr. Locke could be capable of any thing so extravagantly absurd, as to appeal to Experience, where no Experience can be had; and whether the ingenious Author could have exerted himself more, in case Mr. Locke had appeal’d to the Experience and Observations of Mankind, even during their supposed unconscious State.

But now, notwithstanding it would be ridiculous to infer, that a Man was never Conscious of any particular Action or Thought, either sleeping or waking, because he has now no present Consciousness of it; yet perhaps it may be a Question, whether our Author himself might not think even this Negative Proof to have its Weight in some particular Cases. Suppose then, for instance, that this Gentleman was examined, whether for several Nights last past, he has not been conscious in his Sleep, of a generous Concern for the cruel Usage, which the Memory of Mr. Locke has met with. Let us suppose him to answer, that, to the best of his Remembrance, Mr. Locke never employ’d any of his sleeping Moments: and that, as far as he can recollect, he never had any Dream or Vision relating to that Gentleman. All this may be very true; but what Satisfaction can it give, as to the Point enquired after? For Mr. Locke, might notwithstanding, have engross’d our Author’s whole last

*B. II. C. I. § 12.

N Night’s

Night's Thoughts. His Want of Consciouſness *now*, is no Proof he had no Consciouſness *then*: He has indeed no *Memory* of such Consciouſness, and this Want of *Memory* is all he *experiences*; but *this doth not infer that he had no Consciouſness* at the Time in Question. So that, for any thing he can be sure of, Mr. *Locke* may often have taken up his sleeping Hours, and have made him his most humble Acknowledgments for all the *Favours* he had received from him.

It is true, our Author can be *as sure* this *never* happen'd, as he can be *sure* he never did any thing, of which he has not the least Consciouſness; because the Foundation of his Assurance is the same in both Cases; and that is, the Want of *present* Consciouſness. But then we have seen, that there is no depending upon this; which is *only Experience of having no Memory of past Consciouſness*. And besides, "there is certainly a great deal of our past Consciouſness, which we retain no Memory of afterward. It is, as this Gentleman observes, a particular Mark of our finite and imperfect Natures, that we cannot become conscious of all our past Consciouſness at Pleasure*."

Tho' after all, whether our Author can be persuaded he was ever *conscious* of such a Scene, may possibly admit of some doubt. — However, he thus continues to press Mr. *Locke*, — "No Man, says he, at Night would infer, that he was not in a State of Consciouſness and Thinking at such a certain Minute about twelve a Clock of the Day, because now perhaps he hath no Memory what particular Thought he

* Vol. I. p. 334.

had

"had at that *Minute*. And it is no better Argument, considered in itself, that a Man was not conscious at such a *Minute*, in his Sleep, because next Morning he hath no Memory of what Ideas were in his Mind then*." — I readily agree with this learned Writer, that one of these Arguments is no better than the other; for indeed, if *Day* be changed into *Night*, there can appear no Difference between them. But possibly it may be here objected, that Mr. *Locke's* Argument is not stated right. That he no where talks of a *single Minute*, or supposes it *improbable* that a Man should forget what he was thinking on, at such a *Minute* either of *Day* or *Night*. But that he sometimes mentions *four Hours* †; sometimes *several Hours* ‡; and sometimes a *long while together* §, and esteems it to be unlikely that the Mind should be consciously employ'd all that time, and yet be able to recollect Nothing the Moment after **. However, as *four Hours* are a pretty large Portion of Time, for a Man to be thus employed to no Purpose; and as *several Hours*, and a *long while*, are very *indeterminate* Quantities; perhaps our Author, for the greater *Exactness*, or for some other Reason, chose to reduce the latter to a *greater Certainty*, and to bring the former within a much narrower *Compass*.

But Mr. *Locke* has still more to answer for. "If the *Soul*, says Mr. *Locke*, doth think in a sleeping Man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such Thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not,

* P. 334, 335. † B. II. C. 1. § 13. ‡ § 14. || § 18.
** Ibid.

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no

“ no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. —
 “ Or if it be possible, that the Soul can, whilst
 “ the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking,
 “ Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleasure, or
 “ Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious
 “ of, nor partakes in: It is certain that *Socrates*
 “ asleep, and *Socrates* awake, is not the same
 “ Person: But his Soul when he sleeps, and *So-*
 “ *crates* the Man, consisting of Body and Soul
 “ when he is waking, are two Persons*.” And
 in the following Section, he maintains, that
 “ they make the Soul and the Man two Persons,
 “ who make the Soul think apart, what the
 “ Man is not conscious of:” Just as *Castor* and
Pollux would be two Persons, upon a Supposition
 that only one Soul should actuate both Bodies
 by turns †. Upon Occasion of these two Sections,
 in which Mr. *Locke* endeavours to shew how
 groundless a Supposition it is, either that the
 Soul should think without being conscious of it;
 or that it should have its Enjoyments, without
 the Knowledge of the Man, our Author thus
 expresses himself, — “ It were
 “ to be wished that he had told us, what Author
 “ it is that asserts, that the Soul in a sleeping
 “ Man thinks, without being conscious of it;
 “ upon which he asks the Question, whether,
 “ during such Thinking, it has any Pleasure,
 “ or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery?
 “ and adds, *I am sure the Man is not, no more*
 “ *than the Bed or Earth he lies on.* Because it is
 “ strange, if any Man put him to the Trouble
 “ of confuting this Contradiction, with the Sup-
 “ position of *Castor* and *Pollux*, *Socrates* and

* B. II. C. I. § 13. † § 12.

Plato

“ *Plato.* The Position his Adversaries main-
 “ tain, infers no such Contradiction; nor justi-
 “ fies another to infer it for them*.”

The learned Reader may easily judge how
 very properly this Gentleman here replies to
 Mr. *Locke*. But perhaps, if our Author had
 known what Person it is, who asserts, that
the Soul thinks in a sleeping Man, without being con-
scious of it, he might have return'd Mr. *Locke*
 a more compleat and satisfactory Answer. In-
 deed it must be own'd, that if the Position of
 Mr. *Locke's* Adversaries infers no Contradiction,
 it cannot justify Mr. *Locke* to infer it for them.
 But as it is not easy to say, what that Position
 may infer, or how far Mr. *Locke* can be ju-
 stified, without knowing what the Position
 is; so it is pity this Gentleman would not fa-
 vour us with a Sight of it. However, as Mr.
Locke has here made a false Inference for his
 Adversaries; so in another Place †, he doth
 not represent the Objection right ‡. If we turn
 to the Section refer'd to, we meet with these
 Words, — “ 'Twill perhaps be said, that the
 “ *Soul thinks, even in the soundest Sleep, but the*
 “ *Memory retains it not.*” — Can any one now
 discover what Objection is here represented
wrong? May not This be said? or does Mr. *Locke*
 affirm any thing more? But, alas, this is only
 the Dwarf before the Giant.

“ We are, says our Author, by no Means
 “ justified in Philosophy, to draw weighty In-
 “ ferences, such as that the Perfection of ratio-
 “ nal Thinking may depend upon Matter, or
 “ that *the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life,*

* P. 333, 334. † B. II. C. I. § 14. ‡ P. 336. in the Notes.

“ to that dead Substance; I say, we are by no means justified in drawing such weighty Inferences from a perplexed and dark Phænomon, without narrowly examining the Nature and Circumstances of it, as far as they are accessible to us*.”

Some Readers would be glad to know, how far that Man is justified either in *Philosophy*, or *Humanity*, who can draw an Inference, which deeply wounds his Neighbour's Character, not from a perplexed and dark State of Things; but in Defiance of the clearest and most evident Proofs, that his Neighbour is altogether innocent? Indeed as our Author has kept pretty well up to his first setting out; so, if a poetical Justification is sufficient, I really think he is entitled to it.

— servetur ad imum

Qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.

Hor. de Art. Poet. v. 126, &c.

But he thus proceeds. — “ It is not to be dissembled by Mr. Locke's greatest Admirers, that his Method of Reasoning all along on this Subject, tends to lead weak and sceptical Men, to make these Inferences; not to say that he points out the Way to them, by hinting broadly at these Inferences himself †.” — The Gentleman who can get Leave of himself to insinuate, that Mr. Locke has broadly hinted, that the Soul may owe its Perceptivity and Life to dead Matter, in express Contradiction to what he constantly maintain'd ‡, need not scruple telling Mr. Locke's Admirers, whatever he pleases; nor will

* P. 338. † P. 338, 339.

‡ See the Vindication

those

those Admirers I believe be much surprized at it.

This Author has, in another Place well observ'd, that “ it is easy to hoist our Sails, but “ uncertain whither the Winds and Waves may “ carry us*.” And truly such Sailing may happen to be the more dangerous; since we are inform'd by a learned Writer †, that Mr. Locke would sometimes divert himself with setting Traps to catch the *Homines ad depugnandum paratos*. But whether our Author be one of those, or not, who are somewhat inclined to pick Quarrels with that Gentleman, the judicious Reader must determine for himself. Be this as it will, the Sails of this ingenious Author are still up, and Mr. Locke is closely pursued.

“ It looks, says this Gentleman, as if he not “ only thought it possible that Matter might “ think, but true that the Soul was really Matter ‡. Pray let us attend to the Passage, from whence our Author has made this wonderful Discovery. “ I grant, says Mr. Locke, that the “ Soul in a waking Man is never without “ Thought, because it is the Condition of being “ awake ||.” I presume that the being awake, and constantly Thinking when awake, are, according to Mr. Locke, two Affections of Matter, and consequently here is another broad Hint for material Souls! But then Mr. Locke adds, — “ whether sleeping without Dreaming be not an “ Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as “ Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration †.” Now if our Author had only said, that this looks as if the Soul was Matter; this would merely have pointed out a Confe-

* P. 365. in the Notes.

† Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, p. 82.

‡ P. 339.

|| B. II. C. I. § 11.

† Ibid. quence

quence of Mr. *Locke's* Supposition, which possibly he was not aware of; but to affirm, *it looks as if Mr. Locke thought that true*, which he has manifestly declared he believed was *false**; this, I may venture to say, is a Piece of *Civility*, which few Men of *Politeness* would offer to any but Mr. *Locke*. Besides we have this further Remark, — “*then it seems separate Souls may sleep.*” Ibid. It is submitted to any Person who is thoroughly *awake*, whether Mr. *Locke* be there speaking one Word of *separate Souls*; but only of the *whole Man*, the whole *Compound* of Soul and Body united in their present State? He mentions not one Syllable of *separate Souls*, or of *Immaterial Being* † [in general] which is still worse.

But where is the Offence, either against Religion or Philosophy, to suppose the Soul liable even to many Inconveniences, whilst united to the Body, and confined to a Prison; to which it will not be subject when delivered from that Prison? Does not our Author himself maintain — “It is certain that Sleep *binders* and *deadens* the active Power of the Soul ‡.” And elsewhere, — “It is true, we know that in a State of Separation the Soul must be freed from all Restraint and Impediment, because *Union to Matter* limits and confines it ||.” But Mr. *Locke* having said, that to be “always Thinking, always in Action, is perhaps the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of Things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps* †, — our Author observes, that “*God differs from his Creatures in higher Prerogatives, than that he doth not slumber nor sleep****.”

* B. II. C. 23. § 15; last Edition. † P. 341. ‡ Vol. II. p. 68. || P. 240. † B. II. C. 1. §. 10. *** Vol. I. p. 339.

Therefore

Therefore, I suppose, he cannot differ from them in this! In another Place, Mr. *Locke* having observ'd that the *Attention* of the Mind in Thinking, admits of various Degrees; and that the Mind is sometimes very *intent*, at others, very *remiss*, he only infers it is “probable that *Thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul*. Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of *Intention*, and *Remission*; but the Essences of Things are not conceived capable of any such Variation*.”

Our Author tells us here, that “this Argument is indeed specious at first View, and yet it is a very equivocal Argument, and concludes different Ways, according to the different Acceptation of the Word *Essence*. Mr. *Locke* grants that Thinking is Action, and supposes *Essence* to be the internal, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend. Now that Thinking or Action, which is a known Property of the Soul, should be the internal, unknown Constitution of the Soul, is a Contradiction; and proving the contrary, is proving what was never denied †.”

But now, notwithstanding this peremptory Declaration, in which Mr. *Locke* appears as a most *solemn Trifler*, and is charged with using a very *equivocal Argument*; — if there should happen to be some Philosophers, who esteem *actual Thinking* to be the very *Essence*, and the whole Substance of the Soul, then the *proving the contrary*, is not *proving what was never denied*.

“*Conscious Activity*, says an ingenious Writer,

* B. II. C. 19. § 3, 4. † P. 341, 342.

O

is

“ is the *Essence* of every Spirit. *Cogitative Power* is a *real Substance**. This *Power* never ceases from *actual Exercise*, and is the *very Substance* of the Soul. If the Soul ceases to *think*, what is it of the Soul that then remains existing? I confess I have no Idea of any thing that remains †.” Indeed those Writers, that Mr. *Locke* opposes, seem to use *Essence* for an *inseparable Property*‡. But whatever they understood by it, if Mr. *Locke* used it in the same Sense, how can he be supposed to *prove what was never denied*; or to take any Advantage of the *equivocal Meaning* of that Word? — But does not Mr. *Locke* call the *internal Constitution* of Things, their *real Essence*? He does so. And therefore I suppose it follows, that whilst those Gentlemen talk’d only of an *inseparable Property*, he artfully took Advantage of a *doubtful Expression*, and what they maintain’d of a *known Property*, he denied of that *unknown Constitution*, on which that *very Property* depended! Indeed the great Misfortune is, this Suspicion has nothing in the World to support it. However our Author attacks his *Fallacy* again; but first objects to his Account of *real Essence*, — “ This, says he, is not the genuine Acceptation of the Word *Essence*. A late Author hath rightly observed, that *Essence* is explained by the chief and radical Property of a thing, or all the Properties of it. — *Essence* (as the same Writer remarks) is very different from *Existence*: The *Essence*, or Nature of Things is *invariable*, and their Existence only *contingent* ||.”

* *Philosophical Essays* of Dr. *Watts*, p. 56. † P. 116. See also p. 52, 53, 164. ‡ B. II. C. 1 § 9. || P. 342.

It

It is impossible for Mr. *Locke* to please this Gentleman with regard to *Essence*. One while he explains it by a Word, that rather imports the *actual Existence* of a Thing, than its *internal Constitution*: at another, the *internal Constitution* of a Thing is not the *genuine Acceptation* of the Word *Essence*. Had Mr. *Locke* been so happy, as to hit upon *Radical Properties*, how much Trouble had he saved this ingenious Author? However, “ from this we may see the Fallacy of Mr. *Locke*’s Argument: He makes *Essence* the internal, unknown Constitution of Things; and because it is contradictory that *Thought* should be of the *Essence* of the Soul in this Sense, he infers it is not of the *Essence* of the Soul in the other Sense, or so as to be inseparable from it*.”

That Mr. *Locke* infers this, for this Reason, wants nothing but Proof. Again, Mr. *Locke*, in his Way of arguing “ takes it for granted, that if a Property doth not enter into the internal, unknown Constitution of a Substance, it is separable from that Substance; which still was the main Point to be proved; for, as has been remarked [N°. 22.] a Property which necessarily flows from the internal Constitution of any Substance, must as necessarily belong to it, as that Constitution itself †.”

Some of this Sort of *Properties*, our Author had mentioned before, such as *Divisibility*, *Figure*, and *Magnitude*‡. These evidently are the *Properties*, which Mr. *Locke* seems to take for granted are *separable* from Substance ||. If we demand, in what Part of his Works? We are, I

* *Ibid.* † P. 344, 345. ‡ P. 328. || See the *Vindication* of Mr. *Locke*, p. 62—64.

presume, to look for it *in his Way of arguing*. This has been considered before. But in the *same Place*, perhaps, this Gentleman has also found Mr. *Locke's Inference*, to wit, that *Thinking* is not of the *Essence* of the Soul, in one Sense; *because* it is *contradictory* it should be so, in another.—All Readers are not born to make the same happy Discoveries. But now, if *Thinking* be as *necessary* to the Soul, as *Divisibility*, *Figure*, or *Magnitude* is to the Body; How comes it, that an *active* Being, a *thinking* Being, and a *free* Being, are *synonymous* Terms*? Surely *Action* and *Freedom* and *necessary* Properties, are not likewise *synonymous*! Indeed the Truth is, *Thinking* does not seem to stand every where in this Writer, for the *same Idea*. Its Meaning varies according to different Occasions. Sometimes it is needful that *Thinking* and *Freedom* should be the same. At N° 23. p. 330. he speaks of *Thinking* in the Sense of being *percipient* of some *Idea* or other. At the Beginning of his N° 24, it takes up both the *Action* and *Perception* of the Soul. At N° 25, he supposes *Thinking* to be *Action*, and a known *Property* of the Soul; and before he finishes that Number, *Thinking* seems to be dwindled into a mere *necessary* Perception.

At N° 26, it is a *necessary* Property, belonging to the *Essence* of the Soul; and this he endeavours to illustrate in the following Manner.

“Figure, says our Author, is but a Property of Matter, and a variable Property; for it may be changed in the same individual Quantity; yet this variable Property *invariably* and *inseparably* belongs to Matter. So Thinking

* Vol. I. p. 203. in the Notes. † P. 345.

“ (allowing

“ (allowing it a variable Property) may invariably belong to the Soul †.”

That *Thinking*, whether it be call'd *Essence*, *Property*, or *Action*, is certainly *variable*, I believe no Man ever questioned, that could but look into his own Mind. And that it may, in some Degree or other, *invariably* [or *incessantly*] belong to the Soul, is no inconceivable Supposition. But whether what is here advanced in relation to *Figure*, will solve Mr. *Locke's* Objection, the learned Reader must determine. “The Operations of Agents, says Mr. *Locke* will easily admit of *Intention* and *Remission*; but the *Essences* of Things are not conceived capable of any such Variation*.” However our Author has found an *inseparable* Property, which is capable of *Variation*. I hope *Figure* is not a *radical* Property: Since *radical* Properties, I think, have already been pronounced *invariable*.—“*Essence*, we have been told, is the chief, and *radical* Property of a Thing, or all the Properties of it. And the *Essence* or *Nature* of Things is *invariable* †.”

And yet, if it be not as *radical* a Property as *Thinking*, what is it here brought for? But be this as it will; of what *Variation* is *Figure* capable? Is it capable of *Intention* and *Remission*? Is a Triangle a *more intense* Figure, than a Square? Or what other *Variation* is Mr. *Locke* speaking of? He does not say, that the *inseparable* Properties of Things are not conceived capable of any *Variation*. He knew certainly that the *same individual Quantity* of Paste or Wax, in any Shape, or Figure whatever, might be *varied* into a *Triangle*, a *Square*, or a *Circle*. But he says, that

* B. II. C. 19. § 4. † P. 342.

the

the *Essences* of Things (or if this Gentleman likes it better, the *essential* or *inseparable* Properties of them) are not conceived capable of any *such* Variation. And what can this relate to, but *Intention* and *Remission*? Or what Analogy is there between these, and the *Figure* of Body? But our Author tells us, ——— “ it is only the “ *Exercise* of the Power, not the *Power* itself, “ which is subject to the Variation of being *intended* or *remitted*. This doth not make the “ *Power* itself separable from the Soul*.” — Who in the Name of Wonder ever said it did? When Mr. *Locke* mentions the *Action* or *Operation* of the Soul, are we to understand by these, the *Power*, or the *Exercise* of that Power? However, even “ the *Exercise* itself of this “ Power is not separable, says our Author, from “ free or active Beings, since, as hath been “ shewn [N° 8.] such Beings are not free to “ act, or utterly to abstain from all Action, but “ to do this or that Action by a Preference †.” I presume this Gentleman will allow, that *so far* as any Being is *not free* to act, *so far* he is *no free* Being: Otherwise *Freedom* and *Necessity* will, in some Cases, be just the same Thing.

Again, “ Life itself, says our Author, consists in being percipient, in this we are necessary. And if we are percipient, we must have Perceptions, by the Terms. Thus it is very conceivable that the Soul should remit its Activity in Thinking, through all Degrees, till at length it can remit no farther, and finds itself necessary in having some Perception or other ‡.”

Well then, the Soul may remit its *Activity* in Thinking, till it finds itself only in such a

* P. 345. † P. 346. ‡ P. 344.

necessary

necessary percipient State, as *Life* itself consists in. That is, according to this Gentleman's former Definitions, till it finds itself in a State of *not Thinking*. For does not *Thinking* imply *Active Perception*, or *Activity* joined with *Perceptivity**? Is not *Thinking* the same as *Action* †? Does not *Thinking* imply the turning the perceptive Capacity from one Perception to another, by an Act of the Will ‡? Is not the Want of such a Power, the very Reason why *Brutes* are not suffer'd to be thinking Creatures, tho' they are allow'd to have Perceptions †? And therefore how can the Soul be said to think, when it has remitted its *Activity* in *Thinking*, through all Degrees, and has nothing remaining but those necessary Perceptions, in which the very *Life* of the Soul consists? However let this Gentleman have his Liberty. Let him sometimes use the Word for *Action*, or *active Perception*, and let it be synonymous with *Freedom*; especially when *Brutes* are not suffered to think. And at other Times, let the Word stand for necessary Perceptions, or be synonymous with necessary Property; yet, if by *Thinking* Mr. *Locke* principally means “ that Sort of “ Operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, where “ in the Mind is active;” as his own Words manifestly imply †; It is then submitted, whether our Author does not here acknowledge, that the Soul may so far remit its *Activity* in *Thinking*, till, in one chief Sense of the Word, it really thinks no longer?

It is true indeed, that two or three Pages beyond this he thus expresses himself, ———

* P. 190.

† P. 324.

‡ P. 203 in the Notes.

‖ P. 190.

† B. II. C. 9. § 1.

“ The

“ The Soul may *slacken* and *remit* its Activity
 “ more and more, to a certain Degree, till it
 “ can go no farther upon the Side of Inactivity:
 “ But still it must have some Perception or o-
 “ ther in *View*. And when we have come this
 “ Length, if we would endeavour to keep this
 “ *one solitary* Perception, still in view, and be
 “ no farther active, we shall find a prodigious
 “ Difficulty in it, or to speak more truly, it is
 “ impossible with all the *Care* and *Attention* we
 “ can *bestow*. Now doth not this shew us, that
 “ when we would endeavour to be inactive be-
 “ yond a certain Degree, *we encrease the Activity*
 “ by that very Endeavour*?”

If it should be now said, that this Gentle-
 man has been entirely misunderstood; and that,
 he supposes it impossible for the Soul to be one
 Moment *inactive*; but that, let it *remit* as much
 as it *can*, it must however be perpetually vary-
 ing its *Ideas*. And that the Soul can no more
 suspend the Exercise of its *active* Powers, in this
 respect, than it can prevent its *passive* *Percep-*
tions; and that all he has said about the *Thinking*
 or *Action* of the Soul being *interrupted*, *impeded*,
 or *obstructed*, must be understood in a Sense per-
 fectly consistent with the *incessant* *Action* and *Ope-*
ration of it:— If this be really so, the Que-
 stion then is, whether our Author has expressed
 himself altogether so *clearly* as might well have
 been expected from so good a Writer? But how-
 ever, let his Meaning be what it will; let it be
 allowed that he has demonstrated the *incessant*
Thinking † of the Soul, either in *one* Sense, or
 in *every* Sense whatever; yet what has our Au-


* P. 347, in the Notes. † P. 343, 344, 347—349, in
 the Notes.

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thor done by this Demonstration? Why, after
various Toil and Labour; after treating a great
 and worthy Man, as *no Man* could wish to be
 treated himself, and as *few good* Men would ever
 chuse to treat others;— he has proved the
Mistake of a certain *Hypothesis*, which, accord-
 ing to his own Confession, *is of no very great*
*Consequence in itself**!

Upon the whole, it is refer'd to the Judgment
 of every dispassionate Reader, whether, if this
 learned Author had been less liberal of his Cri-
 ticisms upon Mr. *Locke*, he would have *much* di-
 minish'd the *intrinsic* Value of his own excel-
 lent Book? And withal, whether this Gentle-
 man did not design to be understood with *some*
Exception, when he affirms in so many Words,
 that “ we *never* had a *disinterested* Examiner of
 “ other Men's Notions †?”

* P. 320. † P. 634, in the Notes.



P REFLECT-



REFLECTIONS

ON

Some Passages of Dr. WATTS'S *Philosophical Essays.*

THIS Gentleman having suggested, that Mr. *Locke* supposed *some Matter* might be *cogitative**, Notice has been already taken of it †, and the Suggestion, I presume, shewn to be entirely groundless: However, till the contrary appears, I shall leave it with what has been before observed upon it; and proceed to consider some other Objections of this ingenious Writer.

But first, the Doctor seems to think, that Mr. *Locke* is guilty of some Inconsistency with regard to *Substance*; as if he had ridiculed the Notion of it in some Places, and defended it in others. “Tho’ Mr. *Locke*, says this Gentleman, would

* P. 62. † Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 6, 7.

seem

“ seem to exclude and abandon any *general No-*
“ *tion of Substance*, as another real, physical di-
“ stinct Being, provided to support all its real,
“ or supposed Accidents or Qualities, and seems
“ to banter it by the *Indian’s unknown something*,
“ *which supports the Tortoise, which supports the*
“ *Elephant, which supports the World*; yet he too
“ often represents this Notion of *Substance* as
“ some real *unknown Thing* or Being, which
“ holds the Properties in Union, and which is
“ different from all those Things, which he calls
“ *Qualities* or *Properties*, and which supports
“ them all in Existence; tho’ he owns, *we know*
“ *it not*, and have no Idea of it: And thus he
“ seems to build again, and maintain the very
“ Notion which he before destroyed*.” And
elsewhere, “ thus we see he maintains his Notion
“ of a *general Substance*, which he had before
“ ridiculed †.”

Most certain it is, that Mr. *Locke* frequently affirms, the *Substance* of Things is unknown to us. And he justly *ridicules* all Pretences towards clearing up the Mystery, by saying it is *that*, which supports *Accidents*: Since this leaves us as much in the dark, as the *Indian’s unknown something*, which supports the *Tortoise*. But where is the Inconsistency between this, and maintaining that there must be a *Substance* for the Support of *Qualities* or *Properties*; — that this *Substance*, tho’ unknown, is distinct from such *Qualities*, and that they cannot subsist without it †?

* P. 49. See also p. 47, 48. † P. 62. This relates to p. 66. of Mr. *Locke’s* first Letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*.
‡ See B. I. C. 4. § 18. B. II. C. 13. § 18—20. C. 23. § 2, 3, 6. 23. C. 31. § 13.

P 2

Mr. *Locke*

Mr. *Locke* had been before charged, with *almost discarding Substance out of the World*: But let us just hear what he says for himself. Having quoted several Passages out of his own *Essay*, he thus remarks, — “ these, and the like “ Fashions of speaking intimate, that the Sub- “ stance is supposed *always something*, besides the “ Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Think- “ ing, or other observable Idea, though we “ know not what it is.” Again, “ as long as “ there is any simple Idea, or sensible Quality “ left, according to my Way of arguing, Sub- “ stance cannot be discarded, because all simple “ Ideas, all sensible Qualities, carry with them “ a Supposition of a *Substratum* to exist in, and “ of a Substance wherein they inhere*.” More- over, it having been objected, that his *Simile* about the *Elephant* and *Tortoise* was to *ridicule the Notion of Substance*, and the *Europæan Philosophers for asserting it*, Mr. *Locke* refers to the very Section †, on which the Charge is founded, to prove he had no such Intention: But says, those Passages were “ to shew, that though *Substance* “ did support Accidents, yet Philosophers, who “ had found such a Support necessary, had no “ more a clear Idea of what that Support was, “ than the *Indian* had of that, which supported “ his *Tortoise*, tho’ sure he was, it was some- “ thing †.”

So that now supposing, that Mr. *Locke* had at first so express’d his Sentiments, in relation to *Substance*, that it might be thought, he really design’d to *ridicule* the Notion of it, or *discard* its very Being *out of the World*; yet after he has

* First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 9, 10.
† B. II. C. 13. § 19. ‡ Third Letter, p. 379.

fo

so clearly told us his Meaning, and that he had no such Design; — what could possibly induce an ingenious Gentleman to repeat a stale Objection, which Mr. *Locke* himself, had long since answered? But the Doctor further observes, that “ if the *Substance of Body*, and the *Substance of Mind* be so much unknown, then the Sub- “ stance of Body may be the same with the “ Substance of Mind, for ought we know to “ the contrary. If we know nothing of this “ Substance, but that it is something that sub- “ sists by itself, and upholds and unites Proper- “ ties, how can we tell but that the very same “ individual Substance, may be the *Substratum*, “ or Subject both of *solid Extension* with all its “ Modes, and of *Thinking* with all its Modes, “ and may unite the Modes, or Properties of “ Body and Mind together*?”

Again, “ If this Substance or *Substratum* be “ so unknown a Thing, as Mr. *Locke* supposes, “ how can I deny any thing concerning it? or “ at least how can I be sure that God and the “ material World have not one common Sub- “ stance †?”

But now, if it can be demonstrated, as it certainly may, and as this Gentleman affirms it has been, by many learned Writers ‡, that *Matter cannot think*; does it not evidently follow, that *Thinking* can only be the proper Attribute of an *immaterial Being*? And therefore tho’ we should never know the very Substances of Things themselves; yet we may be abundantly assured, from their well known Properties, that the *Substance of Body*, is not the same with the Sub-

* P. 61. † P. 63. ‡ P. 115. He mentions particu- larly Dr. Clarke, Dr. Bentley, Mr. Grove, and Mr. Ditton.

stance

stance of Mind; and that God and the material World, neither have, nor can have, one common Substance. And besides, these Things have been fairly demonstrated by those very Men, who acknowledged their Ignorance, as to what the inmost Nature of Substance might be*. Indeed, if the very Substance of Spirit, was a Power of Thinking always in Act, as this Gentleman maintains, and if Nothing remained of the Soul, when it ceas'd to think †, the attempting to prove that the Substance of Body was not the Substance of Mind, would be only proving that actual Thinking, and a marble Statue were different Things. Nor would there, one might hope, be much Difficulty in convincing Men, that these Things were not the same.

But since the Generality of Men have been accustom'd to suppose, that Powers and Properties are one Thing, and Substance another: And since, if there really be a Substance distinct from all such Powers and Properties, the inmost Nature of it seems to be conceal'd from us; it may therefore be submitted, whether demonstrably proving that Thought and Consciousness cannot arise from a material System, be not a rational Method to convince Men, that Thinking is by no Means a Mode of Matter?

However it is still urged, that upon Mr. Locke's Hypothesis, "our own Souls may be material Beings, for ought we know, and consequently divisible and mortal ‡."

* As to the latter, see Hum. Und. B. IV. C. 10. And as to both, see Dr. Clarke's first Vol. of Boyle's Lectures, and Preface to the second. And to mention no other, see the Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*. What he thinks of our Knowledge of Substance, see Vol. I. p. 323, 324, in the Notes, and p. 328. † P. 52. 116. ‡ P. 62.

I pre-

I presume it has been shewn*, that Mr. Locke very firmly believed both the Indivisibility and Immortality of the Soul. It is true, the Doctor here only mentions the Consequence of that, which Mr. Locke supposes might be effected by Omnipotence. But will this Gentleman maintain, that the Soul, upon his own Hypothesis, is securer of Immortality, than upon that, which Mr. Locke mentions? Tho' even this, 'tis evident, he mentions only as a bare Possibility, and not as his own Opinion †. However, will the Doctor's Hypothesis better secure the Soul, than Mr. Locke's, from the Power of that Being who created it? Or can he think of any firmer Basis, to rest the Immortality of the Soul upon, than the Veracity, the Power, the Goodness and Justice of God?

The learned Author of *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, whose Zeal for Mr. Locke has been already considered, not only acknowledges, that Mr. Locke "allows the Soul is Immaterial:" But tells us, that "Mr. Locke hath well observed, that they are different Considerations, that prove the Soul immortal and immaterial ‡." And tho' that Author be as strenuous an Assertor of the Soul's Immateriality, as ever wrote in Defence of it; yet he supposes, he has shewn the Folly of those, "who, to prove the Soul mortal, think it enough, if it were shewn material ||."

How far the ingenious Dr. Watts may give into this Opinion, which is here condemn'd; and how far he may be wrong, in so doing, the learned Reader must determine.

* Vindication of Mr. Locke, p. 2—6. 9, 10, 14. † Ibid. p. 2—6. ‡ Vol. I. p. 194, 195. || P. 294. see also P. 242—245. in the Notes.

But

But now, tho' the Doctor does not mistake Mr. Locke's Meaning about the *Mobility* of Spirits*, as the learned Author, just mentioned, certainly does; yet he will not allow that *Mobility* belongs to them.

He supposes that Spirits are neither *extended*, nor have any *Relation* to Place †. That they do not properly *exist* or reside *any where*; but that it may be philosophically said, *they exist or reside no where* ‡. It is therefore no Wonder, he will not allow them a *Power to move themselves* from one Place to another. For it is certain, as he observes, that "if *Mobility* be ascrib'd to Spirits, or a *Power to change their Place*, then it "necessarily follows that *they are in a Place*||." Whereas on the contrary, if they are properly in *no Place*, or *no where*; it really seems impossible that they should move *any where*.

The ingenious Author says a great deal to support his Opinion; but I wish his *Metaphysics* are not too *abstracted* for the Generality of Readers. For tho' the Doctor tells us, that "Spirits properly belong to another Rank of Natures, another World of Beings, which require only *Activity and Consciousness*, and do not require any proper Situation to be given them, any Space to possess or *Place to exist or reside in* †;" yet how is it possible to conceive (for me I am sure it is not) that any real Being should be *active and conscious*, without being active and conscious *somewhere*? He says indeed, that "tho' a Body cannot be without Being *somewhere*; yet a Spirit, which is a conscious active Power, may have a real Existence, and yet have *no proper*

* See his *Essays*, p. 132, 147. † P. 296. ‡ P. 161, 162. || P. 147. † P. 162.

Place;

"*Place*; that is, may reside, or be situated *no where* in the Sense he has explain'd it, *i. e.* "have no Proximity of Situation to Bodies, or "fill up no supposed Dimensions of Space*." And moreover, that "our Spirits act immediately upon our Bodies, and receive Sensations "from them †."

If the Doctor had only maintain'd, that Spirits are not in *any Place*, or *any where*, in *such a Manner*, as to exclude either Body, or Spirit, from that *very Place*, I could easily, I think, have understood it; but how Spirits can *act*, and be *acted upon*, without being *somewhere*; or how they can *really exist*, as so many *Substances* ‡, and yet not be *nearer to*, or *farther from*, every finite Being in the Universe, is a Piece of refin'd *Metaphysics*, which must always be admired, even by those, who can never understand it. But Mr. Locke is again attack'd in relation to Spirits, in the following Article of *Identity*. This Gentleman says, that Mr. Locke, "having "written more intelligibly on this Subject [of "Identity] than preceding Philosophers, grows "bold, and asserts, that the Difficulty of this "Subject arises from Names ill used, rather "than from any Obscurity in the Thing itself; "and that 'tis want of Care and Attention that "has clouded and confounded the Thoughts of "Men." And then the Doctor proceeds to observe, that "in his general Scheme of *Identity*, "and *Diversify*, as well as in his particular Application hereof to *Body, Mind, Plant, Animal, &c.* he has performed with great Ingenuity." Tho' the Doctor thinks "there remain some Difficulties to remove ||."

* P. 164. † P. 162, 165, 166. ‡ P. 52, 53. || P. 295.

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The

The Reader will judge, from what has been before observ'd on Dr. *Butler's Dissertation*, whether it be not a just Remark of Mr. *Locke*, that the chief Difficulty *arises from Names ill used*.

As to Mr. *Locke's* growing *bold*, tho' it may sound a little harsh to some Readers; yet I durst say the Doctor meant nothing worse, than *valiant* or *courageous*. In which Sense, *Virgil* seems to use *audax* and *audentior**, and *Homer*, *τολμήεις*†

But Mr. *Locke* is of opinion, that Spirits, as well as Bodies, “ must each of them exclude “ any of the same Kind, out of the same Place: “ Because otherwise the Notions and Names of “ *Identity* and *Diversity* would be in vain, and “ there could be no such Distinction of Substances, “ or any thing else, one from another †.” Upon which the Doctor observes, that this “ is not “ only oppos'd by the vulgar Philosophers, “ who suppose a thousand *Minds* may be in the “ same *ubi*, but 'tis very disagreeable also with “ the juster Notion of a *Mind*, which being not “ extended and having no relation to Place, “ can neither be said to admit, or exclude Fellow “ *Minds* from the same Place †.”

As it is impossible that *Fellow Minds* should admit or exclude one another from the same *Place*, which never were in any *Place*; So it must be allow'd that Mr. *Locke's* Language is not exactly suited to the Doctor's Hypothesis.

But it is much this Author should oppose the *vulgar Philosophers*, as he calls them, to Mr. *Locke*: Since having himself deprived Spirits even of their *ubi*, which has been allotted them by several, as a more becoming Habitation than

* *Æneid*. IV. § 615. VI. § 95. IX. § 625. † *Iliad*.
x. § 205. ‡ B. II. C. 27. § 2. † P. 296.

Locus;

Locus; — moreover, having himself smiled at the *Distinction* which is made between these two Names; and withal having plainly intimated that Spirits can be in neither, but they must be *circumscribed**, in express Contradiction to the Doctrine of the *Schools*, viz. that a Spirit is only *definitivè in loco*; I say, for these Reasons, he might have been silent on this Head; since he lies equally expos'd with Mr. *Locke* to the Censure and Displeasure of those Gentlemen.

However the Doctor thus proceeds, — “ If “ *Minds* were extended, why may not two cre- “ ated *Minds* be in the same Place, and pene- “ trate each other, as well as [Mr. *Locke*] sup- “ poses God, the infinite Mind, to penetrate all “ *Minds*, and all Bodies whatsoever? Must God “ be the *same* with all *Minds*, because he pene- “ trates all *Minds*? If a Spirit be never so little “ denser than Space, 'tis Matter; and if Spirits “ be no denser than Spaces, why may they not “ penetrate each other, as well as both Space “ and Spirit are supposed to penetrate Matter? “ I thought it had been a peculiar Property of “ Matter to be impenetrable by a Being of its “ own kind. What? is Spirit, impenetrable “ by Spirit too? Can a Spirit penetrate the “ grossest Matter, and yet not penetrate that “ thin Extension of a fellow Spirit, which is “ finer than the most refined Matter, and as te- “ nuious and unsolid as Space itself, as mere “ Emptiness †?”

What a strange Metaphysician was Mr. *Locke*! He makes a manifest Difference between the *infinite Spirit penetrating* every Substance; and one *finite Spirit penetrating* another! That is, he sup-

* P. 147, 148. † P. 296.

Q 2

poses

poses that the *Omnipresence* of the Eternal and Unchangeable Creator, can occasion no Doubt concerning his *Identity*: Whereas if *finite* Spirits did not “exclude each other out of the same Place, he thinks the Notions and Names of Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such Distinction of Substances*.” Let the learned Reader judge of his Mistake. The Doctor indeed seems greatly surprized, that Mr. *Locke* should not allow an *extended, finite* Spirit to be *penetrable* by another; a Being as *unsolid* as *Space* itself: That is, if I rightly understand the Doctor, as *unsolid*, as just *Nothing* at all †.

But has not Mr. *Locke* given a Reason, why every finite Spirit should have a Place peculiar to itself?

However to this the Doctor replies, “that every Spirit is sufficiently distinguish’d from all others, by its particular Cogitations, and Consciousness ‡.”

Let us first suppose, that all the finite Spirits in the Universe were extended, and that a thousand of them penetrated each others Substance; and were thus in the Language of the *School-men* in the same *ubi*. Now, notwithstanding each would have a Consciousness of its own, and so be sensible of its particular Existence, Pains, or Pleasures; it may be ask’d, whether any one of them could distinguish its own Substance from that of another? Or whether any other finite Spirit whatever could thus distinguish? And consequently whether, as Mr. *Locke* supposes, “the Notions and Names of *Identity* and *Diversity* would not be in vain,” in such a *Jumble* of Sub-

* B. II. C. 27. § 2. † See p. 40. 116. ‡ P. 296. stances?

stances? Two Drops of Water, or two Globules of Quicksilver, would, I think, be full as *discernible* from each other, after they were incorporated, as ten thousand Spirits, who had penetrated each others Dimensions. And therefore it is submitted, whether for a proper *Distinction of Substances* of the same kind, a *Distinction of Place* be not absolutely necessary?

But now supposing these Beings to be *unextended**, and that a *Power of Thinking* is the very *Substance* of Spirit †, it would then be an odd kind of Jargon, to talk of one Spirit’s *Power of Thinking* penetrated by the *Power of Thinking* of another. So that notwithstanding this Author seems to plead so strenuously for the *Penetrability* of Spirits, ’tis plain that his own *Hypothesis* will not admit of it, any more than Mr. *Locke*; tho’ he was willing to shew what Arguments might be brought against that Gentleman. Indeed there is this Difference between the two Hypotheses, that, whilst the one will not *admit* fellow Minds into the *same Place*, the other will neither *admit* or *exclude* them ‡.

The Dr. next proceeds to observe, that Mr. *Locke* “makes the *Identity of Vegetable and Animal* Beings, to consist in a Participation of “the same continued Life by constantly fleeting “Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united “to the same organized Body ¶.” Here, says this Gentleman, “I ask Leave to remark, first, “perhaps it would be too hard to ask this Author ** to explain with great Exactness what “he means here by *Life* and *vitally*; the same

* P. 296. † P. 116. ‡ P. 296. ¶ B. II. C. 27. § 4. 5, 6. ** The Doctor here takes Notice, that Mr. *Locke* was living, when this was wrote.

“ *Life* in a Plant cannot signify the same Juice,
 “ or nutritive Particles; for it may be transf-
 “ planted from Clay to Chalk, or from a Bed of
 “ Earth to a Bottle of Water, and still ’tis the
 “ same Plant. Nor can *Life* mean the same
 “ Tubes, or the same Channels betwixt the
 “ Fibres, for they may by Degrees be obstruct-
 “ ed, and new ones found or formed, till the
 “ old are narrowed, withered, and grown im-
 “ pervious to the Juice. Nor can *Life* mean the
 “ same Method of Motion of that Juice thro’
 “ the Plant; for if you bend the Head of a
 “ Plant down to the Earth, and let its Top
 “ take Root, as may be done to Vines or Bram-
 “ bles, then cut off the old Stalk near its first
 “ Root, and the Passage of the nourishing
 “ Juice will be just contrary, and yet perhaps
 “ ’tis the same Plant still. I would ask further,
 “ when the Graft of a Pearmain has grown three
 “ Months, or seven Years, upon the Stock of a
 “ Crab, is it the same Tree? Has it the same
 “ Life, or has it not *?”

I beg Leave here first to observe,* that since we are not so happy as to have Mr. *Locke’s* Explanation of his own *Meaning*, we can only guess at it. Tho’ I will venture to believe, he would have found no manner of Difficulty in *explaining* himself, even *with great Exactness*—— But now, whatever Plant or Tree is capable of receiving Nourishment, whether from *Chalk*, or *Clay*, or *Water*, or each of them alternately; let the *old Tubes* or *Channels wither*, and *new ones* be *formed*; or let the Nourishment such Tree receives, be distributed in any manner or Direction whatever; yet whilst such Nourish-

* P. 297, 298.

ment

ment was continued, would not that Tree be said to have a *vegetable Life*? And whilst such *Life* was not interrupted by any Accident, might it not be said to be the *same Life*? And whatever was so *united* to that Tree, as to partake of that *common Life* with it, might not this be said to be *vitally united**?

And therefore, whether the *Pearmain* growing upon the Stock of a *Crab*, be esteem’d *one* and the *same Tree*, or not (in either of which Views, it may appear to different Men, according to their several *Ideas* † of a Tree) yet whilst the *Graft* and *Stock* are so *united*, as to partake of one *common Life*, might they not be said to have the *same Life*, as much as any other Tree, and its Branches?

The ingenious Author thus proceeds, ——
 “ I might say the like concerning the Life of
 “ Animals. It can’t be the same Blood, that is
 “ the *same Life*; for in a few Months perhaps,
 “ we have few of the same Particles of Blood as
 “ before; however by Dr. *Lower’s* Experiment
 “ of *Transfusion*, it may be all changed in an Hour.
 “ Nor can the same Veins, or Vessels, make
 “ the *same Life*, for they are the same when the
 “ Animal is dead, or they may be changed in
 “ Life-time. Nor is it the same Motion of the
 “ Blood and Juices, that makes the *same Life*;
 “ for individual Motion can’t be communicated
 “ to successive Parts of Matter, since ’tis perish-
 “ ing every Moment, as [Mr. *Locke’s*] second
 “ Section assures us ‡.”

Whatever that may consist in, which is call’d *Animal Life*; whether in a certain *Motion from*

* See Hum. Und. B. II. C. 27. § 4.

† Ibid. § 28, 29.

‡ P. 298.

within

within, as Mr. *Locke* supposes*; or *only in the Heat of the Heart*, as the famous *Des Cartes* maintains †; or howsoever it is kindled up by the Great Author of Nature; yet as long as any Creature enjoyed such *Life* without Interruption, tho' it be communicated to *constantly fleeting Particles*; tho' the *Blood*, the *Vessels*, and the Motion of the *Fluids* undergo never so many Alterations; yet whilst such *Life* is enjoy'd by the same Animal without Interruption, might it not be call'd the *same continued Life* ‡?

But “If a Tree, or Animal, says the Doctor be dead for some time, and by Almighty Power new Life and vital Motion be given to the same Matter, 'tis a different Life, according to [Mr. *Locke* ;] for 'tis not the same continued Life, yet it seems to be the same Plant, and the same Animal ||.”

If any thing so extraordinary should have happened, let us suppose Mr. *Locke* would have call'd one the *same* Plant, and the other the *same* Animal, *restored to Life*. If we suppose this, would so remarkable a Case any way injure his general Description either of *vegetable* or *animal Identity*?

However the Doctor afterwards approves of what Mr. *Locke* supposes it necessary to constitute the *same Man* **, and then proceeds to consider what is said of *Personal Identity*; but first he makes the following Quotation out of Mr. *Locke*, “A *Person* is a thinking intelligent Being, which has Reason and Reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking Thing in different Times and Places; which

* B. II. C. 27. § 5. † Lettre 67. p. 338. ‡ B. II. C. 27. § 6. 8. || P. 298. ** P. 298, 299.

it

“it does only by that *Consciousness*, which is inseparable from Thinking*.” “Now I question, says Dr. *Watts*, whether we may so easily agree with him in this, as a sufficient Account of what a *Person* is.

“Let us consider a little. The Words *Self*, and *Consciousness of self* refer only to the Pronoun *I*; but are not the Pronouns *Thou* and *He* personal Pronouns as well as *I* †?”

Beyond all Controversy they are; but what then? Can either *Thou* or *He* judge of another Man's *Consciousness*? If they cannot, what signifies their being *personal Pronouns*? — But the Doctor thus proceeds, — “suppose *Armando* has slain his Neighbour in the Sight of *Martys* and *Criton*, and should be seized with such a Loss of Memory afterwards, or such Distraction, as to blot out the *Consciousness* of this Action from the Mind. *Armando* then would say, *it was not I*; but may not *Martys* and *Criton* still charge him, *Thou art the Murderer*? May they not justly say, that *He* is *guilty*, and *He* should be put to Death? Are they not as good Judges of the *same Person*, as *Armando* is himself?”

If the Doctor uses *Person* here in Mr. *Locke*'s Sense, the Question then is, — are they not as well acquainted with *Armando*'s *Consciousness*, as he is himself? But if *Person* signifies any thing else; how does this Objection affect Mr. *Locke*?

Again, “what if *Armando* should deny the Fact, as having really lost all *Consciousness* of it? Is he not still the *same Person* that slew his Neighbour?” — According to Mr. *Locke*'s *Idea* of the *same Person*, he certainly is not. And why will

* B. II. C. 27. § 9. † P. 299, 300.

R

Gentlemen

Gentlemen dispute against Mr. *Locke*, without attending to the Meaning of his Words?

However, “ Does not the Witness of *Martyrs* and *Criton* declare him to be the *same Person*? ” — But if he be not the *same Person*, in Mr. *Locke*'s Sense, will all the *Declarations* in the World make him the *same*? And as to his being the *same Person* in any other Sense, what has Mr. *Locke*, in the least, to do with it?

But still, “ they know his Body to be the *same*, and according to the Laws of Nature, “ they justly infer his Soul must be the *same* also, “ whatsoever *Armando*'s Distraction might distracted concerning himself*.”

Whatever they might justly infer as to the *Sameness* of *Armando*'s Soul and Body; they could not surely infer with any Reason or Justice, that the *distracted Armando* ought now to be punished for what the *sober Armando* formerly did.

The Doctor afterwards quotes several Passages from Mr. *Locke*'s 9th and 10th Section †, where we are told, that “ in *Consciousness* alone consists *Personal Identity*. And that it is not considered in this Case, whether the *same self* be continued in the *same*, or divers Substances.— “ And that the *same Consciousness* unites distant Actions into the *same Person*, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.”— The Doctor having mentioned these, and more to the *same Purpose*, he is pleased to make the following Remark, — “ any Man that reads “ this, and knows that the Author is in doubt, “ whether Matter may not think ‡, would be “ ready to suspect that he is so very solicitous

* P. 299, 300. † B. II. C. 27. ‡ See the Vindication of Mr. *Locke*, p. 2—7.

“ to make the *same Substance* unnecessary to *Personal Identity*, that so he may maintain his supposed Possibility of Matter being made capable of Thinking, &c.*”

With Submission to the Doctor, I believe that any Man, at least most unprejudiced Men, who know that Mr. *Locke* maintains that Matter is of itself incapable of so much as *Motion* †; who know he believed that his Sensations could not be the Action of bare, insensible Matter, nor ever could be, without an *immaterial* thinking Being ‡, and who likewise know, that his Doctrine of *Personal Identity* would hold equally true (at least in his Opinion) whether the Soul was allowed to be *immaterial* or not ‖; I say most unprejudiced Men who know these Things, would, I believe, be inclined to think, that the Doctor's *Suspensions* are neither very kind, nor well-grounded. But besides, does not the Doctor's own *Hypothesis*, full as much as Mr. *Locke*'s, require that the *same Substance* should be unnecessary to *Personal Identity*? I really think it does; since *Body* is one Part of the Doctor's *Idea* of *Person* ††.

However, I suppose, the Doctor's *Hypothesis* may innocently require that, which renders poor Mr. *Locke*'s highly suspicious. Such a Misfortune is it to be a *suspected Man*!

“ But to indulge, says the Doctor no further “ *Suspensions* †.” — In my humble Opinion, he has rather indulged too many already. And I should hope, when the ingenious Author comes to review them, he will heartily wish they had not been indulged.

* P. 301, 302. † B. IV. C. 10. § 10. ‡ B. II. C. 23. § 15. last Edition. ‖ B. II. C. 27. § 16, 17, 25. †† P. 309 † P. 302.

Towards the Conclusion of his last *Essay*, he thus expresses himself, — “ To do Mr. *Locke* Justice, he acknowledges * that *the more probable Opinion is that this Consciousness* (in which “ he supposes Personal Identity to consist) *is annexed to one individual immaterial Substance †.*” Well then, since Mr. *Locke* acknowledges this, and still maintains that *Personal Identity* consists in *Identity* of *Consciousness*; this evidently shews, what has been just observed, that he thought the *Immateriality* of the Soul and his Doctrine of *Identity* were very consistent with each other.

But farther, Mr. *Locke* does not only acknowledge, “ the more probable Opinion to be, that “ this *Consciousness* is annexed to one individual immaterial Substance;” but that it “ is annexed to, [and the *Affection* of,] one individual immaterial Substance †.” Thereby plainly making it, not a mere *superadded* Property, as some might possibly suspect him; but a Power belonging to the very Nature of an *immaterial Substance*.

And therefore the Doctor should not have curtail'd this short Paragraph, when perhaps the whole was no more than necessary to take off those bad Impressions, which his Representations of Mr. *Locke* might have made upon the Reader.

This might indeed proceed only from *Haste*, or *Inattention*, or the Doctor might think that the greatest Part of the Proposition was sufficient; I would not so much as insinuate it arose from any worse Principle. But the Doctor has still more Objections to Mr. *Locke*'s Notion of *Personal Identity*.

* B. II. C. 27. § 25. † P. 311. ‡ B II. C. 27. § 25.
“ Mr.

“ Mr. *Locke*, says that Gentleman, seems to allow, that according to his Description of “ Personal Identity, two different Men may be “ one and the same Person; for in his 13th and “ 14th Sections, as well as in other Parts of this “ Chapter *, he grants that a different Spirit “ created long after, may possibly have the “ Consciousness of Actions done by a Spirit existent “ many Ages before, impress'd upon it; by this “ Means the Mayor of *Queenborough* might suppose his Soul had been the Soul of *Socrates*, “ as Section 19, and then this latter Soul or “ Spirit, or this Man, becomes the *same Person* “ with the former, and thus *Socrates* and the “ Mayor of *Queenborough* become one Person.

“ But I deny, continues the Doctor, this to be “ proper conscious Remembrance: 'Tis only a “ delusive Impression on the Mind or Fancy “ imitating the Act of Memory: 'tis a strong “ Belief of what is false. And can such a Frenzy “ be sufficient to turn two Men into one Person †?”

The Doctor having tack'd what is said in the 13th Section, concerning the *Possibility* of a *false Representation*, with what Mr. *Locke* mentions in the 19th; to wit, that if *Socrates* and the Mayor of *Queenborough* agree in the *Identity* of *Consciousness*, they are the *same Person*; he maintains that what is here call'd *Consciousness*, is only *Phrenzy* and *Delusion*. But how could this Gentleman get Leave of himself to imagine that Mr. *Locke* wou'd call *Madness* by the Name of *Consciousness*? Has Mr. *Locke* any where so much as intimated that *Phrenzy* and *Consciousness* are identical Terms? Or that *Madness* is

* Ibid. † P. 304.

essential to *Personal Identity*? He affirms indeed, that *Socrates* and the Mayor of *Queenborough* wou'd be the *same Person* in case they agreed in the *same Consciousness*. But in answer to this, the Doctor first takes it for granted, that the poor Mayor is actually in a *Pbrenzy*, and then demands, whether *such a Pbrenzy* (which I presume is the *same with Consciousness*) be sufficient to turn two Men into one Person? Mr. *Locke* surely knew full well, that *mad Men* were capable of imagining any thing whatever. But in his whole Discourse upon *Personal Identity*, which he makes to consist in *Identity of Consciousness*, I believe it will be found upon a careful Examination, that he means only such a *real Consciousness* as renders Men *justly* liable either to Rewards or Punishments for their past or present Behaviour. This is the *Consciousness* upon which, according to him, *Personality* depends; and as far as this extends, so far reaches the *Identity* of every *Person*.

“As far, says Mr. *Locke*, as any *intelligent* Being can repeat the *Idea* of any past Action with the *same Consciousness* it had of it at first, and with the *same Consciousness* it has of any present Action; so far it is the *same personal Self*.”

Can the Meaning of this be — so far as any *distracted* Being, can thro' his *Frenzy*, appropriate any Action to himself, of which he was never *truly* conscious, so far he is the *same Person*: Or in other Words, so far he is *justly* entitled either to Reward or Punishment.

But the Doctor thus proceeds, —

“Must *Domitian* be really the *same Person* with *Romulus*, if his Pride cou'd so far impress

* B. II. C. 27. § 18.

“his

“his Imagination, and impose upon his Memory, as to persuade him that he built *Rome*? Is not this contrary to all the Sense and Reason, as well as the Language of Mankind? And might not *Domitian* by the same Madness become *Ninus* and *Darius* and *Plato*, and twenty Persons as well as two*?”

One would think Mr. *Locke* had said enough in that 14th Section which the Doctor quotes, to have discouraged him from asking all these Questions, and others to the same Purpose.

Mr. *Locke* there mentions a learned and considerable Man, who was persuaded that his Soul had been the Soul of *Socrates*: But yet Mr. *Locke* will not allow him to be the *same Person* with *Socrates*, because not *conscious* of any of that Philosopher's Thoughts or Actions †.

Can we now suppose that Mr. *Locke* would own *Domitian* for *Plato*, because *Domitian* thro' Pride and Madness would be taken for him? Or that *Domitian's* Soldier (who is afterwards mention'd) was *Domitian* himself, because by a *Disorder of his Brain*, he imagin'd himself Emperor ‡. On the contrary, so far would Mr. *Locke* be from acknowledging the *mad Domitian* to be the *same Person* with *Plato*, or the *mad* Soldier to be the *same Person* with the Emperor; that he cou'd not, I presume, allow either *Domitian* or the Soldier, to be *any Person* at all: I mean in that strict Sense, in which Mr. *Locke* uses the Word. For what is it that he understands by *Person*? Is it not “a thinking, *intelligent* Being, that has *Reason* and *Reflection* ||?” Is not *Person*, according to him, a “forensic Term appropriating Actions and their *Merit*,

* P. 304, 305. † B. II. C. 27. § 14. ‡ P. 305.
|| B. II. C. 27. § 9.

“and

“ and so belongs only to *intelligent* Agents,
 “ *capable* of a Law, and Happiness and Mi-
 “ fery *?”

But does any *mad* Man whatever come within this Description? Can they properly be said to be *intelligent* Agents *capable* of a Law; or their Actions to have either *Merit* or *Demerit* belonging to them?

Again, the Doctor having mention'd Mr. *Locke's* Distinction betwixt the *same Man* and the *same Person*, he thus remarks, — “ So I
 “ may be the same Man that performed a hun-
 “ dred former Actions of Life, tho' I have en-
 “ tirely forgot them all; but I am not the same
 “ Person that performed Millions of those Acti-
 “ ons, since I have entirely forgotten a far
 “ larger Number of my Thoughts than I can
 “ recollect. Now, I wou'd only enquire whe-
 “ ther such a Distinction between *Man* and *Per-
 “ son*, is either correspondent with the Nature
 “ and Reason of Things, or with the common
 “ Language of all Men, or the accurate Ex-
 “ pressions of true Philosophy †?”

But now, if the *same Man* shou'd sometimes differ as much from himself, as the *sober Man* does from the *mad* Man; can it really be thought any Violation either of *Grammar* or *Philosophy*, or the *Nature* or *Reason* of Things, to adapt a particular Name to the one State, which shou'd not belong to the other; even notwithstanding such a particular Expression may not altogether agree *with the common Language of all Men*?

But, perhaps it may be enquired, how far the Doctor has acquitted himself in this Affair, in order to approach nearer to the *Nature* and

* Ibid. § 26. † P. 305, 306.

Reason

Reason of Things, to *common Language*, and the *accurate Expressions* of true *Philosophy*? Why, this Gentleman defines *Personal Identity* in the following Manner, — “ the *same Person*, in a com-
 “ *pleat Sense*, is the same Spirit united to the same
 “ Body, that is, in short, the *same Man**.”

This, according to the Doctor, is “ consider-
 “ ing *Personality* rather in its *philosophical* Signi-
 “ fication, [but] which yet is by no Means so
 “ very different from the more usual Meaning
 “ of it in common Life, as Mr. *Locke's* Account
 “ of it is †.”

And moreover, whilst Mr. *Locke's* is a *strange*
 “ and *novel* Opinion, [this] is much plainer in
 “ itself, and much more agreeable to the com-
 “ mon Sense of Mankind ‡.” And thus, I sup-
 “ pose, the Doctor has avoided those “ many In-
 “ conveniencies that may arise from [Mr. *Locke's*]
 “ Notion of *Personal Sameness*, even in the com-
 “ mon Affairs of human Life, as well as in Phi-
 “ losophical Science ||.”

These Inconveniences the Doctor not only apprehends to be such, “ as may utterly discour-
 “ rage our Assent to this Notion;” but he
 “ fears this Opinion, if universally received,
 “ would bring in *endless Confusions*, wherefoever
 “ the Word *Person* was introduced †.” Some
 Instances of these *Confusions* and *Inconveniences*
 the Doctor gives us, and therefore it may be
 proper to consider them.

“ According to [Mr. *Locke's*] Doctrine of
 “ *Personal Identity*, many Men, says this Au-
 “ thor, may successively or simultaneously be
 “ one Person; and thus every private Soldier in
 “ the Army of *Lewis XIV.* may become the

* P. 309. † Ibid. ‡ P. 313. || P. 307, 308. † Ibid.
 S “ same

“ same Person as *Alexander the Great*, if a general Frenzy should seize them, &c. And so any one Man may become many Persons: For if Mr. *N. Lee* the Tragedian hath a strong Impression on his Fancy, that he taught *Plato* Philosophy, then he is the same Person with *Socrates*; or that he pleaded in the Roman Senate against *Mark Antony*, then he is *Cicero*; or that he subdued *Gaul*, and made himself Master of *Rome*, then he is *Julius Cæsar*; that he wrote the *Æneid*, then he is *Virgil*; that he began the Reformation from Popery, then he is *Martin Luther*; and that he reign'd in *England* at the latter End of the sixteenth Century, and then he is the same Person with Queen *Elizabeth*.

“ On the other hand, this Doctrine seems to allow us to believe, that if *St. Paul* should irretrievably forget all the Labours and Sufferings that he underwent for the Sake of the Gospel, he would not be the same Person that fulfill'd his Apostleship so gloriously: And if *Judas* should never think again through all his future Existence, that he betray'd the Saviour of the World, he would not be the Person that committed that heinous Wickedness*.”

But now, after the Doctor has set forth the dreadful Tendency of Mr. *Locke's* Notion, in so tragical a Manner, he immediately acquaints us, that “ the Way Mr. *Locke* comes off from any terrible Consequences of these Possibilities in his 26th Section, is by applying the Word *Person* to Man only in a forensic Sense, as he is the Subject of Happiness or Misery, and is an Object of Rewards or Punishments: And in Section 13. he supposes the Goodness and

* P. 306, 307.

Justice

“ Justice of God will not suffer such extravagant Possibilities to come to pass, which may affect the Rewards or Punishments of Men; but his Equity and Truth will discover themselves in attributing proper Recompences to Men or Spirits, consider'd only as Persons, or in their Personal Identity, i. e. as conscious of their own former Actions of Vice or Virtue*.”

I don't at all wonder, that a fair Writer should give us Mr. *Locke's* Answer to these extraordinary Objections; but I really wonder, that an ingenious Writer can get Leave of himself to suffer such Objections to stand, when he has already such an Answer to them.

However the Doctor next proceeds to mention certain Inconveniences that may attend Mr. *Locke's* Notion, with respect to the common Affairs of Human Life.

“ The Word *Person*, says this Gentleman, is often used, if not most frequently, without any forensic Sense: We say, *there were five Persons present in the Room at such a Time, or I had but one Person with me, &c.* And how can we tell how many Persons were, or were not present, if the supposed Consciousness of five other Persons should place them there at that Time, and render them the same Persons? Or if the supposed Forgetfulness of the Persons really present should take away their Personal Identity †?”

It must indeed be acknowledged, that the introducing a Distinction betwixt *Man* and *Person*, either at *Balls* or *Drawing-Rooms*, or many other Places of public Resort, might be often attended with some Disorder and Confusion: but as it

* Ibid.

† P. 308.

does

does not appear that Mr. *Locke* had any such Design, or that he was for altering the *common Language* of Mankind in the *common Affairs* of *Human Life*, perhaps these last Objections might as well have been spared.

The Doctor concludes his *Essays* with this Remark, — “ *Personality* and *Sameness of Persons*, “ either in this World or the other, must not “ stand upon such a shifting and changeable “ Principle, as may allow either one Man to “ be two Persons, or two Men to be one Person, “ or any one Man or Person to become another, “ or to be really any thing but himself*.”

If this Gentleman only means, that *Personality* and *Sameness of Persons* cannot stand upon the *Principles* laid down by Mr. *Locke*, this is what every one must judge of for himself. But if he means, that *Nat. Lee*, notwithstanding his *Distraction*, is neither *Cæsar*, nor *Cicero*, nor *Luther*, nor *Queen Elizabeth*, the Doctor is entirely in the right; but then the Point to be consider'd, is, whether he be not altogether mistaken, when he supposes Mr. *Locke* to be his Antagonist?

I shall give the learned Reader no farther Trouble, than just leaving the two following Queries to his Reflections.

First, Whether it be not highly reasonable that Gentlemen should *understand* Mr. *Locke*, before they undertake to *censure* or *confute* him?

And, in the next Place, If they had always done this, whether the Number of his Opponents might not have been considerably lessen'd?

* P. 313.

F I N I S.